Galbraith on Inflation

FEBRUARY 1970
ONE DOLLAR

The Washington Monthly



The Navy Prepares for World War II

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The Washington Monthly

VOLUME TWO NUMBER ONE

FEBRUARY 1970

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Letters

Nuremberg Revisited

In its January issue, *The Washington Monthly* printed an article entitled "The Nuremberg Suggestion" by Townsend Hoopes. It purported to answer our December 4 *Village Voice* column in which we discussed some of the complex problems of wartime morality and personal accountability. While we considered answering his rebuttal in *Sports Illustrated,* in the interest of a direct exchange of views we decided to reply in the *Monthly* and the editors have kindly agreed to reprint our original article on the accompanying pages.

The most startling (and revealing) aspect of Mr. Hoopes's article was his failure to discuss the central issue raised by our column: are Americans guilty of war crimes in Vietnam? As more information about My Lai, Operation Phoenix, Free Fire Zones, U.S. bombing policy, and civilian resettlement programs come to light, it is becoming almost fashionable to admit that atrocities have been committed in Vietnam. Fixing responsibility, however—especially for high-level bureaucratic decisions—is an entirely different matter. In our luncheon discussion, Mr. Hoopes advocated punishment for any soldiers found guilty in the My Lai incident, and for any military superiors who had direct knowledge of their actions. But what of the men who conceived of the bombing of free fire zones, which Mr. Hoopes agrees produced civilian massacres equal to what allegedly happened at My Lai? Somehow it has become legitimate to speak of war crimes without war criminals.

Mr. Hoopes attributes our views to what he calls "the generation gulf." We agree (although our views were shaped by men of his generation like I. F. Stone, William Appleton Williams, and Senator George McGovern). Hoopes also argues that members of the generation "not old enough to vote for John F. Kennedy" make "judgments unshaped by historical perspective." But we note that in large part it has been that generation, unfettered by the Cold War paranoia and global ambitions of his generation, that has brought the criminality of the Vietnam war to the country's attention.

Mr. Hoopes's reputation—like those of many of the liberal policymakers of his generation—has recently been enhanced in liberal and academic circles by his openness to a kind of Cold War revisionism. But the limits of his re-evaluation of American foreign policy clearly demonstrate that he and men like him remain prisoners of their generation. Mr. Hoopes can find only one flaw in policy-making by the men who got us into this war: they were unable to perceive (in 1965 and later) that international communism was no longer the threat that they had considered it in the immediate post-war years. But this is to imply that American global interventions have been purely a response to another aggressive force, rather than the attempt to protect our dominant political and economic interests abroad. America's global adventures did not begin in 1945 (or with the Russian Revolution), nor did they end in 1968 when Mr. Hoopes and his colleagues persuaded President Johnson to cease escalating the war. Nor do we believe that such interventions (although they may take new and more "limited" forms) are likely to end as long as this country's economic and political activities continue to dominate the globe.

A further historical point: Mr. Hoopes writes that President Johnson "was not an evil man in the Hitlerian sense" and that the war "was conducted entirely within the framework of the Constitution, with the express or tacit consent of a majority of the Congress and the country until at least the autumn of 1967." While we intended no direct analogy between Hitler and Johnson, one of the most frightening lessons of Nazism, in our views, is the constitutional ascendence of a psychopath and his colleagues who enjoyed great popular support.

But more important, Mr. Hoopes makes much of the fact that the defendants in an American war-crimes trial would be decent men, "those considered when they took office to be among the ablest, the best, the most liberal men that could be found for public trust." That, of course, is the tragedy, the essence of the "banality of evil." Men acting out of some misguided ideology or following orders, never really examining the consequences of their acts. Judging them harshly does not come easily to us. Men like Bundy, Rostow, McNamara were our professors, our relatives, their children our classmates. But the very fact that these are men whose class

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and values dominate American life only increases the importance of holding them accountable.

We are not so sanguine as Mr. Hoopes about the democratic processes and their effect on the Vietnam war. Public opinion—mobilized largely by young people—may have ousted Lyndon Johnson from office, but neither major party offered the voters a peace candidate in 1968, and both his Administration and its successor have failed to end the war. Mr. Hoopes asserts that war-crimes trials are useless to discuss ("assuming that some celestial sponsor could be found") because there is no proper administrative body. We remind him that the Japanese and Germans were put to trial after World War II by (American) mortals. As Justice Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, wrote: "If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."

JUDITH COBURN
GEOFFREY COWAN
Washington, D. C.

The following is the full text of the Village Voice *column discussed in the letter above and in Mr. Hoopes's article in the January issue of this magazine:*

The War Criminals Hedge Their Bets

by Judith Coburn and Geoffrey Cowan

"The question of morality in war is very relative, very relative. Basically war is just a dirty business. The Special Forces incident took the form it did because General Abrams felt he had been lied to," President Johnson's last Undersecretary of the Air Force said recently during lunch. "And if a village had been destroyed by an air strike, killing as many people as the reported Pinkville incident, it would be written off as an unfortunate mistake."

During the last couple of months, Townsend "Tim" Hoopes, Air Force Undersecretary from late 1967 until last January, has become a minor hero of the new establishment-oriented peace movement. He has written a relatively bold book, describing the successful internal struggle to change President Johnson's war policy, which made front page news around the country when excerpts appeared in the October issue of Atlantic.

Early opponents of the war find it difficult to welcome former Vietnam policy makers like Hoopes rushing to our side, or to embrace Moratorium supporters like the vice-president of an anti-personnel bomb manufacturing company who delivered an anti-war speech on the New Haven Green on October 15. As Washington journalists this fall, we have endured endless explanations by the silent majority of politicians and former members of the Johnson regime who did not speak out publicly against the war until last spring, but now credit themselves with private misgivings all along.

Is there a new morality in the land, or are these men hedging their bets? Should we herald these Nellies-come-lately for breaking away and providing the force that may finally push us out of Vietnam, or should we remind them that they are, after all, still war criminals?

It was with these ambivalent feelings that we spent a long Friday lunch with Townsend Hoopes, a tacit supporter of the Johnson Vietnam policy from the time he joined the administration in 1965 until the Tet offensive, and later that afternoon interviewed Senator George McGovern, one of the earliest critics of the war, and one of three senators willing to support the November 15 Mobilization.

When we asked whom he thought might be indicted if war crimes tribunals were ever held for the men who had been involved in making American policy in Vietnam, Senator McGovern appeared at first to share the conventional 'war is hell' wisdom in a 'personal' experience story:

"I was a bomber pilot in World War II. One afternoon I was in a bar in Naples during my rest leave listening to some fighter pilots recount some of their experiences. One pilot said he had some extra rounds coming back from a mission, and he peeled off and shot up some Italian fishermen sitting on the bank. 'Jeez, you should have seen them fall,' he exclaimed, 'just like sitting ducks.' "

McGovern seemed, as we were, simultaneously shocked and yet not surprised by this story.

Earlier that day Hoopes had suggested that the inevitable dehumanizing effects of war legitimize individual acts of brutality. "I have nothing but the greatest sympathy for these 18-year-old boys from the Middle West," he says. "When bodies are being blown up by booby traps and the V.C. hide in women's clothing, you begin to think anyone who isn't with you is against you." It is true that for men on the battlefield, faced by death over each hill, and charges of cowardice or treason behind

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them by the generals in their bunkers, there is little reason to expect of them much moral deliberation.

According to Hoopes, however, those in the councils of government who make the decisions, which the troops must then enforce, also deliberate in a moral vacuum. "Moral questions were never discussed in policy meetings, only operational questions," he says. For example, "Bundy and McNamara were skeptical about the success of a bombing campaign against the North, but were consumed by the desire to prove to Hanoi it could not continue infiltration with impunity."

Hoopes paused, and we asked whether anyone ever brought up the question of the effect of the bombing on civilian populations. Hoopes looked surprised. "In respect to the bombing question, the effect on the population was never discussed in quite that dramatic form. As the bombing increased we sensed the moral unease here and abroad. But the question of effect was more often posed in terms of its effect on foreign countries, for example, whether Sweden might recognize Hanoi."

We soon developed a simple way of bringing out the question of accountability. We asked both Hoopes and McGovern whether they believed the lieutenant and his men who are charged with killing Vietnamese civilians in the Pinkville massacre should be tried. Both agreed that if guilty they should at least be court-martialed. Both also agreed that if a general or high commanding officer had given the order, he too should be court-martialed .But what if the Secretary of Defense had established a policy which he should have known would lead to such massacres? As the New York Times pointed out editorially, "The face-to-face shooting of civilians in a village street is not far removed morally, if at all, from the indiscriminate shelling or bombing of civilians from a distance, as happens regularly in the 'free fire zones.'" Free fire zones, of course, are part of official Pentagon Vietnam policy.

McGovern was circumspect, accepting the logic of it. "I accept the principle of the idea that people can be punished for crimes in time of war. I'd include the civilian Defense Department officially if they specifically break the Geneva accords. But the real problem is that there is no international machinery." Hoopes, however, balked at the suggestion that civilian officials be held accountable for policy leading to incidents such as Pinkville. "War crimes tribunals would be the worst thing that could happen to this country. That would amount to McCarthyism. You're proposing a system of legal guilt for top elected officials. The traditional way to deal with these top officials is to throw the rascals out."

Later, in the friendliest possible terms, he accused our "generation" of wanting to impose a totalitarian system of morality in which we insist on personal retribution against people of whom we disapprove. If the world operated on such personal standards of morality, he said, it would lead to "universal anarchy."

We argued that without some method of establishing accountability, American policy-makers would continue to commit war crimes in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1907, 1929, and 1949, and the principles established in the American-run war crimes trials in Germany and Japan. Need the American Secretary of Defense (or State or the Air Force—or indeed the President of the United States) answer finally only to his own conscience? If Tojo can be sentenced to be executed by an American war crime tribunal for leading Japan into a "war of aggression," should the only punishment for an American President be that he is voted out of office while his Secretary of Defense serves a secure term as President of the World Bank? The "anarchists" who frighten us most are those who wield the big bombs, control the courts, and assume for themselves the power to declare all their enemies outlaws.

The trials of Japanese and German leaders for war crimes, especially Nuremberg, were concerned primarily with defendants who had had some decision-making role or responsibility in the war effort. American lawyers (and the Russell war crimes tribunal, which deserves to be taken more seriously than it has been in this country) have argued that three of the Nuremberg charges, later incorporated into the 1949 Geneva agreements, are applicable to America's role in Vietnam.

The first of these is called "crimes against the peace," the argument that the U. S. and South Vietnam are responsible for aggression against North Vietnam by bombing the North. Townsend Hoopes, the Air Force Undersecretary in him speaking, said he has "nothing but the highest praise and respect for the obedience of the airmen during the bombing campaign. Over-all there was little deliberate violation of the rules and few deliberate civilian deaths." Hoopes went on to admit, "The makers of the bombing policy, McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk—the civilians—were concerned about proving a political point by the bombing, not by hitting things. But of course as soon as the bombing commenced, it opened the door for military men to advocate 'a real bombing campaign that will accomplish

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something militarily.' "

A second category of charges applicable to the U. S. role in Vietnam is "war crimes"—battlefield tactics like search and destroy missions, free fire zones, forcible transfer of civilian population, and mistreatment of prisoners. Hoopes writes in his book that the proposal he supported during the re-evaluation of Vietnam policy (held by Clark Clifford) called for cutting back the bombing of the North and substituting tactical air power for search and destroy missions in the South. When we pointed out that such a tactic might lead to even more civilian deaths because of the inevitability of accidents, Hoopes became impatient. "The important thing was to scale down bombing in the North and the use of American ground troops in the South. Involvement in any war involves immorality—particularly when that war is fought in heavily populated areas."

The third criminal charge that could be made against the U. S. would fall into the category of crimes against humanity, the allegation that certain practices in war have a cumulative effect and add up to genocide. Ellsworth Bunker, in a recent report to Congress on the refugee situation in Vietnam, writes that the fact that 65 per cent of the popular are now refugees may be misleading, since the war-torn Vietnamese are used to disruption, and "have been moving around for centuries." Hoopes describes in his book what he believes was the successful air siege that saved Khesan. "It was without question a signal triumph for the high competence and courage of professional airmen from all branches of U. S. military aviation." But, he continues, ". . . the relief of tiny Khesan had required a greater bomb tonnage than had ever been dropped on any other single target in the history of warfare, including the atomic drop on Hiroshima."

* * *

Reports to date indicate that American criminality at Pinkville (Songmy) was in some respects more monstrous even than the Nazis' at Lidice, Czechoslovakia, which served as one of the principal exhibits of German criminality at the Nuremberg trials. "In London, memories of the Nazis were inevitably invoked," Anthony Lewis wrote in his New York Times column from London on November 22. "Songmy was compared with Lidice, the Czech village destroyed by the Germans in a 1942 reprisal. But at Lidice the Nazis spared the women and children."

* * *

After the Cuban missile crisis, Leo Szilard, the late nuclear scientist who devoted himself to peace after his work helped lead to the development of the atomic bomb, wrote a letter to Rusk, Bobby Kennedy, Bundy, and others, suggesting they prepare themselves for the day when there would be war crimes trials in the U. S. for the nuclear brinksmanship they were playing. Szilard said that one of the primary difficulties in such trials was establishing the political atmosphere and conditions at the time the crimes were committed at the later date the trials were held. He offered to take affidavits from these top-officials describing in their own words the reasons for their actions. This modest proposal was designed to make them pause, perhaps, since no one could conceive that such trials would ever be held.

* * *

Robert Jackson, Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court and the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, wrote after the trials, "If certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."

* * *

What treatment should be afforded the critic who bucks the system and comes over to the other side? Townsend Hoopes is not a Rusk or a Rostow; he is now aware of the bankruptcy of our Vietnam policy. He is a man who is willing to worry over the problems of morality with two young reporters whom he may feel have no understanding of the position he was in, the battles he has fought. He is even willing to think the unthinkable, saying that "the possibility that we were on the wrong side is inherent in any disinterested examination of Vietnam." Hoopes is among those who opposed the war from within, and who, he says, along with Paul Warnke, Paul Nitze, and possibly Nicholas Katzenbach and William Bundy, would have resigned if Johnson hadn't changed United States policy in March, 1968.

Trying to get a moral fix on men like Hoopes, one thinks of the host of World War II movies in which German Field Marshal Rommel (the Desert Fox) is treated as a hero for his attempt to assassinate Hitler when it became clear that the Fuehrer's war policy was suicidal. Rommel's crimes have been absolved by Hollywood, but one wonders whether the Nuremberg judges would have been so generous.

Hoopes is honest about his late arrival in the anti-war camp. He first joined the

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administration in 1965 in a post which gave him little reason or opportunity to think carefully about the war. "When I went to the Air Force, even though it was already the fall of 1967, Vietnam wasn't uppermost in my mind. After I got there and started to have responsibility for managerial problems—comparing costs with inconclusive results—I began to focus on this fairly sharply. Then I began to find secret allies all over the Pentagon. What made dissent difficult for a long time was the insistence by the people at the top on pro forma loyalty to the policy. McNamara—whatever doubts he was said to express to the President in private—never let his subordinates know about them. He kept a stiff upper lip and so did everyone else. This also made resignation seem futile, without some outside precipitating event. Otherwise how could you explain it?"

Senator McGovern is not so impressed with most of these tales of inner bureaucratic struggles. "The record of the officials of the Johnson administration is a disgrace," he says bitterly. "I kept hearing what a great critic George Ball was, what a great man he and others were (I'm not just talking about Ball), but what did they do? They could have taken their views to the country, resigned publicly, or even spoken against the war from their positions of power and forced the President to fire them. Instead they told everyone at cocktail parties how against the war they were. Then you'd see them up on the Hill the next day defending the policy. A man who goes against his conscience is the worst of all to me. They all said they thought they had more influence inside the administration. Well, to me they just wanted to hold on to their jobs."

But once they've come over to his side, McGovern admits he's inclined to rejoice. "I'm just grateful for any support against the war."

Exploring who is responsible for Pinkville or black market profiteering may titillate us morally, but it doesn't go to the nature of the system that produced this war. Townsend Hoopes became a war critic, but primarily because Johnson's policies and those "surgical air strikes" were not successful. "Tet burst on us like a rocket," he says, "exposing the fallibility of our efforts." He holds the romantic or self-interest view of many liberals that JFK could have re-oriented Vietnam policy much quicker. Without some form of accountability, politicians can take their time, test which way the wind is blowing, and end up on the right side every time. Instead of some system of accountability, we seem to operate on a kind of reverse Nuremberg principle: we prosecute the men who execute the orders, not the ones who give them.

Can a concentration camp guard be a good man? Can a Secretary of Defense be a good Secretary of Defense? The real questions to ask about such men is how they got there, what happened to them by the time they got into a White House meeting about the war, what does it mean to the country and the world that they are in that small room making those decisions? Few declined to enter that "Vietnam situation" room, and not one man chose to leave it and tell the country what went on there. Men are still in that room poring over the maps of defeat, while other men run to and fro trying to save themselves by prosecuting others.

Recently a former aide of Robert Kennedy said wearily that only former war criminals can end the war. He may be right, and for this reason perhaps we must welcome their support. But must we offer these men honor or amnesty as well? Were they to end the war today, more than 40,000 Americans and 500,000 Vietnamese would have been killed, countless maimed, a nation destroyed. A criminal war should not be like a poker game where the players can cut their losses, shake hands, and come back to play again.

We believe that Americans, in a spirit intended to build for our future society rather than take vengeance for past crimes, must deal with those who made the policy for this war as we might wish that they expected to be dealt with when the war began. But when this government or any international body fails to develop an official way to deal with these men, then they must be dealt with unofficially. Those of us who refuse to forget must at least treat them like the thousands of Japanese who never served a term in jail, but who were forbidden to return to public life. It will be of further importance that this judgment will have been made by the people among whom they live and on whose behalf they pretended to act.

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Army Intelligence

A nation can unwittingly transform itself into a garrison state while responding to sometimes valid concerns about internal and international security. We cannot do without an effective intelligence system but we must be acutely aware that it can be a very sharp two-edged sword that can sever liberty's jugular vein.

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If security officials at any level are left on their own to define the public interest, the nature of the threat to national security, or to determine their own missions and operational procedures, America's basic liberties are jeopardized.

Over the past 20 years, our proliferated secret services have grown to enormous size and have operated without adequate and effective policy controls. This seems to have been true of the C.I.A., the N.S.A., the "Green Berets," and now, as we learn from Christopher H. Pyle's excellent article, the U.S. Army ["CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics", January, 1970].

I applaud Mr. Pyle's careful and responsible treatment of this hitherto unpublicized intelligence activity. His recommendations deserve attention and action at the highest levels of government, and Congress should launch its own investigation.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Nashville, Tenn.

Mr. Ransom, a professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, is the author of the forthcoming book The Intelligence Establishment.

Tax Resistance

Kennett Love's article on tax resistance ["Hell, No—I Won't Pay," December, 1969] pointed directly to our last alternative in protesting the war in Vietnam. I believe that the effectiveness of mass demonstrations has come to an end. We have reached what Gandhi called, "the last stage of civil disobedience." If only one hundred thousand citizens refused to pay any part of their federal taxes, the government would realize they have real trouble on their hands, namely, a militant protest by middle-class taxpayers, using the ultimate in civil disobedience, tax resistance. If a million can take to the streets, surely one hundred thousand can be organized into active tax resistance. It will be then, when we use the thing America cherishes most, MONEY, that the government will be forced to realize that it can no longer forego the democratic process as it has with the war in Vietnam.

FREDRICK C. RUF
Newport Beach, Calif.

Mr. Ruf is Orange County Chairman of the New Democratic Coalition.

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

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The Oldest Established Permanent Floating Anachronism on the Sea

by John Wicklein

The carrier admirals are worried. Several influential Senators are questioning the role and usefulness of attack aircraft carriers, the ships the admirals feel are the backbone of the Navy. So the admirals hold a briefing for one of the Senators, to show him he is wrong to question the conventional Navy wisdom on attack aircraft carriers.

"Attack carriers are very important in carrying out our foreign policy," one of the briefing officers tells the Senator. "I'll give you an example—you remember the labor riots in the Dutch Islands? We sent a carrier to stand off Curaçao, just in case it was needed. You never can tell—it just might have cooled things, and nobody had to be bothered about it."

Nobody—not the State Department, the National Security Council, certainly not the President, had to be bothered with the fact that the Navy was intervening unilaterally in the domestic affairs of a friendly country—the Netherlands.

The Senator, far from having his doubts about carriers assuaged, was horrified. The story made the rounds of the Senators and Congressional staff people who were looking into the carrier question.

Last September, a short time after this briefing, the question came before the Senate for full debate. To dramatize it, Senators Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) introduced a controversial amendment to the military-procurement appropriation bill (S2546). They proposed that $377 million for completion of the Navy's next nuclear-powered carrier, designated the CVAN 69, be held up until a thorough study could be made of the need for attack carriers. Congress had already appropriated $133 million to build the nuclear power plant for this ship. As in the case of the ABM, Mondale and Case wanted to stop the practice of appropriating these massive weapons blindly, without questioning the Defense Department's requests for them. In the debate they trig-

John Wicklein, a former reporter with The New York Times, *is an executive producer for public affairs with National Educational Television in Washington.*

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

gered, they ran into strong resistance from supporters of the military, led by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who fought chiefly against delaying completion of the CVAN 69.

Back of the Mondale-Case request for an inquiry was their conviction that:

1. The Navy is supporting an interventionist foreign policy in order to justify a large force of attack carriers in the active fleet.

2. The costs of attack carriers are exorbitant compared to their military power and utility.

3. Carriers are extremely vulnerable against a sophisticated enemy in a limited war, and absolutely useless in a nuclear war.

"Foreign policy determines defense policy," a carrier admiral told me at the Pentagon. "The attack-carrier level is determined by the requirements of national strategy derived from our foreign policy." The present policy, the Navy contends, requires a force level of 15 attack carriers.

Senator Case saw sufficient cause for alarm in the Navy's reading of foreign policy to make it one of the central issues in the debate. He asked Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee to give him a report on each time since the Korean war that an attack carrier had been ordered to a given area for a show of force or for any other foreign-policy purpose short of war. Chafee sent him a list of 42 such instances. Case then sent this list to the Secretary of State.

"Since the Department of State bears primary responsibility for the execution of foreign policy," he wrote in his covering letter, "I would assume that in each instance the decision to employ the carriers for such purpose originated in the Department." He asked for a report on the Department's role in each instance.

The reply came from William B. Macomber, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, who

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took exception to the idea that the State Department had initiated all the Navy's "shows of force."

"It is not the function of the Department of State to employ attack carriers," he wrote. "In some cases, the Department recommended a show of force or requested evacuation of U.S. nationals and then approved the method proposed to carry out the task." Then Macomber added significantly:

"Unfortunately, because of the lapse of time, we have not been able to document the [State] Department's specific role in some of the events [listed by the Navy]."

Senator Case took *that* reply to the floor. Of the 42 instances of carrier usage cited by the Navy, he told his colleagues, State could not document its involvement in 13.

The Navy reported, for example, that during a "Laotian crisis" in 1961 three attack carriers "provided U.S. presence in South China Sea" from February to April "and prepared to protect and support amphibious and airborne assault force." Yet State said it had no record of any role in the deployment.

"Nor is the carriers' freewheeling record confined to the Far East," said Senator Case. In April, 1963, because of what the Navy called "increasing Middle East tensions," two carriers provided a "U.S. presence and show of force" in the Mediterranean. Again, the State Department could find no record that it had ever been informed.

State *has* been involved in some actions, the lists revealed. In April, 1957, during a crisis in Jordan, it concurred in a show of force by two carriers in support of King Hussein. "Whether the 'show of force' was proposed by King Hussein, the Navy, or the American Embassy in Amman is not clear," Case commented.

What Case found particularly striking about the Navy's list was that the vast majority of the missions could have been accomplished by other means, whether by smaller vessels or by land-based aircraft. In most cases, the carriers were assigned simply because they were in the vicinity. The practice, said Case, "raises serious questions about the need for, and the propriety of, using attack carriers for such purposes in the years ahead." It also bolstered the suspicion that the availability of carriers suggests their use. If the Navy has the force available and intervenes with it, doesn't the Navy thereby provide its own circular justification for having the force? To go into that, Case and Mondale also suggested that the Senate hold hearings on the foreign-policy implications of the use of carriers.

State Is Skeptical

The State Department itself apparently is skeptical about the uses the carriers have been put to in the past, and the uses to which they may be put in the future. Some of the foreign-policy actions on the Navy's list "were just absurd," a senior military liaison officer at State told me. "In a number of cases, we couldn't have called on the Navy Department to help us."

An attack carrier—one of the world's largest ships—would not be required for the situations that State expects to emerge in the Seventies—insurgencies in which a U.S. military presence might be desirable offshore to protect American lives and evacuate Americans from danger. "You don't need a lot of black boxes to do that sort of thing," the man at State told me. "A simple ship can protect lives and property. The nuclear carriers are not likely to have to exercise even a small part of their capabilities in the coming decade, if they have to do anything at all."

The Navy says its carriers also support the country by "showing the flag." Case gave this interpretation of one instance from Secretary Chafee's list:

"In April of 1960, the *Bon Homme Richard* provided 'a U.S. show of flag to India'—that is a great expression, is it not?—in what the Navy described as 'first carrier visit since World War II.' "

The State Department said its role in this show could not be documented. It concedes that there might be some benefits in "showing the flag"—bolstering the confidence of a small country being pressured by a Soviet Navy presence, for in-

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stance. But that can be done by ships other than carriers; it seems a waste, somehow, to tie up more than 4,000 men and half a billion dollars in equipment to show the Indians what a big ship we have.

In weighing the Navy's role in foreign affairs, the State Department was not even thinking about an all-out war with the Soviet Union. In a nuclear war, many naval strategists believe, every one of our attack carriers would be sunk within 30 minutes.

Nor is State, apparently, thinking about another Vietnam. Rather, the Department says it is taking President Nixon at his word on the Guam Doctrine: the United States will no longer supply military manpower to an Asian ally, only military tools. This policy, presumably, extends to air strikes from attack carriers—i.e., if there are to be no U.S. ground troops in Asia, then carriers will not be needed to support them. (Besides which, their usefulness even in a situation like Vietnam is limited, as we will see later.)

The Guam Doctrine and other emerging policy decisions are leading to less U.S. military presence overseas. This would seem to presage a reduction by the Navy of its attack-carrier forces in the Seventies. But cutbacks in overseas commitments in the past have not brought about a voluntary reduction in the force level from an average of 15. Nor is the Navy volunteering cuts today. Rather, by insisting that all future carriers be nuclear-powered, and that these replace the older carriers on a one-for-one basis, it actually is *expanding* its forces. The Navy itself declares that nuclear carriers can provide nearly twice as much tactical air support as the old Essex-class carriers they would replace (and cost, not incidentally, about twice as much).

Magic Number

Dr. Desmond Wilson, Jr., an analyst at the Institute for Naval Analyses, a private think tank, contends that the criteria the Navy uses to determine force size have "little relationship to the strategic environment, the nation's defense commitments, and the weapons of the other military services." The Navy, he told me, had never got together with the Air Force to eliminate overlapping sea-based and land-based tactical air coverage. It seems to have fixed on the "magic number" of 15 for attack carriers, and tailored its mission to fit the force, rather than the other way around.

In the years since World War II, Wilson pointed out, the modal size for the attack-carrier force has been 15. (The Navy also has eight obsolescent antisubmarine carriers, but they are not counted as first-line ships.) The number 15 probably goes back to the 1921 Washington Arms Limitation Treaty. Then, the U.S. was limited to 500,000 tons in capital ships. Since the capital ship of that day was the battleship, and a battleship weighed something over 30,000 tons, the Navy permitted itself 15 battleships. And that's what it maintained, from 1921 to 1941. But in World War II, the carrier—capable of launching bombers to attack a distant enemy surface fleet—passed the battleship in importance. The carrier became the Navy's capital ship, despite the rearguard fight put up by the battleship admirals. After the war, the admirals who had commanded carriers took clear control of the Navy. *They* wanted 15 capital ships, just as the old battleship admirals had. Ever since, they have succeeded in keeping the average up, although they have had to do a lot of policy juggling to bring it off.

For most of the war, the carriers were the glamour weapons of the armed forces. But at the finish, the Air Force came up with a real grabber—an atomic bomb, delivered by long-range strategic bomber. The aviator admirals were shaken. They sweated out the realization that one atomic bomb could wipe out an entire carrier task force. But they adjusted. They came to the conclusion that, if they were to exist in an era of revolutionary new technology, the attack-carrier forces had to get a piece of the nuclear action. Against competition from the Air Force, they convinced the Administration that they should be allowed to build even *bigger* attack carriers, large enough to handle

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strategic bombers armed with nuclear weapons. And so, through the Fifties, they were away and running with their new mission as part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan for strategic nuclear bombing. In the Korean war, the carrier admirals found an additional assignment, and the force was increased to 18.

But in the Sixties it became clear that the B-52s, the Minutemen in silos, and the Polaris missile-firing submarines were far more effective strategic nuclear instruments. In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who was beginning to have doubts about the usefulness of carriers under *any* circumstances, forced the Navy to give up the carriers' SIOP role. More and more it was recognized that Polaris provided the country with a nearly invulnerable strategic nuclear deterrent force. You might think that the men running the Navy would adapt to this reality by recognizing the Polaris and its successor, the Poseidon-firing submarine, as the new capital ships of the fleet. But no—the attack carrier is the impressive ship, the prestige boat, and the carrier admirals wanted to keep them. So they became again a task group in search of a mission. No one likes to be phased out of business.

Tactical Shift

The admirals noted now that the U.S. was reducing the number of overseas air bases from which the Air Force could launch tactical air strikes in support of ground operations. Their point now became that land bases could be denied to the U.S. by politics or overrun by an enemy. But some bases are *not* subject to politics or ground attack. What bases? Attack aircraft carriers! The new carrier role was to provide *tactical* air support for our military involvements in areas where land-based air was not sufficient to carry out the task.

Again, McNamara confronted the admirals with skepticism. In a posture statement in 1965, he said the Defense Department planned to reduce the number of attack carriers by the end of the Sixties. "The increased range of land-based tactical air has reduced our requirement for forward-based power," he said. The systems-analysis people he had installed in the Pentagon added the kicker that, against land-based tactical air, sea-based tactical air could not be justified on a cost-effectiveness basis. But McNamara did not press the issue, and the admirals rode him out. The systems analysts lost, and they have since been substantially downgraded by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

Despite evidence to the contrary, the Navy found that "there are two primary overseas areas critical to the national interests where an adequate base structure under U.S. control is not currently available—the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific littorals." The Navy says these areas need the ministrations of its sea-based tactical air—from the Sixth Fleet in the Med and from the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. How many carriers are needed to give the coverage the Navy has determined is necessary? Fifteen.

To handle this mission in peacetime, the Navy says, five carriers are needed on forward station—i.e., patrolling at sea—at all times. (In crisis periods, more are sent to forward stations.) Three are regularly deployed in the Western Pacific, two in the Mediterranean. But because of the need to rotate ships between the States and overseas stations—for the morale of their crews, for overhaul and training and the like—two back-up carriers are normally required to keep one on forward station. Five X three = 15.

We are now past the end of the Sixties and into the Seventies and, so far, the Navy has made that sort of reasoning stick.

Just last fall, the Air Force submitted a report showing that, because of the greatly increased range of modern tactical jets, world coverage and striking power have in no way diminished since the closing of marginal air bases overseas. Although the bases have decreased from 119 in 1951 to 47 today, the number of Air Force tactical air wings has increased from 16 to 23 in the same period. These wings, according to the Defense Depart-

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ment, can provide ample tactical air support in any area of potential conflict—especially the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. ("The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is redundant," comments Desmond Wilson.) The Air Force report states that there are enough land bases in Europe and Southeast Asia to base all the tactical aircraft the Joint Chiefs of Staff have estimated are required to meet a major contingency in those areas.

Ah, say the admirals, but look at Korea—all the Air Force bases were overrun by the North Koreans, and tactical aircraft had to retire to Japan. Here is where the Navy's "surge" role comes into play—it can fight to protect troops while the Air Force gets its bases lined up. What if South Korea were invaded *again*?

One Point for Navy

Carrier critics concede the Navy a point on Korea, in retrospect. The carriers did provide tactical air while the Air Force regrouped. (And, to keep their hand in, they continued to do so after the Air Force came back to the peninsula.) But even here, the "surge" was hardly instantaneous. The Navy was reluctant to commit a carrier until it was reasonably sure that she would not be attacked by Red Chinese or Soviet submarines—the *Valley Forge* went into action eight days after the North Koreans invaded the South. Naval doctrine as yet says nothing about treating a carrier as expendable in a limited war. The critics also point out, somewhat wryly, that no carrier on forward station was able to "surge" to the defense of the *Pueblo* in time to prevent its capture by the North Korean Navy.

Today, because of 18 years of airplane development, planes from Japan could stay over targets in Korea just as long as Navy planes flying from carriers 200 miles off the coast. In addition, Korea is closer to Japan than South Vietnam is to Guam. And for two years our Guam-based B-52s made routine attacks on ground forces in South Vietnam.

But to get back to the post-Vietnam

Seventies. Suppose the United States *does* do what the President said in his Guam statement—pull back from its overseas military presence, especially in Southeast Asia. Won't fewer carriers be needed then?

You forget, say the carrier admirals—our *other* important mission is to provide free access of the seas in support of U.S. policy. You can't do that without attack aircraft carriers.

Sure you can, says the State Department. Freedom of the seas, in State's eyes, is the right of passage of our ships and the ships of our allies. "Nuclear carriers are not necessary for that," a State Department officer told me. "The naval vessel—any fighting ship—is the symbol of our insistence upon our right to free access to the seas."

In most instances, long- and medium-range fighter-bombers could get to any area where our free access were challenged faster than carriers could.

But what about control of the seas in a general war with the Russians—wouldn't the carriers have to protect our

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merchant shipping from the new Russian Navy? Here, State and most non-Navy analysts are in accord: it is not conceivable that a general war at sea would be fought between the Soviet Union and the United States without resort to nuclear-armed missiles—against which carriers are sitting ducks.

The foreign-policy issue raised by the Navy is a serious one, whether or not it concerns the use of attack carriers. It suggests a broader inquiry, one that the Senators challenging the carriers are much concerned about: to what extent, if any, should the country use its military forces in keeping order around the world?

Even if, after such an inquiry, you accepted the idea that the country does have the right to put on a blue coat and patrol the tough neighborhoods of the world, the question would still be: is an attack carrier the most effective squad car this cop could use?

This was the second point of the Senate debate. From their investigations, carrier opponents have come to believe that the maintenance of these ships since the Korean war is—in the face of strong evidence of their obsolescence—a $100 billion boondoggle put over on the taxpaying public. The Navy has estimated that 40 per cent of its budget goes to maintain the carrier fleet.

A Look at the Costs

A group of 80 Senators and Representatives, meeting informally under the designation Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, determined to look into the continuing costs of carrier operations. Its Military Spending Committee, headed by Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), and including Senators George McGovern (D-S.D.), Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.), Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), and Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.), estimates that the capital cost of providing enough ships to keep one carrier on forward station year round is about $5 billion. Here is a breakdown:

CVAN 69, the nuclear carrier at issue in the Senate debate, is budgeted at $510 million. The way cost overruns—oops, "cost growths"—have been going on Navy projects, the final price may be more than $700 million, sources in the Pentagon indicate. The just-completed conversion of the 25-year-old carrier *Midway* to handle modern aircraft cost the Navy $202 million through overruns. This is more than twice what the Navy paid for her in the first place (1945), and not far short of the $277 million it cost to build the latest non-nuclear carrier, the *John F. Kennedy*.

But for the sake of argument, the Military Spending Committee accepts the $510 million estimate to build a nuclear carrier. To that half billion is added $405 million to provide six guided-missile destroyers to protect her from air and submarine attack, plus another $400 million for the logistic ships to keep her operating on forward station. Subtotal: more than $1.3 billion.

If you add to this the cost of an air wing of 85 planes for the carrier, plus a proportionate share of the cost of bases for maintenance and overhaul, plus the cost of bombs and ammunition and other sundries, the capital investment in one carrier task force comes to $1.8 billion. But, the committee reminds us, the Navy normally operates two carriers in back-up roles for each one on forward station. So if you multiply the capital costs by three, you get a total of $5.4 billion. Since the Navy regularly keeps five task forces on forward station, the cost of our carrier lineup is $27 billion, exclusive of upkeep.

Senator Goldwater, however, argues that the committee came up with figures "which are not recognizable by responsible and knowledgeable people." He thinks the public is getting more for its money than the committee says it is. For most of the Vietnam war, he said, the Navy has operated five carriers in the Western Pacific alone, in addition to the two in the Med. Besides that, he pointed out, a 16th attack carrier has been added to the fleet for the duration, by taking one of the Navy's eight antisubmarine warfare carriers and converting her to an attack role.

The difference would seem to lie in "regular" practice versus "wartime" practice.

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Operating costs of keeping a single flight deck and its escort ships on forward station for one year are estimated by the Military Spending Committee at $114 million. This does not include the operating costs of the attached air wing. (Other naval analysts put the operating costs of an attack carrier alone—without its accompanying task force—as high as $115 million in the case of the *Enterprise*, the Navy's first nuclear carrier.)

Thus, using the committee's figure, operating costs for the 15-carrier fleet come to more than $1.7 billion a year, without aircraft. Carrier operations are budgeted at about three times the amount the Nixon Administration asked to support the food-stamp program to feed the poor in fiscal 1971. To provide one carrier on forward station, Senator Mondale emphasized, costs $1 billion more than President Nixon has budgeted for his widely heralded program to provide income maintenance for 22 million Americans living in poverty.

Before he left office, Charles Schultze, Director of the Budget during the Johnson Administration, was asked at a joint budget hearing if he could designate an area of military spending which in his view should have the lowest priority and which could most clearly justify a reduction. "Yes," he replied without hesitation. "A 15th aircraft carrier."

As far back as 1963, the Defense Department estimated that the country could save $1 billion a year by dropping just one carrier from the active fleet.

"Incredibly Higher" Costs

Last July 25, the Systems Analysis Branch of the Defense Department submitted a memo stating the cost of a sea-based air wing (75 to 85 planes) to be, in Senator Mondale's words, "incredibly higher" than the cost of a land-based wing. Mondale asked that the exact figures be made available to him, but the Pentagon refused, on the grounds of security. However, the Military Spending Committee gives an indication of the disparity:

New base construction in South Vietnam was performed at a fraction of the cost of carrier construction, the committee reported. An overseas base can be made ready for military use through prepackaged kits that the Air Force has developed. The total cost of the three air bases needed to accommodate one 90-plane wing of aircraft was estimated at $245 million. Operating expenses for the wing for one year was put at $39 million. This against $510 million-plus capital costs and $115 million in operating expenses for a nuclear carrier alone.

"No more costly method of keeping a limited number of airplanes at a forward base has ever been devised by the mind of man," says William W. Kaufmann of the Brookings Institution. Kaufmann, a former Defense Department consultant, is the author of *The McNamara Strategy* and an adviser to the Military Spending Committee. If you express the costs of this forward air power in cost per sortie—one plane flying one mission from a carrier—the price is extremely high, he told me. "The Navy cannot define circumstances in which these very expensive sorties will make a significant difference in a situation where we care."

In the presence of any substantial threat, he said, a carrier uses about 25 per cent of its combat complement to protect itself. (This compares with about three per cent used by the Air Force to protect land bases in the Korean war.) In the Eastern Mediterranean, where potential opposition exists, the two carriers together would be able to use only about 100 aircraft for sorties in support of Israel, should we decide to provide such support. The carriers could get off about one and a half sorties per day per aircraft, making a total of 150 flown, Kaufmann estimates. Israel, with nearly 300 attack planes, has much greater capability from land. In the Six-Day War, Israeli planes were able to get off "shuttle" sorties against Egypt, flying more than 1,000 a day.

In Vietnam, the Navy provided about 150 sorties a day from two carriers while the Air Force was flying 1,000 from land bases, Kaufmann said. He questions whether the extremely expensive, relatively small increment provided by carrier air

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off Vietnam was worth the cost. "We might just be throwing away ordnance," he said. He raised the same question about the Navy's role in Korea, where 1,000-sortie days were commonplace. In all wars since World War II, land-based aircraft have provided the bulk of the aerial attack.

The Navy tends to operate its attack carriers conservatively, reducing its capacity to provide offensive strikes, Kaufmann said. Despite its claims for a surge role, he said, the Navy has shown great reluctance to commit a carrier where there is potential for sophisticated opposition. The lateness of its arrival in Korea was one instance. And when Vietnam heated up, carriers were not sent into the Gulf of Tonkin until the Navy became convinced that the Chinese Communists were not going to come in with subs and bombers.

In fact, the celebrated "torpedo-boat attack" on a U.S. destroyer in the Tonkin Gulf, which gave President Johnson his rationale for ordering the Navy's attack carriers to launch air strikes against North Vietnam, now seems to have been a mythic, all-radar non-event.

Very Large Target

The attack carrier's vulnerability provided another persuasive argument for Senators seeking a Congressional review of its usefulness.

"The reliance upon carrier rather than land-based air is made even more questionable by the high degree of vulnerability of the carrier in light of modern weaponry," Senator Mondale said. "Carriers are vulnerable to attack by submarines, aircraft, and by ship-to-ship and air-to-ship missiles."

Rapid technical innovations have made them unusable in all but the most limited conflicts. The lethal nature of even the older missiles, such as the Soviet STYX, was demonstrated when an Egyption PT boat sank the Israeli destroyer *Elath* by firing a single STYX missile into her. The Soviet arsenal contains far more advanced anti-ship missiles, including the much-feared cruise missile, which has a range of 400 miles.

Carrier admirals are sensitive to the vulnerability charge. In response to it, they insist that an attack carrier is a very tough ship to sink. But this has yet to be tested against a modern missile. A position paper put out by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledges that "antiship missiles, whether air-, surface-, or submarine-launched, constitute the major threat to U.S. surface forces." Missiles can outrange the guns of the Navy's surface combatant ships.

"However," the admiral said, "the carrier aircraft greatly outrange even the most advanced Soviet cruise missile. Further, the launching platforms, the surveillance systems, the cruise missile itself, are all vulnerable to attack and destruction by carrier aircraft and other defensive forces."

True. But first you've got to find them. For example, you have to spot the missile-firing ship or submarine in the 500,000 square miles of ocean within range of the 400-mile cruise missile. If a carrier is hit by a conventional missile, the Navy asserts, the carrier would probably survive. But there don't seem to be any guarantees that the missile won't be nuclear-armed. In such a case, the Navy concedes rather blandly, the carrier will be destroyed. "But carriers can get around at better than 30 knots, you know, so they have a good chance of avoiding detection." About as good a chance as the Empire State Building, carrier critics remark. Our carrier task forces are shadowed by Soviet fleet units and tracked by Soviet spy-in-the-sky satellites. And it is suspected that a carrier task force is considered a big enough target on which to expend a nuclear missile.

Everyone agrees that an all-out nuclear attack isn't likely. What's to keep a carrier from being sunk or crippled by, say, a potshot from an Albanian submarine? She has a few subs, and a nasty feeling toward the United States.

Look at the record, said Admiral Moorer, in a speech to the VFW convention last August:

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"In some 50 wars or near wars since 1946, we have not lost a carrier or had one damaged owing to hostile action."

Which "50 wars or near wars" have the carriers engaged in since World War II? Senator Mondale asked the admiral in a telegram. The admiral made a list of 48 and asked Mondale to keep them classified. The Senator said he didn't see why the information should be kept from the public, so the admiral declassified all but a few.

"To be charitable to the Navy, I would say the most embarrassing incidents remain classified," Senator Mondale remarked. Then he and Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) used the list to have a field day on the floor of the Senate:

> **Senator Mondale:** . . . He says "50 wars or near wars" in which a carrier was engaged which was not lost or damaged through hostile action.
>
> **Senator Fulbright:** That is right—in 50 wars or near wars, no carrier which engaged in them was lost or damaged. This makes a great news story. Here there have been 50 wars or near wars and the carrier has gone out with flags flying and not one has been sunk—not a one, and this shows their invulnerability.
>
> **Mondale:** Or damaged.
>
> **Fulbright:** Yes, they have not even been damaged. This is Admiral Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, who makes this serious statement. I assume it is made seriously. He did not say he was talking facetiously or jokingly.
>
> Let me call attention to some of the wars in which the aircraft carrier has made such a great impression and has come through such terrific exposure of itself. One that struck my mind in particular was in Laos in 1963. "Alert—provided presence." I suppose the admiral does not know that Laos is 200 or 300 miles from the ocean. Laos is not located near any ocean.
>
> Another was the Jordan crisis in 1963 —"Alert — provided presence — surface patrol." I think that Jordan is a considerable distance away from the sea. I do not think it adjoins the Mediterranean.
>
> **Mondale:** I do not know that any carriers were sunk in that war.
>
> **Fulbright:** They were not sunk. But of course, they could not do anything. This is one of the biggest fraudulent statements I have ever seen. It pretends that carriers have been engaged in 50 wars or near wars and that they have demonstrated invulnerability because they were not harmed or sunk.
>
> Then there is the Haitian disorder. The great country of Haiti. The carrier braved the power of Duvalier and came out of it unscathed. Just think of it. Just imagine. How wonderful that is, that a carrier can brave Duvalier, who uses pompoms down there and Bowie knives.
>
> He mentions the Zanzibar riots. It says, "Alert." Here, apparently, he meant we must have participated in a war or near war so that a ship was alerted. I do not know that the ship was even in Zanzibar. Maybe the alert took place in the carrier's berth at Norfolk, Virginia, I reckon. [Laughter.]
>
> **Mondale:** In four of the 48 wars he cites, the carrier was not even there. It had been alerted and was somewhere else, but it nevertheless survived.
>
> **Fulbright:** Yes, survived. [Laughter.]

Against the admiral's list, the critical Senators might have advanced *Esquire's* list of Navy vulnerabilities since 1965. In its July, 1969, issue, the magazine listed 11 serious accidents involving attack carriers —six collisions with other ships, one grounding, and five fires aboard ship. In the fires, 181 men were killed and 25 aircraft were destroyed.

The Navy itself adds another incident —to demonstrate "the hardness of the modern attack carrier." This was the sea disaster of January 14, 1969, in which nine major-caliber bombs detonated on the flight deck of the nuclear carrier *Enterprise*. That incident killed 27 men and destroyed 15 planes. "Yet the ship could have resumed her scheduled air operations within hours, as soon as debris was cleared from the after end of the flight deck," said the Navy.

If carriers have such utility and survivability, it may be useful to look at what the Soviet Union is doing—especially since many of our military plans in other categories of defense are based on parity with the Russians. The Soviet Navy has no attack carriers at all. Missile

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cruisers, missile destroyers, high-speed missile boats, nuclear subs and attack subs, but no carriers.

In the Senate debate on withholding funds for CVAN 69, Senator Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio) struck at the heart of the matter:

"This proposed huge carrier is as obsolete now . . . as was the battleship some time back. But, of course, the big brass of the Navy did not appreciate that and did not believe it. They were proved wrong. Over the years, it has become clear that our military and naval leaders are among the last to accept changes in the nature of warfare in this space age."

Why do people in the Navy, the Congress, and the White House continue to support attack carriers when so many good arguments can be made against them? They support them because of:

- The military-industrial-governmental complex and all that that suggests for the perpetuation of a large force involving huge construction contracts;
- A sincere belief that the carriers *are* the backbone of our naval strength, and therefore a deterrent to Soviet adventurism at sea; and
- Simple chauvinism.

Carriers are big—make no mistake about that. They project the image of an American Colossus that many Congressmen and their constituents still want this country to project. It does not matter that a missile sitting in a silo in Minnesota is a far more potent instrument of foreign policy and destructive capacity. The attack carrier *looks* powerful. It can move around and be seen, both by foreigners when it sails into their ports, and by *us* when there is an open house. No one would be as impressed by a holiday tour of a missile silo—if there were such tours.

As one of the carrier opponents in the Senate remarked privately to another, "Don't ever go aboard one of those things and watch air operations at sea—you'll get so charged up by it, you'll vote for every nuclear carrier they try to slide into the pipeline."

I felt that way myself when I was in the Navy during World War II. Going aboard a carrier was exciting: this was the ship that was winning the war in the Pacific. But it was a different war.

In time, I came to realize that this was also a very dangerous piece of equipment, even during noncombat operations. Early in 1946, a World War II-style carrier fleet was assembled in the Caribbean for one last time. Three attack carriers were assigned to the operation, probably to give the admirals a chance to start thinking about what role they could find for these flattops in peacetime. In three weeks of air operations, the carriers lost 17 planes because of "routine" mishaps. One pilot ran out of fuel at sea, another made a mistake in judging the flight deck and crashed into the stern, another, unexplainedly, dived into the ocean at a 45-degree angle and went to the bottom with his plane.

Watching from the bridge of my destroyer as a plane exploded on the catapult of the carrier we were following, I was glad I had joined the surface Navy. After a day of "normal" flight operations during which we had fished a flyer out of the water, one of my friends remarked at dinner, "Carriers are fun—but they just aren't practical." We laughed. But we believed it.

Noncombat carrier accidents off Vietnam are not regularly reported in the press. But you hear about some of the crashes, and about the shipboard fires, and you suspect that, with the faster and heavier planes of today, the losses continue apace. And, you wonder, to what purpose?

Congressional Inquiry

When the Senate debate on the Mondale-Case amendment ended, carrier opponents lost their fight to delay the $377 million for completing CVAN 69. Although they might be throwing good money after bad, most Senators decided they could not chance "wasting" the $133 million already committed for the new carrier, $43 million of which had already been spent. They did agree, however, that

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a case had been made for the study the carrier opponents wanted. The Senate voted 82-0 to prohibit authorization of a fourth nuclear carrier—designated by the Navy as CVAN 70—until the Armed Forces Committees of the Senate and House complete an inquiry into the country's need for future carriers. When the military authorization bill went to conference, House supporters of the Navy tried to knock the study out of the bill. Surprisingly, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), who as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee had supported funds for CVAN 69, insisted that the study be made. The amendment stayed in the bill that finally became law.

Stennis said that he favored some reduction in the carrier force level, and that Secretary Laird had assured him the Defense Department was making its own study of the question. But the Senator is convinced of the carriers' utility:

"I think that carriers are the greatest deterrent we have, so far as keeping down trouble, being available, patrolling the seas, and going into trouble spots," he told the Senate. "Yes, it does cost a little more than the Air Force per plane. It is worth more in the particular job they do. I would not say one is better than the other. They have to complement each other if we are serious about keeping the sealanes open." The Nixon Administration apparently also thinks we should continue to build carriers. Its 1971 budget is reported to contain funds that the Defense Department programmed for beginning construction of CVAN 70.

Carrier opponents fully expect that an honest study would support their contention that the attack carrier is no longer a viable weapon. Some, notably Senator Fulbright, want no more money at all to be spent on new carriers. Others want a reduction in force level—ten is the number they talk about.

When you press the carrier admirals, you discover, deep down, that they sense a cutback coming. One of them told me that "if things simmer down" by 1974, when the third nuclear carrier is programmed to join the fleet, the Navy *might* be able to reduce the force level to 11 attack carriers. This would keep in the active fleet: the two *Nimitz*-class ships; the *Enterprise*; and eight conventionally powered *Forrestal*-class carriers. The older *Midway* and *Essex* carriers could be taken out of the attack lineup. The Navy would accede to this, he indicated, only if we continue to build nuclear attack carriers to replace the Forrestals as they reach the 30-year mark in age. Nuclear carriers are much more efficient, much more flexible.

At a recent symposium on sea power, another admiral had a comment that is pertinent: "There is nothing more useless than doing something with great efficiency that should not be done at all."

If the admirals *are* preparing a fallback position, it may be because they now find themselves stuck with their own rationale: the U.S. *is* withdrawing from its posture as policeman of the world, so fewer carriers will be needed.

That is as much as many carrier critics think they can get. Convinced that political ends are gained only by inches, through maneuvers and compromise, these Senators don't come right out and say the whole fleet of flattops should be phased out.

But why *not* say it? The attack aircraft carrier *should* be phased out. This should be done whether we decide to continue an interventionist role or whether we decide to cease present exercises overseas. Their exorbitant costs, considering the alternatives available, and their extreme vulnerability make their continued construction unjustifiable.

Life Without Carriers

This, in time, would deprive us—and the admirals—of a prestigious ship. But we have learned to live in a world without battleships. (Although, as the $40 million fiasco of de-mothballing and then re-mothballing the *New Jersey* shows, the Navy still has its regrets.)

The Navy should forget its heady love affair with air power and look again to its traditional environment, the sea. The carrier admirals, predictably, are stubborn

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about that. They see an attack on the carrier force as an attack on the Navy—their Navy. This is not so. On the admirals' way of life, perhaps, but not on the Navy. A large part of the Navy—the Polaris submarine fleet—is engaged in the extremely important function of providing a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union. And an underseas fighter force—the nuclear-powered attack submarines—provides a counter to Soviet missile subs and a deterrent to any of the more sophisticated smaller countries that might be tempted to use subs or surface vessels to harass our merchant shipping. Submarine sailors themselves complain that their branch of the service is downgraded by the officers now in charge of the Navy. The role of nuclear submarines will continue to be major as long as peace is preserved by a balance of terror.

Another prime mission of the Navy in the Seventies should be one of rescue: protection and removal of American nationals in sea-bordering countries suffering from internal disruptions; protection of merchant ships that might be challenged in peaceful passage through international waters. These are the more likely contingencies. *They* should be the concerns of a surface fleet, rather than the imaginary role induced by nostalgia for World War II and implied by the continued use of supercarriers. In a world where tensions must be reduced, the role of the Navy should be seen as defensive, not aggressive.

Dr. William A. Nierenberg, director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, thinks that, to meet the likely contingencies of the Seventies, or even the less likely one of another limited war, a different kind of surface force should be brought into being as the carriers are phased out.

He has in mind a highly mobile surge force of small vessels that can converge on a trouble spot—sea or shore—at speeds up to 100 miles an hour. In the October, 1968, issue of *Science and Technology*, he wrote that our massive capital ships are a Maginot line that has been outflanked by the introduction of antiship missiles and small, highly mobile, missile-firing craft. Faced with that, he argues, the Navy should reorganize its surface forces into smaller units that depend on speed and maneuverability as the best-known defense against missiles, subs, and planes.

The essential feature of these forces would be a "surface-effect" vessel of 1,000 to 4,000 tons (the biggest would be the size of a destroyer), capable of skimming over the waves at 50 to 100 knots in almost any kind of sea. These craft operate on the Captured Air Bubble principle, an improvement on the technique used by hovercraft, which now operate in more protected waters. Fast surface-effect vessels are now under development by the Navy. Given a commitment to push forward with such a program, 4,000-tonners could be coming down the ways by the mid-Seventies, he says.

Some could be armed with missiles, others could carry a small number of VTOL (vertical takeoff and landing) planes. Nierenberg suggests that they would operate more like Air Force squadrons, on missions of three or four days, ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 miles. They could be supplied from regular naval bases, supply ships at sea, or by another device that Nierenberg says is already under development—a floating island base, capable of being positioned anywhere in the world and maintained at costs far less than those of a carrier.

The essential point is that there are far more useful alternatives to carriers for meeting the country's overseas requirements. But it will take a high-level commitment to make a meaningful change. As a practical matter, no Congress is going to vote to scrap the newer attack carriers now in the fleet, even though that would save billions of dollars at no loss in security.

So what would we do with the attack carriers during the changeover to a missile-age Navy of submarines and highly mobile surge and rescue forces? Here is a possible scenario:

- Cancel all carriers beyond CVAN 69.
- Withdraw to U.S. bases the carriers now maintained on forward patrolling stations.

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• Bring home, as redundant, the two carriers now stationed in the Mediterranean.

• Scrap the remaining *Essex*- and *Midway*-class carriers—except the *Midway* herself; we have to think we can get *some* use out of her expensive rebuilding. (Scrap the eight antisubmarine warfare carriers as well—they are *also* obsolete.)

• Put the five oldest Forrestals in mothballs.

This brings us down to the *Midway*; the latest Forrestals (*Constellation, America*, and *Kennedy*); the *Enterprise*, and two nuclear carriers still to be completed. When these two join the fleet, the *Constellation* and *America* could be retired to mothballs. Naval analysts who favor this reduction suggest that three ships could be stationed at bases in the Pacific—one in Hawaii, one at Subic Bay in the Philippines, one at a West Coast port; and two could be stationed in the Atlantic—one at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the other at an East Coast port. Obviously, there could be other basing arrangements, should the Joint Chiefs decide there were specific areas where Naval air was still needed because Air Force tactical air might not be available in sufficient strength. (The Air Force, of course, says there are no such places.)

One or two carriers might still be used to pick up astronauts in the Seventies, if the space agency continues to use the technique of sea recovery.

Abolitionists might accuse me of a make-work program in suggesting a long-drawn-out scenario for the declining years of the carriers. But really, that is what the Navy has been doing, on and off, since World War II.

It is intrinsically difficult to get rid of a system once it exists. It may be that, in the Navy's case, change won't come until the President appoints submarine admirals to succeed carrier admirals at the top, or reaches down to promote younger men not afflicted with the glory of the carrier experience in World War II. Congress could encourage the changeover, but it would take a decision within the executive branch to bring it about.

The carrier study now being undertaken jointly by the two Armed Services Committees, and the debate that will follow its release this spring, might lead the Administration to take an interest in the problem—as a chance to make a walloping cut in the budget, if for no other reason.

Sink the Navy? Quite the opposite. Launch the Navy on a new course, one that will be useful to the country in the Seventies. ■

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What Happened

by John Kenneth Galbraith

Anyone who foresees a decline in tension between capital and labor, employer and employee, is intellectually suspect, and so it has been for a long while. The class conflict is part of our cultural heritage. Moreover, in the last two centuries a great many employers have proclaimed fulsomely a new era of good feeling in their labor relations. Many thereafter have been burned in effigy by their employees, who have regretted only the need for a surrogate.

The claim of reactionary politicians that they have eliminated labor strife, and the claim of reactionary philosophers that the interests of the worker are being cared for by God, have added similarly to the bad reputation of the prophet of labor peace.

It is in this obdurate environment that I find myself today. I am about to argue that labor-management relations have undergone a fundamental change in the heartland of the modern industrial system —the area of the large industrial corporation. The effect is to limit and even dissolve conflict where we are most accustomed to expect it. The classical class struggle at the center of our industrial life is a dwindling phenomenon. But those who feel that without conflict life would be unduly dull should be of good cheer. As tension diminishes in this part of the society, it burgeons in others.

Tension diminishes in that part of the industrial economy where large corporations bargain with strong unions. This is the classical area of conflict—that part, indeed, where socialists of a half century ago would have foreseen the ultimate facedown between capital and labor. The reason lies not with the mellowing of the trade unions, the tendency of the union with passing years to become senile as some would suggest. Unions, like all other institutions, have a life design; they are certainly not the same when old as when young. But the relevant changes occur in the corporation—and in the economy itself. Four changes have a claim on our attention.

There is, first, the transmigration of power within the corporation itself. To a point this is not subject to dispute. Power

John Kenneth Galbraith teaches at Harvard and is the author of Ambassador's Journal *and* The New Industrial State. *This article is a revision by him of a paper given before the National Tripartite Conference on Industrial Relations in Ottawa last autumn.*

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to the Class Struggle?

has been passing from the owner to the manager, from the capitalist to the corporate bureaucrat. Capitalist goals are sharply juxtaposed to those of labor. Both capitalist and worker want revenue; speaking broadly, both want the same revenue. This is a condition well calculated to induce conflict. One should not make complicated what has a simple clarity of line.

With the passage of power to the corporate bureaucracy, to what I have called the technostructure, the conflict is a good deal less stark. In degree the technostructure has the choice between allocating revenue to stockholders and to labor. There are risks of disturbance to the technostructure in underpaying the stockholder. Up to a certain size they risk a takeover. But there are also risks of disturbance in under-rewarding the unions. Peace is worth paying for.

Additionally, the goals of the corporate bureaucracy are less opposed to those of labor than to those of corporate capitalism. Growth, bringing new opportunity, promotion, prestige, and higher pay is what best rewards the technostructure. Concern for growth thus modifies the concern for profit maximization. In reliability of employment, opportunity for overtime and even, in degree, opportunity for advancement, corporate growth also rewards the worker in a way that profits do not.

The second factor reducing conflict is technology. This has numerous mitigating effects. Blue-collar are replaced with white-collar workers. White-collar workers identify themselves with the firm and do not organize. (The number of white-collar workers in the United States almost 15 years ago overtook the number in the blue-collar working force and is, of course, now far greater.) And technology converts many of the blue-collar workers who remain to sedentary operatives sitting at a console. Identification tends to be with the machine and the process rather than with a fellow working stiff. All of these changes reduce the militancy of the worker and the union man and also the number who are available to be militant. We have here a probable reason why a fair number of highly technical firms—IBM, the advanced electronic enterprises serving the Penta-

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gon, and NASA—are not even organized.

Third, we have the effect of general affluence. This may not make people less interested in income. But for the worker it does increase mobility and enlarge alternatives. For the worker who is dependent as a matter of life and death on his job, the union is the alternative to something only marginally superior to slavery. (The difference between starvation and a whip for compelling toil, as I have argued elsewhere, is mostly a matter of taste.) The compelled worker clings desperately to his union, suffers for it, rises angrily to its cause and command. It, literally, guarantees what liberty he has. The affluent worker is not similarly so driven.

Fourth and finally and most important, the Keynesian context has greatly reduced the role of the union. I need not emphasize the stress that this system places upon high employment and economic growth. Underwriting such employment and growth is a high and reliable level of aggregate demand. In the industrially developed part of the Keynesian economy, firms are large. This is a normal aspect of capital intensive production with high technology. Such firms exercise extensive control over prices; stable price and cost parameters are a requirement of highly technical, highly capitalist production. If demand is strong and reliable, differences between firm and union can usually be resolved by meeting the union demand and passing along the resulting price increase to the public. On occasion some company situation or policy will lead to resistance and a strike. The recent General Electric dispute is a case in point, but, I think, an exceptional one. Or the wage and price increase may be opposed under public pressure because it is against public policy—because it is inflationary. And this can also lead to strikes. But a wage dispute that involves public policy invokes the government or the society, not the employer, as the antagonist. It is not a conflict in the context of the classical class struggle. Nor does it raise temperatures as does a struggle over profits. The latter is a zero sum game; what one side wins the other loses. A conflict in the context of high demand and employment can leave both the employee and employer better off than before and often does.

There is a considerable vested interest in the classical labor/employer confrontation. It is something we understand; our perceptions of social matters are not so numerous that we can let go easily of those we have. The unions that deal with the large firms resist any notion that they are less vital, less embattled, that they live less dangerously than, say, half a century ago. Men concerned with labor relations do not wish to seem less heroic than their precursors. Yet the conclusion is inescapable. In the heartland of the industrial system—in the automobile, steel, non-ferrous metal, rubber, chemical, oil, petrochemical, and large-scale consumer product industries—industrial conflict has been extensively dissolved or absorbed by the system. Much as it may be regretted, it will never be the same again.

But although conflict has been greatly reduced in this part of the economic society it has reappeared or been intensified in other parts of the society. But this is not all. The very process by which tension has been absorbed in the heart of the industrial society has brought about an increase in tension elsewhere. It has exported its problem to other parts of the economy. This is a development, I venture to think, of first-rate importance. To it I now turn.

The heartland of the industrial system resolves its differences at high employment by raising prices—by passing the cost of settlement along to the public. This is to say, the cost is passed along to the public employee, the pensioner and, less dramatically, to the white-collar worker in the private sector of the economy. These all live under the price pressures emanating from the heart of the system. And there is here no similarly easy solution. There is no equally easy way by which the teacher, patrolman, fireman, civil servant can have an amicable negotiation with *his* employer and then pass the cost along to someone public. In relation to the taxpayer it is a zero-sum game. In recent years by far the most rapid in-

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crease in trade-union membership has been in the public sector. And, farm workers apart, it has been the most important area of trade-union militancy. In very large measure, this has been the result of the method by which tension has been reduced in the industrial sector.

There continues to be a feeling that unions in the public sector of the economy are somehow less legitimate than in the private sector. And there is a stronger belief, reinforced generally by law, that if they exist they should not strike. These attitudes are obsolete—and also socially damaging—and also unjust. We reduce tension in the industrial sector by passing the cost to these people. And we say it is improper, even unpatriotic for them to react. And this attitude is exceedingly damaging to the public interest. For if the public services cannot act on their own behalf their compensation will fall ever further behind. And good manpower, skills, and talent will not be attracted to these services. Schools, law enforcement, municipal services, other government services, will suffer in consequence. And this is not hypothetical. They have already suffered for precisely this reason. Few things, it seems to me, are now socially so necessary as strong trade-union organization in the public services. And organizations, except in the most extreme cases, should not be denied the use of any bargaining instrument in their own behalf. Far better occasional teachers' strikes than no teachers. Far better an occasional garbage collectors' strike than no garbage collectors. If we deny the right to strike to policemen and firemen it should only be because we have made manifestly certain that they do not need it. For here too the difference to the public between a strike and a situation in which policemen and firemen cannot be hired will eventually become rather theoretical. To thieves and arsonists it will be even more academic.

The industrial heartland does not export its tensions only to the public sector. All whose incomes respond slowly are in some degree recipients. This has something to do with the middle-class, middle-income *malaise* of our time. And in the case of both the public sector and the white-collar community it raises important questions about larger economic policy. For why should we cause trouble here by the way we settle disputes in the industrial sector?

This line of thought suggests that even at the cost of some trouble, even anguish, in the industrial heartland we should stop this export of tension (and inflation) to the rest of the economy. I believe we should. And I believe that sooner or later we will admit the need to do so. It means some system of wage and price restraint wherever strong unions bargain with strong employers in a strong market. Though many countries now accept it, the notion of an organized system of wage and price restraint is still greatly resisted by the present Administration. In part this responds to the power, including the power of suggestion, of the large corporations and the unions. They do not need it. In part the resistance is theological. There is reluctance to admit the decline of the market. This concedes economic sin. There is aversion to recognizing the role of the modern corporation and the modern union in wage and price determination. This concedes further wickedness. There is the belief, as I have elsewhere said, that God is a conservative gentleman who will not let His side down. There is the undying faith of the modern high church economist in macroeconomic measures—in fiscal or monetary policy.

This belief that fiscal and monetary policy can reconcile high employment with price stability, a belief asserted against all the force of both experience and logic, will be counted without question the most unforgivable error of the present generation of American economists. Until we agree on substituting some mechanism of public price determination of wages and prices—which I do not think need be very complicated—for unhampered determination by corporations and unions, the strongest parts of the economy will continue to export their tensions to the weakest. Or they will be kept from doing so by yet greater social injustice. That, of course, is recession and unemployment with even more damaging implications for the weaker members of the community.

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One further form of conflict is replacing the classical class struggle. It is of a very different sort.

The modern industrial heartland is highly technical, highly organized, and highly planned. It has, in consequence, a large and insistent demand for highly qualified people. This talent, not the supply of capital, not workers skilled or unskilled, diligent or otherwise, has become the touchstone of industrial success. It has brought into being everywhere in the industrial world a very large educational establishment. There is, I think, no real doubt as to the cause and effect. When capital was vital for industry we multiplied banks and savings institutions. The educational system supplied unlettered proletarians. Now that industry needs educated men, we marvel at our enlightenment.

But the ethic of the modern educational system has not yet been successfully accommodated to that of the industrial society. That ethic sets store by personality and independent thought. It celebrates the sovereignty of the individual in markets and equally in the political process. The industrial system is, in contrast, highly organized, highly bureaucratic. And so is the state that, in considerable measure, sustains it. The ethic of the industrial heartland requires the individual it has called into existence to subordinate his personality to the goals of organization and the truths of organization—to the goals and truths of General Motors, General Dynamics, and the generals who comprise the Joint Chiefs.

Here we have the foundations of the conflict that is replacing the class struggle. It comes to sharpest focus, not surprisingly, in the universities but has far wider implications. Not having to do with money, men who are identified with the classical class struggle think it frivolous, even adolescent. This is the particular and natural reaction of many unions. It is not frivolous.

The form and dimensions of this conflict—of personality with organization, of individuals with what they believe to be bureaucratic arrogance or matters ranging from environment to weaponry—is still far from clear. Its ultimate resolution is even less so. I am beginning to believe that it may eventually involve some retreat from some of the rewards of massive industrial organization—a decision, if personality is to be expressed, to subordinate or abandon some of our concern for more goods, more production, a higher standard of living. The price of an unremitting pursuit of these we may one day decide is too high to pay.

But this conflict I must, for the purposes of this article at least, put out on the plate and leave. Let me insist only as to its reality. It is not the passing neurosis of a few people in the universities. In one form or another it is the crisis of all the industrial countries. More immediately, I am persuaded, it is going to involve a very sharp reaction to bureaucratic power and bureaucratic arrogance especially as these are expressed by the large industrial corporation and its public allies. The political effort to assert other values, to protect the individual against organization, to curb organization power, to frustrate bureaucratic convenience in the private sector as in the public, will be central to our public debate and our political effort for a long time. Those who fear that life in the advanced industrial society is becoming too peaceful should relax. There is, I think, no danger.

But let me content myself with a summary reminder of two more immediate points. The industrial system eases its tension by shifting it to the public employee and to the white-collar worker. Let us be certain that we do not keep the public employee simply because he is so valuable, from defending himself and defending therewith recruitment for the services he renders. And beyond this let us cease to solve problems of labor relations in one part of the economy by exporting inflation and tension to the rest. Let us accept that no combination of conventional economic policy with prayer and incantation reconciles high employment with price stability, in what I have called the industrial heartland. There will be a price-wage or a wage-price spiral. Having recognized this and the damage that results, let us be practical and act accordingly. ■

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Spocklash: Age, Sex, Revolution

by Philip E. Slater

A curious event of the late Sixties was the popularity of the film, "The Graduate," the viewing of which became almost a ritual for a wide spectrum of middle-class youth, who went to see it over and over. It was a brilliant film, constructed almost entirely of movie clichés, but many middle-aged reviewers were disturbed by its fusion of satire and naïve romanticism. With the intolerance for ambiguity that characterizes both the generation and the genre, some critics attempted either to maintain that it was really *all* satire, or to dismiss it as basically callow.

The satire is largely associated with the more modern aspects of the film, reflecting intergenerational hostility, its sources and consequences. But the heart of the film is its celebration of the old American dream of love triumphant over culture. One might even say that it is a revival and a reformation of that Dream. Like Christianity, the Dream has always borne an almost antithetical relation to the everyday life of the society in which it is embedded, yet has still managed to dominate attitudes and even behavior within certain limited spheres. And like Christianity, the Dream became tarnished by this peculiar position in which it found itself.

Mike Nichols, the director of the film, was thus the Martin Luther of the Dream, reviving it and purifying it; clarifying, through satire, its ambiguous relation to the total culture, and restoring its original naïve form. It is of no consequence that the hero and his bride will become corrupted as time goes by. What is important is that the confrontation has taken place and Love has won, however briefly. "The Graduate," like its paler predecessors, is a ritual of purification and cleansing, a cele-

Philip E. Slater is chairman of the Sociology Department at Brandeis University. This article is excerpted from his book, The Pursuit of Loneliness—American Culture at the Breaking Point, *to be published in April by Beacon Press.* *© 1970 Philip E. Slater*

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bration of the *capacity* of feeling to triumph over pattern. The interruption of a wedding ceremony—always a popular theme in American films—is not merely a suspense gimmick. It is what the film is all about: the battle between social forms and human feeling. And it is important that human feelings should occasionally win—as important as occasional epiphanies and miracles are for religion. In our society this issue is a matter of life and death (of the society, if not the individual).

In earlier films the basic conflict was usually attenuated, revolving almost exclusively around the question of choosing the more romantic and less conventional of two prospective marital partners. The stop-the-wedding element tended to be approached either comically or in a very muted way (i.e., no disruption of the cere-

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mony). "The Graduate" moves up to its climax with cinematic clichés so densely packed that we feel we have seen the film before. Once in the church, however, we find that the years' accumulations of compromises and dilutions have been ruthlessly cut away. The hero makes no attempt to cover or mask his feelings, the ceremony is totally and irretrievably shattered, and the hero must physically battle the representatives of society's forms. In this scene the old theme is presented with a baldness so complete that it becomes new and revolutionary.

Making a Scene

When an old theme is revived in its true form, stripped of its routinizations and redefinitions, it always seems shocking. Raw and literal Christianity has this kind of impact. That "The Graduate" achieved popular success therefore implies some change in values (middle-aged people tended to object to the church scene, while most young people did not). The major change seems to me to be a strengthening of the feeling side of the human-need-versus-social-form conflict. For the older generation rituals, ceremonies, and social institutions have an intrinsic validity which makes them intimidating—a validity which takes priority over human events. One would hesitate to disrupt a serious social occasion for even the most acute and fateful need unless it could be justified in social rather than personal terms. Doris Lessing and Shelley Berman have both observed, in the case of people confronted with aircraft whose integrity has been cast in doubt, that most people would quietly die rather than "make a scene."

The younger generation experiences a greater degree of freedom from this allegiance. They do not see social occasions as automatically having intrinsic and sovereign validity. Their attitude is more secular—social formality is deferred to only when human concerns are not pressing. A well-brought-up young man like the hero of "The Graduate" would have tended, 30 years ago, to stand passively watching while his personal disaster took place—thus the church scene at that time would have seemed much less realistic (or else the hero defined as severely disturbed). Indeed, much of the older cinematic comedy made use of this meek deference—we recall the cops-and-robbers chases in which both participants would briefly interrupt their frantic efforts in order to stand at attention while the flag or a funeral procession passed by.

This change is responsible both for the character of radical protest in the Sixties and for the angry responses of older people to it. Sitting-in at a segregated restaurant, occupying a campus building, lying down in front of vehicles, pouring blood in office files, and all of the imaginative devices emerging from modern protest movements depend heavily on a willingness to make a scene—not to be intimidated by a social milieu. And this is precisely what so enrages their elders, who are shocked not so much by the students' radicalism as by their bad form. That students should be rude to a public figure is more important to their elders than that the public figure is sending their children to their deaths in an evil cause. Students faced with situations in which existing practices are having disastrous consequences (killing people, destroying neighborhoods, cheating the poor, stultifying the minds of children, starving or brutalizing people, or whatever) are skeptical when told they should at all costs go through proper channels, knowing that such channels are typically ineffectual or prohibitively slow.* To be told it is better to kill or be killed than to be rude or make a public scene arouses much youthful bitterness and disillusionment.

A part of this mistrust is unfounded. The young assume that their elders are attempting to deceive them with this talk of

* Only a year or so prior to campus disturbances at Brandeis University, a proposal for curriculum reform was passed after seven years of moving through "normal faculty procedures," and of course long after those students who had sought the change were graduated. The cynicism that this kind of event evokes in activists is nicely captured in the protest song, "It Isn't Nice."

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proper channels—that it is deliberate obstruction, since the elders know that "proper channels" are designed to negate rather than to facilitate change. But while this motive is undoubtedly present (much less consciously than the young assume), the reaction is based primarily on a horror of social uproar that the young simply do not experience and cannot comprehend. The elders' notion that radical leaders are "just trying to get their names in the papers" expresses their own bafflement at the contrast.

Yet the change is one that the elders themselves created, for it is based on child-oriented family patterns. Europeans have always felt that American parents paid far too much regard to their children's needs and far too little to the demands of adult social occasions; but Spock's emphasis on allowing the child to develop according to his own potential and needs (starting with the abandonment of the fixed schedule fad that enjoyed brief popularity in the Twenties and Thirties) focused the parents' attention on the child as a future adult, who could be more or less intelligent, creative, healthy, and personable according to how the parents behaved toward him. This was unlike the older view that the child had a fixed personality to which the parents tried to give a socially acceptable expression as best they could. The old method was based on the military drill model: you take people who are all basically different and get them to behave outwardly in a uniform manner, regardless of whether they are inwardly committed to this behavior or not. Thus there is a sharp distinction between the outer and inner spheres. The child or recruit is expected to harbor inner feelings of rebellion or contempt, so long as these are not expressed outwardly.

The new method gives much more responsibility to the parents, for they must concern themselves with inner states. They are not merely trying to make the child well-behaved—for them personality is not a given, but something the parent can mold. The parents under the old method felt they had done their job well if the child was obedient, even if he turned out dull, unimaginative, surly, sadistic, and sexually incapacitated. Spockian parents feel that it is their responsibility to make their child into the most all-around perfect adult possible, which means paying a great deal of attention to his inner states and latent characteristics. The consequence of this is what is superficially defined as greater "permissiveness," but from an internal perspective is actually more totalitarian—the child no longer has a private sphere, but has his entire being involved with parental aspirations. What the child is *not* permitted to do is to take his own personality for granted.

Under the old system, for example, the parents would feel called upon to chastise a child defined as bright but lazy, and if they forced him to spend a fixed amount of time staring at a book—whether he learned anything or lost all interest in learning—they would feel justified and relieved of all moral responsibility for him ("I don't know why he's so bad, I beat him every day"). Today parents feel required not just to make him put in time but to make him motivated to learn.

The trade-off for having his whole per-

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sonality up for grabs is that the child's needs are paid much more attention. The old method demanded the subordination of these needs to social reality: for the most casual social encounter the parents would be willing to sacrifice the child's sense of truth and fair play ("kiss the nice lady"), bodily needs ("you'll just have to wait"), and even parental loyalty ("he's always stupid and shy with strangers"). For the parent who loved him to throw him to the dogs for something so trivial as etiquette makes a deep impression on the child. He sees the parent nurturant and protective in situations that seem much more important and dangerous, why not here? Since he cannot *see* anything so important as to justify his betrayal, all social situations tend to assume a sacred, awe-inspiring, inviolate quality. Since the parents put this mysterious situation above all else, it comes to assume the same sovereignty for the child.

Facing Reality

But Spock-oriented parents, absorbed with the goal of molding the child's total character, were much less inclined to sacrifice the child to the etiquette concerns of strangers. The artist working on his masterpiece does not let guests use it to wipe their feet on. As a result, their children have grown up to feel that human needs have some validity of their own, and that social occasions are less sacred than they appeared to earlier generations. As an SDS leader observed: ". . . educational institutions exist to fit [the student] to the system and not *vice versa*, and that is a recognition that all of his careful socialization to upper-middle-class values has ill-prepared him to accept. We grew up feeling reasonably potent in influencing our personal milieu; and without our parents' deeper needs for economic and status security, we are in a much better position to challenge a society that promises to make us impotent." When parents today enjoin their children to "face reality" (by which they mean *social* reality) there is a double irony: first, because their children have become so skillful at exposing how fictional "reality" is, and second, because the parents themselves have never been able to "face" this reality but have always been stared down by it.

The hero of "The Graduate" is thus not intimidated by the wedding ceremony but wails out his pain, and the heroine, until then bewitched by social forms, is disenchanted, rescued, and redeemed. But what of the parents, who gave their children the power to confront what they are unable to resist themselves?* How do they react? In "The Graduate," they show vindictive hatred, and this also is a new departure, for in the older films the representatives of social forms are merely left open-mouthed, or slyly smiling (secretly glad), or futilely shaking their fists. But here they attack viciously and a true melee ensues. The hero fights off the mob by grabbing a large cross from the altar, beating them off with it, and then using it to bar the church door from the outside, permitting the couple to escape.

The cross incident is important for two reasons. First, the hero, by appropriating it, transforms it from a symbol of church convention and ritual to one of revolutionary Christianity, in which love takes precedence over ceremony. It is the final act of purification in the film, and it was shocking to adults who could not imagine religion being on the side of human feeling and against convention. But to young Christian activists it was not shocking at all, but a proper role for the cross to play. For was not Jesus himself impatient with traditional forms and rude to authority? Can it not be said of him that he acted in bad taste, and refused to seek reform through proper channels? Wasn't throwing the money changers out of the Temple a far more obstreperous act than occupying a building? But then Jesus was very much a Yippie, which is why he wound up in

* This unique power that parents have—to give their children attributes they do not themselves possess—is perhaps the unconscious determinant of an otherwise incomprehensible theme that appears so often in fairy tales: that of the impoverished old parent or helper who gives the hero magic gifts that could have made the giver himself wealthy and powerful but apparently did not.

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jail, Jerusalem being the Chicago of its day.

Second, the wielding of the cross exposed a peculiarity of contemporary parent-child relationships. As every moviegoer knows, one carries a cross to ward off vampires, and putting a cross on a door prevents the vampires from getting through. In "The Graduate," as in upper-middle-class America generally, parents relate to their children in a somewhat vampiresque way. They feed on the child's accomplishments, sucking sustenance for their pale lives from vicarious enjoyment of his or her development. In a sense this sucking is appropriate since the parents give so much—lavish so much care, love, thoughtfulness, and self-sacrifice on their blood bank. But this is little comfort for the child, who at some point must rise above his guilt and live his own life—the culture demands it of him. And after all, a vampire is a vampire.

We are shown this relationship at the very beginning of the film when a party is given to celebrate the hero's return from an honor-laden college career; family and friends clutch and paw him like a valuable artifact. Much of the satire throughout the film centers on this theme, perhaps best exemplified by the pool scene, in which the hero becomes a mannikin on which his father can display his affluence to his friends. The hero's struggle to shed his diving gear—to disentangle his own motivation from the vicarious aspirations of his parents—takes up the entire movie.

Mrs. Robinson

In this process Mrs. Robinson is a crucial transitional figure. Unlike the parents, she is not a crypto-vampire but an absolutely open one. She gives nothing whatever and thus induces no guilt. Nor does she want to derive any vicarious satisfaction from Ben's achievements. She wants only to feed on his youth and obtain sexual gratification from him. In this relationship—initially an expression of his Oedipal enthrallment—Ben can extricate himself from these familial entanglements, for Mrs. Robinson's cold exploitativeness enables his own motivation to separate itself out and become coherent. In shifting his interest to her daughter he moves a step further—perhaps as far as he is able. It is significant that at the beginning of this new relationship he adopts a very uncharacteristic mode of behavior—one which resembles Mrs. Robinson's—as if he were using her cold and distant personality as a lever to establish his own separateness prior to forming a serious relationship.

Before leaving "The Graduate" we should take note of the hostile reaction of older adults in the society to the cross incident, which was widely criticized as being "unnecessary" and "in bad taste." That they should pick up this issue of "taste" and ignore the meaning of the incident exemplifies a characteristic tendency toward irrelevance that exasperates their children. In the midst of a dramatic confrontation between the generations they are distracted by the unorthodox use of a religious symbol. In the midst of a dramatic confrontation between blacks and whites they are distracted by a four-letter word. In the midst of a dramatic confrontation between those who espouse and those who oppose the Vietnam war, they are distracted by the long hair of some of the participants.

The young are baffled, amused, and enraged by these bizarre responses. They alternately view the middle-aged as hopelessly detached from reality and as willfully perverse. What they overlook is the terror. The young are challenging the fundamental premises on which their elders have based their lives, and they are attacking at all of the weakest points. No one likes to admit that they have spent their lives in a foolish, evil, or crazy manner. Furthermore, the elders were always taught to lie about their feelings. They are not likely to say: "You frighten and depress us. We are afraid we have spent our lives in narrow self-aggrandizement, neglecting and brutalizing our neighbors, pursuing useless and trivial artifacts, and creating a joyless environment. It always seemed the right thing to do, but now we are a little unsure, and anyway we wouldn't know how to behave differently." Instead, they suppress their doubts and fears about themselves by refusing to

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perceive the meaning of the stimulus. When their children cry for peace or social justice they say, "don't talk dirty" or "get a haircut." This is a way of saying, "There is nothing important or disturbing going on here—this is just my child who is mischievous or careless at times—it is just a family affair" ("But Mother, I'm going to jail—I'm a political prisoner. . . ." "Well, at least they'll give you a decent haircut"). It is a desperate attempt to view the world as unchanging—to convert the deep social unrest of the day into the blank torpor of suburban life—to translate Watts into "Julia," Berkeley and Columbia into "Dobie Gillis," Chicago into "Mayberry," and Vietnam into "McHale's Navy."

This is precisely the way the parents of schizophrenic children typically respond to emotional crises of a personal kind. Lidz and his colleagues illustrate this pattern by telling of a patient who, after much struggle and resistance, finally was able to pour out her anguish and bewilderment to her parents and plead for their understanding and help. At the height of her plaintive entreaty her mother "offhandedly turned to one of the psychiatrists, tugged at the waist of her dress and blandly remarked, 'My dress is getting tight. I suppose I should go on a diet.' " The kind of communication pattern that characterizes the families of schizophrenics appears in a number of contemporary dramas, suggesting that it speaks to a much larger social phenomenon. How, for example, can matters so intrinsically trivial as hair length or apparel arouse reactions of such intensity in people who present themselves as the most sane, stable, and effective members of our society? The answer is that two incompatible processes are taking place at once: the elders are expressing anger while pretending to themselves that the causes of that anger do not exist.

The Spockian Challenge

More deeply revealing of the generational issue than "The Graduate" was the odd non-event that followed the arrest of Dr. Spock. Many people expected that the arrest, on such a basis, of a man who had been doctor, teacher, and advisor to millions of American mothers would cause a torrent of protest. Instead it was met with a profound and malicious silence.

Why did the mothers turn against their benefactor? What was Spock's impact upon American society and why did it try to revenge itself upon him? Since a man does not write a child-rearing manual as successful as this one unless it strikes extremely responsive chords in its readers, it appears that we have found yet another example of Americans raging against the consequences of their own inclinations.

Spock's book reinforced three trends in American family and child-rearing patterns: permissiveness, individualism, and feminine domesticity. The first two are patterns that have been with us for two centuries, but the last is a relatively recent (post-World-War-II) reversal of an older trend in the opposite direction. Curiously enough, it is also the only one about which Spock does not caution against excess, even in his latest edition.

Current popular discussion has centered around permissiveness, but this is due to two misunderstandings. First, it is usually assumed that permissiveness in child-rearing is a recent American development, which is quite clearly not the case. Every generation of Americans since the first landing has imagined itself to be more permissive than the previous one, while foreign visitors have resolutely refused to recognize any variation in an unremitting stream of American laxity. Second, it would be absurd in any case to blame parental permissiveness on Spock, who places great emphasis on the child's need for parental control and the importance of not letting the child become a tyrant in the home. The areas in which Spock reinforced "permissiveness" had to do not with social behavior, but with such matters as feeding schedules, toilet training, and the like. Even here he did not advance totally new approaches, but merely revived practices current in America and England prior to the middle of the eighteenth century. While I do not wish to minimize the extent to which Spock has become a *symbol* of permissiveness in

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childrearing, I think we will learn more about the nature of his impact and the reaction against him by examining the other two variables.

Pygmalionesque Fantasies

Spock's work epitomizes the old American tradition that every individual is somehow unique. Furthermore, he implicitly endorses a concept that pervades popular American thinking about education—the notion of an individual having a "potential." This potential is seen as innate, partially hidden, gradually unfolding, fluid, and malleable. The parent cannot simply coerce the child into a set uniform pattern of behavior, because it is important, given our achievement ethic, that a child realize his maximum potential, and this means taking into account present, anticipated, or fantasied characteristics of his own. The concept of potential is thus rooted in individualism and achievement ideology. It also serves, however, as a kind of compromise between biological and environmental determinism. The parent is given not clay but some more differentiated substance with which to hold an adult.

In a sense this is the worst of both worlds: the parents are given as much responsibility for the child's future development as if the child were a *tabula rasa* at birth, yet we are not allowed the freedom to warp the child in any direction desired. They must observe emergent skills and propensities and seek to unfold and maximize these. The parents are placed in the role of manufacturers, who must make the right product out of the right materials.

This is in sharp contrast to the approach of more traditional societies, in which the task of the parent is simply to get the child to fit into the existing society in some way. In such societies the intellectual and personality development of the child is left more or less to chance, while in our society this is the parent's main task. We do not feel, on the other hand, that we can adequately instill proper social attitudes (just as traditional societies feel they have no control over the child's personal development), since our society changes so rapidly that what may be proper tomorrow is unknown today.

In any case, the notion of individual differences, of special unfolding potentialities, is fundamental in Spock although the latest edition makes a modest effort to stress more universal social demands on the individual. Indeed it is curious that he talks of the need to instill social consciousness as if this were something that his previous approach failed to do (presumably because he makes no explicit mention of it in earlier editions). Yet the product of child-centered, Spockian childrearing is the most socially conscious youth America has ever known. This should warn all of us (including Spock) against the simple assumption that a deliberate push in a given direction will produce the expected outcome.

Spock is nonetheless concerned about what he feels to be our excessive child-centeredness, although he sees no escape from it: "I doubt that Americans will ever want their children's ambitions to be subordinated to the wishes of the family or the needs of our country." He suggests that the children would be happier if they did, and advises parents to stick to whatever principled guns they have. But this hardly balances the general thrust of his work. From the very beginning Spock's book has tended both to encourage Pygmalionesque fantasies in mothers and to stress the complexity of the task of creating a person out of an infant. His good sense, tolerance, humanity, and uncanny ability to anticipate the anxieties that everyday child-rearing experiences arouse in young mothers helped seduce them into accepting the implicit (and probably unintended) challenge. Underneath all of the qualifications and demurrals, most middle-class, Spock-oriented mothers believe, deep in their hearts, that if they did their job well enough all of their children would be creative, intelligent, kind, generous, honest, warm, sympathetic, happy, brave, spontaneous, friendly, and good.

It is this challenge and this responsibility that have led mothers to accept the third pattern that Spock has reinforced—feminine domesticity. For Spock makes quite explicit, even in his latest edition,

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his belief that a woman's place is in the home. He lays great emphasis on the importance and the difficulty of the task of child-rearing, and gives it priority over all other possible activities. He suggests government allowances for mothers otherwise compelled to work, on the grounds that it "would save money in the end"—thus implying that only a full-time mother can avoid bringing up a child who is a social problem. He allows reluctantly that "a few mothers, particularly those with professional training" might be so unhappy if they did not work that it would affect the children—the understanding here is that the professional training was a kind of unfortunate accident the effects of which can no longer be undone. The mother must feel "strongly" about it and have an "ideal arrangement" for child care. Otherwise Spock tries to induce guilt: "If a mother realizes clearly how vital this kind of care is to a small child, it may make it easier for her to decide that the extra money she might earn, or the satisfaction she might receive from an outside job, is not so important after all."

Although in other respects Spock merely endorses existing cultural patterns —reinforcing them or making them explicit—one could conceivably make a case for his having contributed to the postwar ultradomestication of the American female, since his book was first published in 1946 when it all began. I personally feel that the flight into the home was only a part of a general postwar retreat from the world—a flight that would have occurred even without *Baby and Child Care*. Yet Spock gave it a certain focus, and supported a set of social arrangements which is now yielding both good and bad results. I raise this point because although Spock is as American as apple pie, he has been attacked as if he had introduced some foreign element into the American socialization process. For the most part, he has been a scapegoat for the ambivalence Americans feel about their own society. Only in his emphasis on domesticity did he introduce a broad departure from the past.

American women have always had a reputation for independence. (De Tocqueville commented upon it in 1830.) The culture as a whole tends to exert a certain pressure for sexual equality, and women in the nineteenth century were not as protected as in Europe (although they were expected to guard their own chastity as vigorously as if men were guarding it for them). In frontier settings they were too important to yield much power or deference to husbands, and among immigrant groups they were often more employable than their husbands. During the present century labor-saving devices reduced the demands of the home to a minimum, education for women increased, women obtained the vote, and contraception undermined the double standard. The direction of events seemed clear.

After World War II, however, a strange phenomenon occurred. Although more women were working than ever before, this was not true for the professions. Despite more women going to college, a smaller percentage were using this education in any way. In short, while single middle-class women were becoming more and more liberated, married middle-class women were embracing a more totally domestic existence than ever before. But how was this achieved? How could educated women devote their entire lives to a task so shrunken? How could they make it fill the day, let alone fill their minds? To some extent Parkinson's Law ("work expands to fill the time available to complete it") can be relied upon in such situations, especially with the aid of the advertising industry, which continually invents new make-work chores and new standards of domestic perfection. Television also fills many gaps.

Motherhood Magnified

But the main factor facilitating the ultradomestication of the middle-class American female was the magnification of the child-rearing role. Child-rearing is not a full-time job at any age in and of itself. In every other society throughout history women have been busy with other tasks, and reared their children as a kind of parallel activity. The idea of devoting the

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better part of one's day to child care seldom occurred to anyone because few women ever had time for it before, and when they did they usually turned the job over to a servant. Occasionally someone fiercely determined to produce a genius would devote many hours a day trying to teach an infant Greek, or whatever, but these were eccentricities. In our society it is as if every middle-class parent were determined to rear a John Stuart Mill; it turns one a bit queasy to see them walking about with signs on them so their three-year-olds will learn to read, or complaining that their children are not learning enough in nursery school.

This is not to say that child care *cannot* fill a day. There have been many social inventions that have successfully filled the time gaps created by home appliances. The modern suburban home is neither built nor equipped in a manner that allows for the comfortable or healthy management of an 18-month-old child. Living in the suburbs also involves the mother in constantly driving her children about from one activity to another. Anyone could add to the list of anomalies created by our being a child-oriented society in the face of a technological environment that is essentially child-antagonistic or at least child-alien. One has only to see a village community in which women work and socialize in groups with children playing nearby, also in groups, supervised by the older ones, or by some of the mothers on a haphazardly shared basis, to realize what is awkward about the domestic role in America. Because the American mother is isolated, she can engage in only one of these three activities at a time—with effort, two. Even taken together they hardly constitute a satisfying occupation for a civilized woman.

But the most important factor here is that the American wife has accepted the Spockian challenge. She has been told: "You have the capacity to rear a genius, a masterpiece. Such an activity is the most important thing you can do and should therefore rightfully absorb all of your time and energy." Given such an attitude it is relatively easy to expand child rearing into a full-time job. For although Spock has many sensible passages about not martyring oneself to one's children ("needless self-sacrifice sours everybody"), the temptation to do so is enormous given the fact that there is so little else. In all the tedium and meaninglessness of her domestic chores this is the only area that is important enough to be worthy of her attention. We are a product-oriented society, and she has been given the opportunity to turn out a really outstanding product.

Unfortunately, however, there really isn't that much she can do to bring about this end. At first the child sleeps most of the time, and later he spends more and more time amusing himself or playing with other children. It is not particularly helpful to waken a sleeping infant, and parents are not very good playmates for older children. The only way she can feel that she is putting a proper amount of effort into the task is by cultivating the child's natural entropic tendencies to make more housework for herself; or by upsetting and then comforting the child so she can flex her nurturant and therapeutic skills. Since she really doesn't know how to create an outstanding adult and perhaps recognizes, deep in some uncorrupted sanctuary of good sense, that the more actively she seeks it the less likely she is to attain it, the only time she will feel she is engaged in her primary task is when she is meeting minor crises. Naturally this produces a great temptation to induce such crises, indirectly and, of course, without conscious intent.

The frequent jovial references to the multiplicity of roles played by housewives in our society serve to mask the fact that the housewife is a nobody. Another custom with a similar function is the laughing narration of the events of a particularly chaotic day, in which one minor disaster follows hard upon another, or several occur simultaneously (". . . and there I was, the baby in one hand, the phone and doorbell both ringing . . ."). These sagas are enjoyed because they conceal the fundamental vacuity of the housewife's existence. Saying "everything happened at once" is an antidote to the knowledge that nothing ever happens, really.

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Solitary Confinement

The emotional and intellectual poverty of the housewife's role is nicely expressed in the almost universal complaint: "I get to talking baby talk with no one around all day but the children." There are societies in which the domestic role works, but in those societies the housewife is not isolated. She is either part of a large extended family household in which domestic activities are a communal effort, or participates in a tightly-knit village community, or both. The idea of imprisoning each woman alone in a small, self-contained, and architecturally isolating dwelling is a modern invention, dependent upon an advanced technology. In Moslem societies, for example, the wife may be a prisoner but she is at least not in solitary confinement. In our society the housewife may move about freely, but since she has nowhere to go and is not a part of anything anyway her prison needs no walls.

This is in striking contrast to her premarital life, if she is a college graduate. In college she is typically embedded in an active group life with constant emotional and intellectual stimulation. College life is in this sense an urban life. Marriage typically eliminates much of this way of life for her, and children deliver the *coup de grâce*. Her only significant relationship tends to be her husband, who, however, is absent most of the day. Most of her social and emotional needs must be satisfied by her children, who are hardly adequate to the task. Furthermore, since she is supposed to be molding them into superior beings she cannot lean too heavily upon them for her own needs, although she is sorely tempted to do so.

This is, in fact, the most vulnerable point in the whole system. Even if the American housewife were not a rather deprived person, it would be the essence of vanity for anyone to assume that an unformed child could tolerate such massive inputs of one person's personality. In most societies the impact of neuroses and defects in the mother's character is diluted by the presence of many other nurturing agents. In middle-class America the mother tends to be not only the exclusive daytime adult contact of the child, but also a contact with a mission to create a near-perfect being. This means that every maternal quirk, every maternal hang-up, and every maternal deprivation will be experienced by the child as heavily amplified noise from which there is no respite.

We know a little bit about the consequences of one aspect of this situation. Societies in which deprived mothers turn to their children for what they cannot obtain from adults tend to produce males who are vain, boastful, aggressive, and skittish toward women. Such males have great fear of losing self-control, of becoming dependent upon women, of weakness. Male gangs often assume great importance.

Female Desexualization

Now middle-class American males do not, by and large, fit this description, although American foreign policy is deeply rooted in machismo philosophies. One of the reasons may be that in the societies that do produce this kind of male there is a strong sexual component in the maternal involvement with the son, resulting from a voluntary or involuntary sexual distance between husband and wife. But although individual American families often show such sexual displacement (the clinical literature is full of them), the American housewife taken as a general type is not a very sexy creature. Indeed, perhaps her major characteristic is that she has been so thoroughly desexualized.

This is no accident. A seductive mother in a family system involving many caretakers has nothing like the impact she has in a society like ours, where she is almost the whole world to the child. The fact that maternal seductiveness is so often associated with male schizophrenia is closely tied to the sexlessness of American housewives as a group. There seems to be some unconscious recognition of the fact that even ordinary feminine seductiveness, given the magnification that motherhood receives in our society, tends to be disorganizing to the child. Since the American mother is so omnipresent and

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intensely committed to her role, she must be defused, as it were. Her desexualization is necessary in order not to add unduly to the already somewhat overwhelming maternal input the child receives.

Let us consider this desexualization further, since it is both a remarkable phenomenon, given the sexual preoccupations of the society as a whole, and rather poorly understood. In many societies a woman is viewed as relatively neuter until she is married—it is at this point that she becomes a full-fledged female, a sexual being. This is especially the case in societies that are strict about premarital sexuality but indifferent toward extramarital affairs. Yet even in societies in which the exact reverse is true, single girls, however promiscuous, are sometimes viewed as merely children playing. In dress, manner, and interpersonal style it is often the married woman alone who is fully sexual.

In our society the exact opposite is true. Stylistically, it is only young unmarried girls who are allowed to be entirely female. Their appearance is given strong sexual emphasis even before there is anything to emphasize, but as soon as they are married they are expected to mute their sexuality somewhat, and when they become mothers this neutralization is carried even further. This means that whatever sexual appeal exists in a malnourished nymphet is made highly explicit, while the kind of mature and full-blown femininity that has excited Europeans for centuries is masked almost beyond recognition. Suburban housewives in particular often affect hard, severe, tight, and rectangular hair and clothing styles. The effect is rather masculine, especially when combined with a bluff, hearty, and sarcastic conversational style, as it so frequently is.

It is tempting to see in this pattern a compensatory process: women cheated of a career express their "masculinity" in the only form left to them. Certainly it seems appropriate to describe as "masculine" a behavioral style which is a transparent imitation of the way men in our society behave in all-male groups, and the hair and clothing style suggests mobilization—a readiness to participate in some vigorous activity outside the home (Chinese peasant women on their way to the factories seem more casually feminine by comparison).

But what is "masculine" and what is "feminine"? Contemporary psychoanalytic literature is full of absurd statements based on the assumption that sex roles in our own society embody biological universals. We know by now, however, that there is virtually nothing in the way of personal characteristics or behavior that is defined in every culture as masculine or feminine. In some societies women are assumed to be stronger, and carry all the heavy burdens. In some societies women are supposed to be impractical and intuitive, in others men are. In most societies women are seen as earthy, men as spiritual, but Victorian England reversed this order. Even within our own society there are odd contradictions: activity is seen as a masculine characteristic, passivity as feminine. Yet men are supposed to move and talk slowly, while women are expected to be birdlike in body movement—constantly moving their hands, using many more facial muscles, talking rapidly. Paradoxically, a man who is too active in the most physical sense of using many muscles from moment to moment is considered "effeminate."

It should be emphasized, then, that when we talk of "masculine" and "feminine" we are referring only to the ways in which these are customarily defined in our culture, and since sex role definitions change from time to time there is ample room for confusion. If women behave in ways that seem imitative of men, we call this masculine, but if customs change, and certain kinds of activities become redefined as appropriate for females are they "masculine" for doing them? One suddenly realizes that we have stumbled upon a powerful weapon for "keeping women in their place." It is really a very old and familiar weapon, used with great effect against minority groups. It begins with a stereotype—"women cannot think logically," for example. If a woman then demonstrates a capacity for logical thought she is stigmatized as "masculine." The same device is used to discourage women from

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engaging in professional careers.* The ancient Greeks were extremely adept at this device—so much so that they succeeded for over two millennia in distracting attention from the fact that Greek heroes almost never knew what to do without the help or advice from some woman ("with a mind like a man," of course).

Revolutionary Response

Today's black militants are the first minority group clever enough to have invented a solution to this ruse. Instead of trying to escape the black stereotype and become "white," they have in a sense accepted the stereotype and said "black, even in your stereotypical sense, is better than white." Since American society was in danger of being strangulated by its alienation from the body, this meant, as Eldridge Cleaver has so brilliantly shown, that blacks could quite reasonably view themselves as saviors of the whites, helping them rediscover their own roots. This is a lesson from which American women could learn a great deal. The missions are not even that dissimilar, since alienation from the body, from the emotional life, is largely a white male invention, although women have played an active and major part in it.

Consider, for example, the question with which we began this discussion: have suburban matrons adopted a desexualized, "masculine" style because they have been deprived of careers? Many people would object that most women don't *want* careers. I suspect the women themselves would agree, but I also wonder if deep inside they don't feel the kind of puzzled uneasiness that we always experience when obliged to accept a formulation that makes us lose either way. The problem is that "career" is in itself a masculine concept (i.e., designed for males in our society). When we says "career" it connotes a demanding, rigorous, preordained life pattern, to whose goals everything else is ruthlessly subordinated—everything pleasurable, human, emotional, bodily, frivolous. It is a stern Calvinistic word. When a man asks a woman if she wants a career, it is intimidating. He is saying, are you willing to suppress half of your being as I am, neglect your family as I do, exploit personal relationships as I do, renounce all personal spontaneity as I do? Naturally, she shudders a bit and shuffles back to the broom closet. She even feels a little sorry for him and bewails the unkind fate that has forced him against his will to become such a despicable person. The perennial success of this hoax perhaps contributes to the low opinion that men so often have of feminine intelligence (an opinion which, as any teacher knows, is otherwise utterly unfounded).

A more effective (revolutionary, confronting) response would be to admit that a "career," thus defined, is indeed undesirable—that (now that you mention it) it seems like a pernicious activity for *any* human being to engage in, and should be eschewed by both men *and* women. Of course, she doesn't want a "career," nor do most humans, with the exception of a few males crazed, by childhood deprivation or Oedipal titillation, with insatiable desires for fame, power, or wealth. What she wants is a meaningful and stimulating activity, excitement, challenge, social satisfactions—all the things that middle-class males get from their jobs whether they are defined as "careers" or not. Rarely is she willing, however, to pay the price that masculine narcissism seduces men into paying in our society. She therefore accepts the definition of herself as the inferior sex, instead of adopting the revolutionary stance of the black militant ("black is beautiful"), and saying: "My unwillingness to sacrifice a host of human values to my personal narcissism and self-aggrandizement makes me the *superior* sex." Such a stance would in fact liberate both sexes: women would be freed from the suffocating stagnation of the artificial domestic role in which they have been imprisoned; men would be liberated from

* This has a particularly nasty side-effect upon the medical profession. To show that it is really "a man's job," the nurturing, helping aspects must be deemphasized. Thus the recruitment of physicians selectively favors cold, ungiving, exploitative, competitive, and mercenary personality types, with a result familiar to all.

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their enslavement to the empty promise (ever receding, always redefined as just out of reach, and unsatisfying even when grasped) of "success." Both could then live in a gratifying present, instead of an illusory future and an ill-remembered past.

This revolutionary response, however, is seldom made. Women have long been stereotyped as bastions of conservatism—a stereotype which receives considerable empirical support from attitude surveys. Even war, the most absurd and vicious of all the games that men play, has rarely produced a feminine revolt. Despite their antipathy toward it, despite the fact that they play no part in it and cannot control it, that it is most hurtful to them and destroys what they have created, women seldom resist war, and in some societies are more chauvinistic and bloodthirsty than the men. "Lysistrata" was, after all, a man's fantasy.

The Opiate Role

The reasons for this are complex and varied, but in our society, at least, feminine conservatism, like the domesticity pattern, is part of a role into which women are inducted by men. Having created a technological and social-structural juggernaut by which they are daily buffeted, men tend to use their wives as opiates to soften the impact of the forces they have set into motion against themselves. Consider, for example, the suburban living pattern: husbands go to the city and participate in the 20th century, while their lives are assigned the hopeless task of trying to act out a rather pathetic bucolic fantasy oriented toward the 19th. Men in their jobs must accept change—even welcome it and foster it—however threatening and disruptive it may seem. They do not know how to abstain from colluding daily in their own obsolescence, and they are frightened. Such men tend to make of their wives an island of stability in a sea of change. The wife beomes a kind of memento, like the bit of earth the immigrant brings from the old country and puts under his bed. He subtly encourages her to espouse absurdly old-fashioned views which he then ridicules when he is with his male associates. There is a special tone of good-natured condescension with which married men gathered together discuss the conservatism of their wives, and one senses how elegantly their ambivalence has been apportioned between them ("it's a great opportunity for me but of course the wife doesn't like to move—she has a lot of ties in the community, and of course the children in school and all. . . ."). It permits the husband to seem far more adaptable and amenable to change than he really feels.

Ultimately, of course, this kind of emotional division of labor tends to backfire, and this case is no exception. Freed from the necessity of confronting his own resistance to change, and having insulated his wife from experiencing the more exciting and enjoyable aspects of such novelty, he tends to become bored with her and somewhat lonely. She is left behind, "outgrown," as William H. Whyte, Jr., puts it.

The domestication and neutralization of the wife is part of the same process. That is, it is important not only that the wife have low stimulus value for her child, but also that she have low stimulus value for her husband. Our society is presently founded on over-stimulation—on the generation of needs and desires which cannot directly be gratified, but which ensure a great deal of striving and buying in an effort to gratify them. Much if not most of this stimulation is sexual—erotic delights are implicitly attached to almost every product that can be bought in America today, at least by adults. The goal of commercial America, therefore, is to maximize sexual stimulation and minimize sexual availability—in this way an infinite number of products can be inserted in the resulting gag. It is the role of the wife to reverse the process for her beleaguered husband—to combine maximum availability with minimum stimulation. This also backfires, of course, since it is a prescription for boredom.

The only real solution for the housewife in this situation is a revolutionary one—to abandon the opiate role and combat the forces that make her opiate role necessary.■

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THE CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY:

Zen Pong and Open Government

A Conversation between Marcus Raskin and Charles Peters

Charles Peters: When we were planning *The Washington Monthly,* we thought of ourselves as focusing a great deal more narrowly on the realm of politics and government than has turned out to be the case. I think the signal came one year ago in a sentence in our first issue saying that paranoia is the chronic affliction of government executives. When you stop to think about that a little while, you realize you're beginning to get out of the realm of talking about better budget analysis and you're into a realm of something deeper in American society.

For instance, the one change I would most want to make in government is to change the wrong thing of closed government to the right thing of open government—which means changing from a society that has men closed down and tightened up in so many different ways to a society that has men opened up.

In practical terms, the day-to-day operation of a closed government means the firing of Ernie Fitzgerald by the Pentagon. It means the firing of Gary Greenberg by Attorney General Mitchell. It means all these ridiculous security measures. It means the executive branch's fear of having Congress find out the truth, or the newspapers find out the truth, or the public find out the truth. What's wrong with the public knowing? We recently had an article on Finch's rebuke of a scientist over at HEW for speaking to the press about the cyclamate problem. Now what on earth was wrong with letting the public know about cyclamates? But here in Washington it's a terrible sin for a subordinate official to speak out, it's a terrible sin for him to speak up. How do you relax and open up this government?

Marcus Raskin: I think this really is a matter of personal responsibility for decisions. My own view is that it will be very useful if members of the govern-

Marcus Raskin is co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies.
Charles Peters is editor of The Washington Monthly.

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ment, people whom we call bureaucrats, begin working out a system of writing majority-minority views on basic questions, to be published with the names of the people in back of them. And in that way you could begin to see where various people stand.

What would it have meant, for example, to see publicly the full debates and decisions on the Vietnam war—to have had majority-minority views stated publicly like the Supreme Court does? It would be good to see essentially the same thing in all areas of public policy, whether it is housing, or treasury matters, or anything else. In that way, the bureaucracy itself would begin to take personal responsibility for what it puts forward.

It seems today that the civil service system was an unfortunate historical reform. It has been predicated on the idea that in exchange for anonymity the bureaucracy itself would serve the purpose of the elected official. Whatever that elected official would want, the bureaucracy would do for that elected official. That, however, is not the way things operate in the government.

Bureaucracy is a separate force, if nothing else it serves the purpose of inertia, of essentially going in the direction it was going before. Beyond that we have the situation where the bureaucracy, whether corporate or public, works on other people's problems. It doesn't view the problems it works on existentially. The real question that it and we have to face up to is this: how can we see the problems with which they are concerned, which seem to be other people's problems, as ours? What, for example, would it mean if people like Robert McNamara and Maxwell Taylor who ordered the bombings in Vietnam understood that their children could be bombed—that, in effect, they had to send their children to those towns as hostages to be bombed? What would it mean, for example, when we talk about

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a minimum wage of $1.65 an hour, if we ask everybody who proposes that wage to live on it?

How, in effect, do you build a bureaucy with individuals who see the pieces of paper they deal with not in abstract terms but in terms of humanness; of relating to others as persons—human beings—and not statistics? That, it seems to me, is the fundamental question of authoritarian structures in the 20th century —whether it's communism, socialism, capitalism. In this sense—where we fail to see humanity in our work—the authority of bureaucracy and hierarchy has won out. It seems to have won out here in this period, because whole groups of people spend their lives working on other people's problems rather than seeing that those problems are in every true sense their own. And in this sense you see one of the great strengths that George Wallace has been able to capitalize on. He's been able to take that fact and use it for his own purposes without building a humanness out of that situation. I mean that he is able to identify with parts of the working class, parts of the middle class who have fears for their jobs and homes against the blacks. But hardly anyone else, except some of the New Left, has seen the importance of an existential pragmatism that identifies the work of the bureaucrat, the work of the upper-middle class, with the work of the poor or the middle-class worker. That's one of the most profound things that has to be done by the bureaucracy. It's at that point, where they are prepared to take responsibility for their decisions, where they are prepared to see themselves as the object of the ideas that they themselves put forward, that they will begin to build in this country the constituencies that would strengthen them within the government itself.

Peters: It seems to me that for the bureaucrat to have the courage to take responsibility, he must have a psychological readiness to be fired or to resign. And you see that happened, very curiously, in the Vietnam rebellion in the defense establishments in March of 1968. Men had reached the point of that psychological readiness to resign. But they weren't at that point in 1965; and so in 1965 the battle wasn't pressed. As Bill Moyers pointed out, you held back at that time from pinning your opponent to the wall. In March of 1968 it *was* pressed. And there was a victory, a considerable victory, for the rebels. So I think that psychological readiness to resign, the willingness to always face losing one's job, goes back to a value change which is necessary so that you don't have to keep progressing up the ladder. You don't *have to* keep that job at the State Department; it isn't a terrible thing to lose it—or a terrible thing to lose that high job at the Defense Department.

Raskin: Well, I think that a lot of those people who waited for so long to get off the Vietnam war did it for expediential and *ad hoc* reasons—technocratic reasons. The war wasn't working any more. The cost was far outweighing the benefits.

No one really made the argument that you just don't do such things—that you don't just destroy whole villages, you don't attempt to blackmail and bomb another country into agreeing with your policies—which is exactly American policy toward North Vietnam. And that you don't attempt to destroy Vietnam in order to contain China, as some of the arguments were put forward earlier. So that the point I want to make here is that those people who took expediential or *ad hoc* reasons for getting out do that all along. It would have taken a very different framework for men to have said, "Look, there are some things that you just don't do, period. And we're not going to have any part of it." But those people would have gotten out much earlier.

The problem is that America is very much committed to win, whatever it is, very much within the psychology of winning. The real question is how, as Senator Fulbright has put it, you show that wars are not football games. Or how you begin to show that winning and losing are not the proper coordinates for the judgment of policy and human relationships. And that that isn't the way one either conducts the government or should necessarily conduct any new aspect of his being.

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Peters: Recently I was fascinated by a newspaper story describing a game that had been developed out in California called zen pong. Zen pong is ping pong played without trying to win. In other words, the fun of the game comes from joint skill in keeping the ball going back and forth across the net, making difficult shots, pulling it off together. It appealed to some deep instinct in me which may have come from a dislike of getting mauled by all the boys in my neighborhood who were about two feet taller than I was when I was a boy. What I loved to do in football was to practice passing. That was something you did jointly with another guy, not against another guy. But one guy is passing to you and you're passing to him, and the joy is the maximum outstretch catch that you do together. It seems to me we need to value that kind of cooperation more than beating someone else. Sometimes you have no choice, you're in a situation where you have to win or lose. But those situations really occur much less often than most Americans think. Most of the time you can play zen pong.

Raskin: I think you're absolutely correct when you say that the cooperative spirit must now be put forward in American life. I think that that's what many of the young people are attempting, maybe not as well as they could or should, to put forward for the establishment—the communes, the notion of helping each other—and hoping it will spread and eventually help the entire country.

Peters: My main reproach to young people today is that their instinct for cooperation doesn't seem to involve the doing of things well. And therein is beauty to me. The working together to do something well is something so vitally needed throughout our society. Shoddiness is overwhelming us.

Raskin: I think that that instinct will be recaptured, that it can be recaptured; I don't know whether it will, but I think it certainly can be. Because after awhile people will begin seeing the importance of doing a thing well together, just to be sure that it works so that you don't have to keep redoing it.

Peters: But there is a vulgar kind of zen pong. The kind that's now played in the bureaucracy is zen pong to cover each other. You're not trying to do something well together; you're trying to protect one another.

Raskin: That's right. In other words what you're attempting to do is destroy the meaning of personal responsibility rather than attempting to cooperate in order to make the product better.

Now the point about the schools, to a very great extent, is that they historically have been run on a competitive basis in the West and in Russia. They have been run on the basis that in any professional occupation or bureaucracy there are only a certain number of places and that the person that is first, second, or third in his class could be assured of a place either in a bureaucracy or at least a science academy. Or he would get to be a professor or, you know, would do very, very well in one form or another in terms of his first jobs. So, for example, law school has reflected that those students who do very, very well will end up with the great law firms. But now I think we are transforming ourselves out of a situation of necessity where people had to compete into a situation where we have to *cooperate*. And we are making this transformation because we have to—because competition doesn't really work. Competition doesn't make society any happier, and people are no happier in the jobs for which they competed. And it certainly doesn't help them in relationships with their children. The notion of competition doesn't mean that you really know things any better. So the Calvinist idea of attempting to perform better than the next guy, I think, is giving way to the sense of attempting to help the next guy.

Now I often think about the difficulty that we have with cheating. When you stop to think about it, cheating could be turned into a positive form of cooperation.

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For example, in the schools the kids instead of "cheating" could work together, with each other. The basis of scholarship, in that sense, becomes constant working, changing, revising of each person's work so that they finally end up with a better product, and better relationships among themselves. I think that's the basic way of beginning to change values. That is, we go from an authoritarian structure to a non-authoritarian, anti-authoritarian one. We go from a competitive one to a cooperative one which still demands excellence, which attempts to find a definition of excellence. We go finally to a situation of what the Greeks called *agape*, where there is a sense of love and charity one for another. Indeed, we find ourselves forced into this situation because there is no other way to confront our system, a situation where a few can destroy the world, a few are able to hold the riches and the resources of the world for themselves.

Peters: It's amazing but I was thinking of something very similar just when you mentioned your theory of cheating. I recall in law school on the law reviews, which had some very hideous competitive aspects, that there was one wonderful thing that fits with your theory. As you worked on your article for the review, it would be checked by another member of the law review. And he wasn't trying to show you up—but instead you and he were jointly responsible for the product. So he would help you make it a better article. But at no point would he be trying to put you down or make you look bad. His efforts *had* to be to make you look good.

Raskin: Well, I think in the law schools that came at the end of a competition, and so it was interesting. But, basically, cooperation began after a competition in which you showed that you could be allowed to have cooperation. And that seems to me a vulgar perversion, in a way, of where we should be going now. I'm convinced that the competitive aspects of individuals are going to stay; but, by the same token, there is no reason at this stage why a far greater notion of cooperation cannot be built into the American mind. Not on the basis of cooperation in terms of a particular function or role, like the left tackle with the quarterback, but rather as human beings—one relating to another as human beings. There is profound cooperation in the sense of attempting to reduce people to mechanized parts. That is the sort of cooperation that competition has attempted to achieve in a hierarchic, industrial, post-industrial structure. But we are at a stage now where we must begin to relate to each other in a whole way, in the sense of attempting to approach each other in what Martin Buber refers to as a betweenness relationship, an I-Thou relationship. Or, as I would put it, an I-and-We relationship.

Peters: What do you mean by an I-and-We relationship?

Raskin: Where people are joined together in relating to each other not only in terms of self to another but in terms of a project which defines who they are, which makes them work together in a cooperative sense. Let me give you an example of this in another way. Sartre uses a case in which he says that the definition of a project could be likened to the case where the worker is told to blow up the bridge and he does it. I would say that is not really the definition of a project in the I-and-We sense that I'm talking about. What I'm talking about is the situation where the worker is joined together with another in deciding what that project is, and working out with that other person how to proceed and how to do the thing together—and how by so doing to relate in a new sort of way to him. Martin King used to talk about this in another sense. When he would talk about confrontation with another, he would say that you are confronting in fact *aspects* of that person, not the person himself. And that once the aspects are changed then you and he can begin to relate in a new way. That is, in effect, the sort of new politics that we should attempt to practice. I don't believe that this is an idealistic politics. I think that it is a politics that at this stage is a necessity. ■

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New Haven: Triumph and Trouble in Model City

by Fred Powledge

On a warm Monday morning last July, employees of Mayor Richard C. Lee of New Haven, Connecticut, summoned reporters to City Hall. The mayor was going to make an important statement.

Almost everybody thought they knew what it would be. Richard Lee was going to announce that he was running again for the position he had held since 1953 and had successfully defended against Republican challengers on eight separate occasions. The rumor gained weight when some politician-watchers reported having seen him at lunch with Arthur Barbieri, chairman of the local Democratic machine and, ordinarily, a political enemy of Lee. Others had noticed that Lee was being seen more frequently in public. "When a man starts cutting ribbons at the dedication of shoe stores," said one sage, "you know he's running."

But instead of announcing his entry into the race, Lee read a two-page, typewritten statement. He said, in part:

> Today I am here to tell you I will not be a candidate for mayor in the coming election. This is a decision reached many months ago, but one which has been withheld publicly because there are so many things at stake for our city in a number of areas—the General Assembly and the Board of Aldermen, to name just two.
>
> Why this decision now, you may ask? I shall tell you why:
>
> Sixteen years is a long time. For me, it covers the lifetime of a child from birth through her junior year in high school. It covers portions of the span of life of four Presidents of the United States, and in Connecticut of three governors; and it has taken me from the age of 37 to the age of 53.
>
> New Haven in the past 16 years has become an exciting city. Just as its liabilities are still evident and constantly underscored, so are its many, many accomplishments—advancements in education, advancements in housing, in people-programs and in magnificent new buildings which now grace the skyline of our community.
>
> These past 16 years have been the most exciting years in all of my life. I am sure that never again will I do anything so important as running a city, for this is where all the problems of my generation are focused—the problems of inequality, of crime, of education, of equal employment opportunities, of poor housing—the problems of the inner city in America.
>
> I have enjoyed life in City Hall and I know I will enjoy life when I leave City Hall. But there always arrives a time in a man's political career when he should do other things, pursue other challenges, and mine is now. . . .

Outside City Hall, a cab driver said things would be all right; it was time for a change anyway; and besides, all politicians were the same. A black militant (there *were* no black militants in New Haven back when Richard Lee became mayor) agreed in part with the cab driver: It didn't matter, because one mayor was as big a racist as another.

Fred Powledge is a writer who specializes in the urban scene. The material in this article is adapted from Model City: New Haven and the Dynamics of the American Urban Dilemma *to be published in the fall by Simon and Schuster.* *© 1970 by Fred Powledge.*

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An official at Yale University said he was honestly worried. Yale had gotten along well with Mayor Lee; he feared that any replacement would not be as kind to the university.

A lawyer, drinking his coffee at a fluorescent-lit table in Lindy's luncheonette, said he didn't know what would happen. "All I know," he said, "is that this is the end of an era. And I'm not quite sure what kind of an era it's been."

One thing the era had produced, in addition to abundant physical evidence of New Haven's efforts to improve and rehabilitate itself, was what few cities have—a reputation. It was a reputation, built over 15 years, for being one of the most exciting cities in the nation.

What made New Haven exciting was the knowledge, among those who cared about such things, that New Haven had the talent, the money, the leadership, the energy, and therefore the potential to become America's Model City. Urban experts—architects, corporate executives, labor leaders, demographers—were experimenting elsewhere with the construction of "new towns"—places like Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, which were started from scratch. But in New Haven there was an effort under way to make a new town out of a very old, decayed, dying, and—some said—already dead one.

One thing that contributed mightily to this excitement was money. For years—a good number of years longer than most other cities—New Haven had been asking for and getting vast amounts of federal and private money to use in rebuilding itself. By 1967, around the time Washington's involvement in poverty and other urban problems was at its height, it was estimated that federal urban renewal allocations to New Haven were equivalent to $790 for each citizen. By contrast, Newark, New Jersey, which was being heralded (before its tragic riot) as another "Model City," was getting $286 per capita, Boston $268, and New York $42. William F. Buckley, Jr., the conservative writer, calculated that if New Haven's per-capita success at getting money were shared by all other U. S. cities, the nation would have been spending $146 billion on urban programs.

And there was money from private sources. In 1962, the Ford Foundation gave the city $2.5 million so that it might try its hand at human, as well as physical, renewal. The result was the establishment of an organization called Community Progress, Incorporated, and CPI turned out to be the forerunner of the national war on poverty that was declared in 1964 with the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act.

With the arrival of the money, it became possible for men to identify the challenges that faced them and to start designing solutions to the city's problems, both physical and human. There were some designs lying around from before—such as the one by Maurice Rotival, the city planner, done when he was a member of the Yale faculty in 1941. Rotival had recommended, among other things, that New Haven utilize its natural harbor setting as its "front door," funnelling in traffic that way rather than through the congested back streets; that the city's centerpiece, the Central Green, be incorporated into the plan, and that everyone involved recognize that the automobile was here to stay. The plan had failed to excite many of those whose support would have been necessary, and Rotival had gone on to other things.

But after Lee had taken office and redevelopment had become an increasingly important issue, talent began to arrive again—men like Edward C. Logue and, later, Mitchell Sviridoff, who were pioneers in a field that *Time* magazine was later to dub "urbanology." Rotival himself returned to help combine the construction of the Connecticut Turnpike—along the harbor, as he had suggested—with a program of slum clearance that would give the projected 34,000 motorists someplace to park once they had entered the city's front door.

Urbanology was a field in which educated, articulate men with training or experience in such fields as sociology, politi-

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cal science, the law, and architecture were able to accumulate and to use power in rebuilding cities. They did not need to be politicians, although it was inevitable that before they were long in the job, they would *become* politicians to a greater degree than before.

They became partners with politicians —and especially with Mayor Lee (who appreciated and understood *them*)—in rebuilding the city. As Robert A. Dahl put it in *Who Governs?*, his classic 1961 study of power and decision-making in New Haven: "The new men in local politics may very well prove to be the bureaucrats and experts—and politicians who know how to use them."

"Executive-Centered Order"

On September 29, 1953, in accepting the Democratic nomination for mayor, Lee had declared that if he were elected he would appoint within 60 days a committee of citizens to study the city's problems and to work out possible solutions to them. "We must take the public of New Haven into partnership with the city government," he said.

Although he won the election, the citizens' group that Mayor Lee had promised took nine months, not 60 days, to organize. It was perhaps the wisest political move he ever made. After an initial reluctance on the part of civic leaders to become involved in the committee, more than 400 of them were finally brought together and put to work finding out, at least theoretically, what was wrong with the city and figuring out what to do about it. The Citizens Action Commission, as the organization was called, was headed by a bank president; it contained representatives of almost all walks of New Haven life. (The "almost" is there because there were no members who would fit a current-day definition of "the poor" and very few who could be properly classified as "representatives of the poor.")

"The members had been shrewdly selected to represent many of the major centers of influence or status in the community," reported Dahl. The question of representation by spokesmen for the poor, or for the militant black groups, was not being raised back in 1953. There is no record that anyone sought to question the claims, by Lee and the commission, that the Citizens Action Commission represented "community participation" in the finest sense.* It was far more important that, in assembling the group, Lee was creating an Establishment that would run interference while he carried the redevelopment ball. The CAC's multi-partisan, multi-interest composition meant that whatever the commission decided or agreed on could not be attacked quite so easily as the decisions of a lone Democratic mayor.

The commission's strategic role in assuring that Lee's goal of redevelopment would be publicly accepted, wrote Dahl, "can hardly be overestimated." With the voters apparently behind him and a seemingly invincible group of prominent citizens on his side (or, perhaps, convinced that he was on *their* side), the new mayor pushed ahead with his plans for the rebirth of New Haven. Using all his skills as a politician, Lee managed to establish a municipal government that was parallel and superior to the existing one.

He did not dissolve the "old" government by firing people; that would have brought on a political revolt. But he was adamant about retaining for himself control over the agency that really counted, the agency that the CAC was created to legitimize, the agency that was the central component of the parallel government—the Redevelopment Agency.

The Redevelopment Agency, tightly controlled by Lee, took over many of the responsibilities that previously had been the business of other city agencies—agencies that had been more attuned to the tra-

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*Lee was asked about this not long ago. Were poor people asking, in 1953, to be on the commission? "No," he said. What about ministers and others who claimed to represent the poor? "No." Members of the social-work establishment? "No." Yet people criticize you for not putting any of the poor on the commission? "Yeah, *now*," he replied.

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ditional, tried-and-true patronage system than to the relatively new idea of redevelopment. The result was what most observers of the New Haven scene have tended to call an "executive-centered coalition" or "executive-centered order," with Lee at the top. "It was the need for redevelopment that created the need for an executive-centered order," commented Dahl, "and it was widespread agreement on the need for redevelopment that generated widespread acquiescence in the creation of an executive-centered order."

By 1961 Richard Lee had plenty of physical evidence that redevelopment, rehabilitation, and renewal of a city was feasible—economically, socially, and politically. In the year 1960 alone, $30 million worth of public and private construction projects had been started in renewal areas, bringing the total since Lee took office to $70 million. In 1960, 500 families were relocated and 379 slum buildings demolished. Old buildings were being pushed down all over the town, landlords and homeowners were being convinced of the importance of rehabilitating the housing that was not beyond repair. Traffic was moving more smoothly. The harbor was being turned into something other than a smelly dump.

In eight years, and largely because of the efforts of a single man, physical renewal had become a fact of life in New Haven. Residents of the once-dying city seemed proud of what had happened and what was happening, and their pride seemed to help them overcome their normal American distrust of City Hall. They bragged to visitors. The officials of other American cities, the dying and the not-so-dying, sent delegations to New Haven by the score to find out How It Was Done. Sometimes New Haven would Show Them by scheduling a special demolition in their honor. The delegations especially wanted to know why it was that when they went to Washington to ask for redevelopment money, a lot of it already had been reserved for Richard Lee.

Lee and his assistants were happy to oblige with advice and demonstrations; after all, they had been first, and when you're first you can afford to be helpful. But at the same time, while the other mayors were wondering how to start physical renewal, Lee and his corps of talented assistants were thinking in terms of *human* renewal. As usual, they were one step ahead of everybody else.

Human Renewal

The leveling of so much slum housing during the first years of the Lee administration had exposed sights, smells, and frustrations that most white, middle-class observers had never known were there. As the physical renewal program progressed, the need for what Lee called "people programs" became increasingly apparent.

The chief instrument of Lee's "people programs" was the organization called Community Progress, Incorporated, and to serve as CPI's first director Lee chose Mitchell Sviridoff, now vice president for national affairs at the Ford Foundation.

"Opening Opportunities," one of the agency's founding and guiding documents in 1962, declared that the "areas of greatest social problems coincide with the areas of greatest physical problems." The paper referred specifically to seven neighborhoods, including the Hill, the largest of the "inner-city" neighborhoods of New Haven, and until fairly recently a community characterized by Italian working-class families. At the time of the 1960 Census, the Hill neighborhood was overwhelmingly (86 per cent) white, but it seemed in 1962 destined to attract more black and Spanish-speaking families. The trend already seemed to be toward young black and Puerto Rican families of child-bearing age, with most whites except the elderly departing for other neighborhoods.

"Opening Opportunities" outlined a wide range of programs—in the fields of employment, education, juvenile delinquency, coordinated community services—and promised community participation, a term that had not yet come into either vogue or controversy.

To execute a program that could only be called ambitious, "Opening Opportuni-

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ties" suggested the organization of a staff for CPI, whose main function at the beginning would be to formulate programs. The staff would be assisted by the creation of a "community seminar," which would be "a vehicle for exploring community problems and developing new programs." The seminar would include representatives of public and voluntary agencies, state and federal officials, local and state lawmakers, political party leaders, "university scholars and other community leaders." No specific mention was made of involving the poor, or their *bona fide* "representatives," in the planning.

A research division would be established, with the help of Yale University, which had promised to assist "in the recruitment of a research director, by encouraging faculty and graduate students to take advantage of research opportunities in their field of interest, and by making available library, computer, and other research facilities." Added the report: "Yale recognizes, too, that with this program going, New Haven is a unique laboratory for research in social science."

Finally, Community Progress, Incorporated, itself would be organized as a nonprofit corporation. "Opening Opportunities" explained who would run CPI. Once again, there was no mention of the poor themselves:

> [CPI] will be governed by a board of directors consisting of persons appointed by the Mayor of New Haven, the Board of Education, Redevelopment Agency, Citizens Action Commission, United Fund, Community Council, and Yale University. The board of directors will be the policy-making body. The board will select an executive director who will select other staff and administer the operations of the organization.

Governor John Dempsey of Connecticut said he would help. So did the Citizens Action Commission, the United Fund of Greater New Haven, the president of the Board of Education, and the New Haven Foundation. There were no letters from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which at that time was thought (by most whites, at least) to be a militant organization; or from Fred Harris, a 25-year-old black man whose father worked for the hospital run by Yale, and who was beginning to sense that something was wrong in New Haven.

But perhaps 1962 was too early to start talking and wondering about people like Fred Harris, too early to start thinking about the involvement of the poor in formulating programs of "human renewal" that presumably would serve them. In 1962, Richard Lee was *the* civil rights leader in New Haven, Connecticut. The poor, the black, and the alienated voted—along with the rich, the white, and the involved—in returning Richard Lee to office over and over again. For a politician, no better proof of stewardship and of acceptance could exist.

The Beholder's Eye

"Citizen participation," like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Whatever its meaning, and regardless of who its beholders are, the fact is that a lot of people have been turned on by the idea. The lunch-counter sit-ins in the South in the early Sixties were the beginning of a distinct phase of the movement for civil rights and, as it turned out, for black togetherness. It was necessary for those sit-ins to take place before their organizers could learn that the freedom to sit at a lunch-counter was negligible unless the person sitting there had a decent job which allowed him the further freedom of buying his lunch. So it was with the words "citizen participation." It was not until the issue came up that people started demanding it. And once they started demanding it, there was no stopping them.

Citizen participation in New Haven once meant the Citizens Action Commission. Later on, it meant pleas from poor people, demands from poor people, and perhaps it even meant the riot of August, 1967. But before that riot, citizens of New Haven had asked for participation in the planning of their own destinies, and the city had given them the run-around. It

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was not surprising that the citizens who made the demands came from the Hill neighborhood, which had been a dumping ground for persons relocated—sometimes more than once—from the other urban renewal areas, and a neighborhood which had seen little renewal or rehabilitation of its own. And it was not surprising that one of the names that came up, again, was Fred Harris.

Mayor Lee had been advised before about people like Fred Harris. Mitchell Sviridoff, in a 1959 memorandum, had told Lee that the "responsible radical may fail to show proper appreciation for progress" and his "behavior may even border on downright discourtesy." But, Sviridoff had added, communications must be maintained with the responsible radical.

Fred Harris fit the description of a "responsible radical" almost perfectly. He was a leader, and a good one, with an appreciation of, and communication with, people on the street, and he had a facility for failing to show proper appreciation for progress and, sometimes, he could be downright discourteous. Such attributes should not have been surprising or disgusting to the white leaders of New Haven—especially those, like the mayor, who were familiar with the Irish Catholic politics of New England—but they were. The white Establishment failed to recognize Harris's leadership; at first it ignored him, his organization, and their requests and demands, even though his Hill Parents Association was obviously one of the few truly grass-roots groups in New Haven. And in the end, according to some interpretations, the whites deliberately had Fred Harris and several of his associates arrested and incarcerated in an exhibition of the Establishment's desire to forbid dissent, even reasonable dissent.

Fred Harris was born in September, 1937, in New Haven. Like Mayor Lee, he was born in a cold-water flat. He remembered that it was a big thrill to be able to move into a public housing project, because in the project there was running hot water. His father worked at Yale's hospital, and when Fred was old enough he worked at Yale, too, where he was impressed with the clothing and carriage of the white students. "I got the idea that the essence of cool was wearing a three-button suit and a rep tie," said Harris one time, "and it took me a long time to undo that." In 1969 he was wearing colorful clothing of African origin.

Harris grew up, married, became a father, and lived in the Hill. He developed a definition of citizen participation: "People should be allowed to determine their own destiny." Harris readily agreed that few people are allowed such a luxury. But it was necessary to work toward such a lofty goal, he said. "I think you have to take that position, because if you want to change things, I don't think you can compromise. You have to work for the ultimate goal, or work to overshoot the target, because most of the time you're going to get half of what you ask for, or a quarter, or you might get lucky and get three-quarters."

At first, Fred Harris could have been called an integrationist. Throughout his youth, because of his father's job at Yale, he had been exposed not only to whites, but to whites who thought of themselves as far above prejudice and intolerance. He thought—erroneously, he said later—that there might be enough decent whites in and around New Haven who could be aroused to help their Negro brethren. So in 1966, at the age of 29, Fred Harris ran for a seat in the Connecticut General Assembly. He ran as an independent candidate in the 106th Assembly District. His Democratic opponent won with 1,584 votes, the Republican was second with 857, and Harris came in last with 119.

Some time later, Harris discussed the campaign. "It was impossible to win," he said, "but I was naive enough to think that if white people knew the problems in the Hill, and also middle-class blacks, they would get involved and help us. That was the only ground I ran on. But that failed, and it really opened my eyes at how people really are and how the city is. Running also provided me a platform to speak from, and get to the ears of the people, and that was the real reason why I ran."

Sharing the platform with Harris was

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his organization, the Hill Parents Association, which had been formed not long before around the issue of the quality of public education, and which was expanding its goals. The HPA had its origins in a predominantly white organization called the Hill Neighborhood Union, that had been established by the Yale students Harris had once envied. Eventually the Union was absorbed by neighborhood blacks. "Then it was taken over by the Hill Parents Association," said Harris, "which was a group of people who had got together around a school issue and gathered people together. Then they were victorious in getting rid of the principal at the school, getting the school cleaned up, getting new books, getting the school painted and getting the floors washed and waxed and things like that." The organization's scope enlarged to take in protests over the welfare system. A march was held on the state welfare offices in Hartford; the police broke it up, and Harris went to jail for 30 days.

Among the agencies which were shook up by the Harris campaign and the emergence of the Hill Parents Association was Community Progress, Incorporated, the organization that was supposed to be the community action agency in the Hill and elsewhere.

Peter Almond, a white man, was one of CPI's bright young employees at that time. He surprised some of his superiors in Sepetmber, 1966, by asking to be sent to one of the neighborhoods, rather than to an assignment in the central office. "I sought the opportunity," he recalled, "to get out of the mainstream of the antipoverty agency administration and go find out what was on the other end of all those programs that I wrote up and negotiated with federal and foundation officials over."

Almond arrived on the Hill at about the time the Harris campaign was getting under way. "I was fascinated by the fact," he said, "that CPI was so closely identified with the opposition. That is, even though they didn't come out and support the two party candidates against Harris, it was quite clear that they were involved in a real resistance to the radical community organizers" who worked with Harris and the HPA. "I had this kind of moral-outrage response that this was simply wrong for this agency, which was supposed to be working with the community, supporting community organization work as well as providing basic social services, to be taking a side one way or the other.

"I guess I would have argued—or I hope I would have argued—that we should not have supported Harris either, in his campaign. But we should have kept ourselves open to the new movement that really represented what was going on in the Hill, in the awakening parts of the black Hill. So this was a fascinating introduction for me. I don't think that I would have been as intensely aware of the militants' activity and the essential irresponsibility of the city officials and the antipoverty agency officials—my superiors, I guess—in their resistance to Harris and to the Hill Parents Association, had it not been for that campaign."

Few CPI downtown officials, said Almond, were talking about citizen participation in a way that resembled what the neighborhood people were saying. "What was so disappointing to me," he said, "was that most of the directives regarding citizen participation were restrictive in the sense that they would say that one had gone too *far* in one project or another."

There were several CPI staff members, said Almond, who were "really quite committed to the concept of community participation and who worked at it full time." But "what was fascinating, of course, was the CPI central office and neighborhood office dilemma on the question of community participation. They were asking: 'How do you get people involved?' 'How do you get people to come to a meeting you've called?'

"It was a question of how do you get *them* interested in what *you* are trying to do? *They* would call meetings, at which *their* programs were discussed. There was never, at least at no meeting I ever attended, any opening where the citizen's word would have any kind of direct and obvious impact. And that's just impact; I'm not talking about where the antipoverty official listens to the neighbor-

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hood group that has come up with *its* program, which is obviously the other side of the fence. And that is where CPI and the city and the mayor all collapsed, as far as I'm concerned; collapsed in the sense that they simply could not tolerate, or understand, or accept the implications and the fact that a neighborhood group could devise and plan and opt to run its own program."

City Hall

The white leadership of the city may have harbored secret ideas that HPA, Fred Harris, his activist wife, Rose, and others were something besides troublemakers—that perhaps they could help bring about the city's salvation. If so, this feeling did not come through in the leadership's conversations, both public and private. A black man who held an important city position and who might be said to reflect a social-work approach to urban problems had this to say when asked for his position on HPA's demands for community control of neighborhood programs:

"When you are one of them and you know damn good and well that they represent a very small minority, you know how to react to it. I wouldn't say this in public, but the Hill Parents Association, number one, doesn't have any parents in it, except illegitimate parents. And that's perfectly all right, too. I've got nothing against a little extracurricular activity. Most of them, seriously, are not married legitimately, are not parents in the true sense of the word, and their following is very, very small."

Melvin J. Adams, the city's development administrator, looked upon the criticism voiced by HPA as the somewhat misguided rantings of a group whose expectations had been raised:

"I think part of their problem is a realization that although there's a lot wrong with New Haven, there's also a lot right. And I think, for their purposes, they'd be happier if there were less right, because then the confrontation would have more meaning. Part of the increase in criticism, I think, is a reflection of the fact that we have been doing a pretty good job. People in Bridgeport or Waterbury don't make these charges, don't get involved, and those cities have done virtually nothing. In the process of raising opportunities, we raise expectations. People feel that things can change and therefore they can play a greater role in changing them faster.

"I think, in part, that that kind of criticism reflects some of the things that are happening nationally; they just don't believe what anyone in a position of responsibility says. No matter what he says, his motives aren't right. I think it's an unhealthy thing in our country and in our city. I don't think the criticism is bad; lack of criticism would be terrible.

"But it's this kind of *intemperate* criticism that recognizes that there's only one way of doing things and it's always *your* way, and not only is there only one way of doing things, but if you don't agree with this, you're wrong and you're evil. We went through that in the Fifties with Joe McCarthy, that same kind of intolerance, which is very unhealthy no matter what the professed motives of the person may be."

For another high city official, Dennis Rezendes, the deputy mayor in charge of administration, Fred Harris was "a mixed-up man."

"He's torn inside. He faces the many problems that a young Negro in this city, or throughout the country, faces. He's torn. I think he's let emotions get the better part of him, the better part of his judgment. I don't think he knows himself where he's going. And in the process he doesn't become helpful to himself or—to use his word—to his fellow 'black men'. You cannot, in my opinion, continue to achieve a goal or objective by using the sledge-hammer approach. If you're going to have a society that's going to live at peace with itself, there has to be some rational dialogue. I don't like that word, 'dialogue'; it's been over-used, but it's the only one I can think of right now.

"Their basic argument is valid. It's absolutely right. And I think, through the dialogue process, they can win over the vast majority of white America. And I

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think they were at this point, and ready to accomplish it, until they went off the deep end. They get the argument hands down. So use it! You can use all kinds of techniques, through the political process and otherwise, and they can be beneficial and help expedite things.

"But you can go to the extreme and lose white America if you're not careful. So what's going to happen? Are we all going to turn out to be like East St. Louis? Every city? And that's what can happen: The core cities will simply become the cities of the poor—the blacks and the white poor, a very small segment of the white poor. So that instead of having a major ghetto in the Hill neighborhood, the whole damn city will turn out to be that way. And to paraphrase the Bible, you know, the meek shall inherit the earth—well, the Negro shall inherit the city. And after he's inherited it, what's he going to do with it? By himself? He's really going to have to pull himself up by his bootstraps."

The Crisis

By the spring of 1967, a crisis was developing in New Haven that was evident to many of her citizens and should have been evident to City Hall, the Redevelopment Agency, and CPI. Many of the city's programs touched the Hill not at all or, if they did, were quickly found inadequate. The beneficiaries (as the city would put it) and the victims (as the critics would say) of relocation in other neighborhoods piled into the Hill. On one side, Yale University and its medical center expanded slowly and surely and ominously, adding another bit of insecurity to the lives of those who lived there.

In the late spring and early summer of 1967, Fred Harris and others of HPA went to Community Progress, Incorporated, with an idea. The Parents Association wanted to operate three programs in the Hill during the summer: a day camp and educational program; a recreation and playground project; and a venture called Operation Breakthrough, which had as its aim the development of jobs for the "hard-core" unemployed. Hill Parents Association wanted approximately $37,000 from CPI to operate the programs.

CPI was suspicious and, perhaps, even fearful of the proposals. Not only had HPA spent three or four months drawing up the plans on its own, without playing the usual Bureau of the Budget game with the CPI central office staff; it wanted a far greater degree of control over the summer programs than CPI had ever allowed before.

"We presented it to CPI," recalled Harris, "and they said they'd look at it. And when they finally made up their minds, they said they'd give us $6,000, which wasn't enough to begin to cover any of the programs. And then the people in the community showed their disapproval, and they did come up with about $33,000."

The "disapproval" shown by the residents consisted of violence, practiced by citizens of the Hill on CPI storefront offices. The antipoverty organization came up, finally, with $32,120 to fund the HPA programs, but not until the situation had reached the point of crisis.

Harris said later he felt CPI had been wary of dealing with the group from the Hill because "we were a political threat to them. And there was a riot potential there; that bothered them, too. And there was a potential, once they agreed to do this type of thing, that *other* communities would be asking to handle their own money and design their own programs. Because up until that point, CPI had been designing the programs for the community, which nine out of ten times turned out to be failures because they weren't designing the programs around the wishes of the community.

"They designed them around what *they* felt were the needs of the community. Or they designed the programs around the kinds of things that would be easy to be funded and where the city would come off looking good. You know, all these things contributed to New Haven getting more money per capita than any other city in the country."

A semi-official record of the crisis was kept that summer by Richard Belford, a

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white attorney who, at that time, was the head of Mayor Lee's Commission on Equal Opportunities (and who shortly was to fall from official favor). Belford had a habit, as some lawyers do, of making notes to himself on what happens around him, and of making the notes while events are still fresh in his mind. While he was the executive director of the CEO, he was a prodigious narrative-writer and memo-compiler.

In December, 1966, Belford wrote a memorandum to Dennis Rezendes, the mayor's deputy for administration, in which he emphasized the importance of citizen participation. "We say in here, for example," he said, reading from his copy of the memo, "that it's very important for people to overcome their feelings of alienation from the quote power structure and to develop a sense that they can control their own destiny. Now we go on to say *this*, which runs into the barrier between us and the mayor: 'One probably inevitable result of this program will be to encourage a sense of independence on the part of many citizens, and it would not be unlikely for many citizens to assert this sense of independence in terms of political action. For better or worse, political action may take a form which is antagonistic to the existing political structure of the city, but it is suggested that this may be inevitable during the transitional period in achieving political sophistication.' "

Belford said he heard nothing of his proposals for almost five months. Then, in May, he learned that the mayor was calling a meeting of city agencies to discuss the possibility of summer violence. Belford wrote another memo, this one a five-page document on "potential summer unrest" that reflected ideas developed by Belford and John C. Daniels, the CEO's deputy director.

The second memo suggested that "some steps can be taken at this time to ease the tensions and to alter the conditions in the more sensitive neighborhoods (such as the Hill) . . . so as to minimize the conditions which may produce a riot." The suggestions, said the CEO staffers, were not "important long-range programs to bring about social change," but rather temporary steps that might be taken to meet "the immediate problems of this summer." They suggested, among the short-range steps, that the city install more street lights in the ghetto; clean the streets (and hire local residents to help clean them); hire, on a preferential basis, young people from the slums for summer employment; and improve relations between the police and the community by raising police salaries, allowing policemen to volunteer for patrol duty in the ghetto areas, urging them to participate in neighborhood civic affairs in their spare time (and, possibly, compensating them for this), and establishing programs whereby civilians could accompany policemen on foot and motor patrols.

Belford's narrative of the HPA-CPI controversy repeatedly made the point, although not in so many words, that CPI was worried about the HPA proposals and did not want to fund them. Hill Parents Association, he noted, felt that CPI was "paternalistic" and "that any funds which CPI was prepared to give for these programs were being given as a dole." HPA wanted Mayor Lee brought into the negotiations.

Belford himself entered the HPA-CPI controversy on June 9, 1967, when Fred Harris called him and said he was having difficulty with CPI. Through the intervention of CEO, discussions were started, and on June 12, Harris reported success: "It looked as if their requests were going to be honored," said Belford's narrative. On the following day, negotiations broke down. By June 14, he noted, "hostilities were high" in the Hill, "tensions were rising, and there were threats of violence."

Hill residents, who apparently had given up on CPI, were demanding a meeting with Mayor Lee, who was out of town. Finally, a meeting with the mayor was promised for the following morning. A little after midnight, about a dozen officials from the city and CPI started a five-hour meeting to formulate the recommendations they would make to the mayor later in the morning. Some of the topics of conversation, according to Belford, were these:

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• Should the proposed programs be accepted as written by HPA, "without critical analysis?"

• One of the programs seemed to call for more staff members than was necessary. "Is this an attempt by HPA to create a patronage base for future organizing, and, if so, should we resist it?"

• "If these programs are accepted and funded as requested by HPA, will this set a precedent for other neighborhood groups to submit programs? If so, does our acceptance of these programs put the city and CPI in a position where we will find it difficult to refuse other groups from time to time?" (To this, Belford appended a parenthetical comment: "This concern is somewhat strange in view of the fact that the whole antipoverty program is supposed to encourage the maximum feasible participation of the neighborhood residents.")

• Item Number 5 for discussion was: "In view of the earlier threats of violence, should we agree to the HPA requests, thereby appearing to be intimidated?"

Belford noted that at about the time Item Number 5 was being discussed, fire trucks arrived a few doors up the street, at the Dixwell office of CPI. The city officials went outside to see what was happening. The office window had been broken and two firebombs had been thrown inside. Then the officials learned that another CPI office had been attacked earlier. "We went back inside . . . to continue our discussion," recalled Belford. "Question Number 5 above received more emphasis at this time."

The group finally decided to recommend to the mayor that the programs be accepted as drawn up by HPA; that HPA be allowed to run the programs as it saw fit, including the hiring of staff; and that when the mayor met with the neighborhood people later in the morning, he should start things off by stating his agreement with the proposals.

All of this came to pass, and representatives of HPA, CPI, and other city agencies adjourned to work out details. Belford noted that the final agreements "were identical" to those proposed a week before. The difference, of course, was that a week before the city would have nothing, or at best very little, to do with HPA. It took pressure, it took violence, and it took a crisis to get the city to move.

Richard Belford was asked, some time after the $32,120 deal (as it came to be called), why he thought New Haven had failed to become the Model City it once was hailed as being. He replied:

"I think there are perhaps a number of reasons for it. I think one of them is that we make the mistake of operating from crisis to crisis with a view toward putting the lid on a crisis, or on an uncomfortable situation, when it arises, without making any real attempt to meet the underlying problems which have produced the crisis.

"And that, in turn, has made many people, especially poor people and black people, feel that there's not a real desire to meet the problem, because this kind of approach, I think, becomes pretty transparent after a while. It creates a situation where people who have legitimate grievances, legitimate points of view, and legitimate suggestions, find out that their grievances, their points of view and their suggestions are not going to be listened to or attended to when they present them in a nonviolent way.

"In essence, the message that comes through, the message that is really being transmitted to these people, is that the city administration will not really attend to the problems unless they're confronted with a crisis. And that's unfortunately the way to get the ear of the administration. This shows before, during, and after the riots."

The upshot of the $32,120 deal, he said, "was that it was not until the city administration was literally confronted with a crisis and with threatened violence that they agreed to give the funds for these programs, notwithstanding the fact that they agreed in principle that it would be a good idea to give these funds for these programs. And it turned out that even our local newspaper, which is anything but liberal on these questions, complimented, eventually, the city administration and the grass-roots people for doing something for the first time in the history of our re-

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development and antipoverty program—namely, funding a program that was developed by grass-roots people themselves. This was in the summer of 1967, after we had had an antipoverty program for *five years!* And yet this was the first time that a citizen-inspired program was finally going to be financed."

State of the City

If any city knew where it was going, and where urban America should be going, and how to get there, that city should have been New Haven.

New Haven was blessed with a liberal Democrat as its mayor. New Haven further blessed him with repeated political mandates and financial resources, and it refrained from active opposition to him long enough for him to demonstrate his ideas to the electorate and to other interested observers. New Haven and its mayor were blessed with unparalleled assistance from a Washington eager to invest in demonstrations that worked, and they were blessed with the invaluable interest and help of some segments of the "private sector," not the least of which was the Ford Foundation. By the end of the decade, New Haven should have known better than any other city where it was going.

But it did not. All that really could be said, as the end of the "Lee era" approached, and as the summing up started, was that there was no Model City, at least not yet.

If no Model City existed, and if almost limitless resources could not build one in 16 years, then perhaps there were at least some tentative reasons why a Model City could not be built. Perhaps there were some lessons that could be drawn from New Haven's experience.

It would be easy, and correct, to say that no city in America, including New Haven, has yet come up with a viable, sustained program of ctizen participation. Many mayors have bragged about the efforts they have made in that direction, but there is always a Saul Alinsky or a Fred Harris to point out that the people never did get control of their own programs. To some extent, the argument over citizen participation might seem to be a futile one: It does not exist, and probably will not exist. Yet the fight for citizen participation—for "neighborhood participation," for "maximum feasible participation"—is going to go on, whether mayors, governors, or Presidents like it or not.

Regardless of the intentions of the men who wrote the words "maximum feasible participation" into the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the result of the phrase, and of the aspirations it raised and the controversy it created, has been to convince vast numbers of Americans that what they had wanted all along was not impossible to achieve.

Such an effort should not have come as a surprise to some of the men who wrote the antipoverty legislation, since many of them were behavioral scientists, and behavioral scientists had been acquainted for some time with an idea called the "revolution of rising expectations." This is the notion that when people are completely subjugated they hardly ever revolt, but that when hope is offered to them—when their expectations are lifted by an event or a promise—they sometimes will stop at nothing in their efforts to get more; to get what they feel they deserve.

In New Haven, the militants were deprived of the chance to negotiate calmly and peacefully for their demands, and they were forced, instead, to precipitate crises; to get part of what they wanted through creating fear. And they knew that what is won through fear will not stay won long, for the people with power will take it back as soon as their fear subsides; as soon as the crisis is over; as soon as summer turns into autumn.

Richard Lee was billed as a man out to save a city. He obviously took delight in being recognized as a new-breed mayor (maybe the *first* of the new breed), a man trying to do something that had not been done before. But he was also a politician, and there is only one thing that really influences a politician in America, and that is a vote. There is no record that the black or otherwise oppressed voters of New

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Haven mounted any kind of sustained effort to impress Lee with their voting power.

It was not difficult to blame Lee, as many inside and outside of New Haven have done, for his paternalism, for his protectiveness of the programs he had initiated, for his unwillingness, or perhaps his inability, to change—to share power with a new, Populist ethnic politician of a sort he had not seen before, a man like Fred Harris.

But the record is very short on evidence that the citizens of New Haven tried —until, perhaps, it was too late—to tell Richard Lee that they wanted him to do anything but what he had been doing.

For so many years—since 1953—New Haveners really *had* been content to "let Dick do it alone." It was only as the end of the Sixties approached—a decade that was a very painful one, full of expectations that had been raised for everyone, then dashed by assassins' bullets, by rioting that many of the nation's leaders refused to understand, and by a war that refused to end by itself—that a significant percentage of the people in New Haven began to complain. Then, and only then, did they start looking for someone on whom to blame their own inaction of previous years. The logical target was Richard Lee.

Peter Almond disagreed with Lee on many subjects and on many occasions. He had been "radicalized" by what Lee had allowed to happen in the Hill. But Almond, like many others who became radicalized, could not find it within himself to blame Lee entirely. He spoke of this one night last summer.

"I don't think you can blame Lee," he said, "because he was doing the best he could to respond to the problems as he understands them. He is shaped by his own past, his own view of New Haven and the world. It's easy to try to blame him, and that is just what keeps us from making significant progress. I think that in the end history will say he started something great. It was only a contribution, though, to a whole chain of events in an entire era, and what he did has to be picked up and continued and given new interpretation and new meaning.

"In trying to understand what's wrong with New Haven right now, you have to understand that there is one man who is in office for 16 years. And then you have a problem because he is *now* committed to ideas which were really formed when he was just getting into office—in 1953. So the problem is that the man becomes a prisoner of his experience and his memory, and he has only so much energy to commit to new ideas, and his ideas, which were indeed the most bold ideas of the mid-Fifties, took us into the Sixties. They led the way in terms of what cities can do to solve their problems."

Mitchell Sviridoff, sitting in his comfortable office high in the magnificent Ford Foundation building in New York, kept up with what was happening in New Haven, even though he had been gone since 1966. The foundation still had money invested in the city's progress. Sviridoff kept in touch by telephone with people like Mayor Lee, his old friend, and Milton Brown, the current head of CPI. People from New Haven often walked into his office to talk over some program they were developing, usually with the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation.

What of the premise, he was asked, that if any city in America could properly rebuild herself, New Haven should be that city?

"Well," he replied, "I don't agree with the premise, first of all, that any city can do it by itself. The problems which the cities face—and New Haven's no exception—are *national* problems that only national policy can cope with.

"As an example: What can *any* city do about the problem of migration of the uneducated, oppressed, unskilled, unurbanized, black poor of the South? That's a problem that has to do with the new industrial revolution, and the problems that this population faces cannot be dealt with through city policy alone. It has to do with welfare policy, which is a national policy; it has to do with employment policy, which is national policy; it has to do with economic policy, which is national policy. And even housing has to

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do primarily with national policy.

"Now. Cities *can* do better. Some cities have done better than other cities. I think New Haven, until very recently, was doing much better than other cities, was making better use of federal programs than other cities. But to look to a mayor, and to look to a city, to solve complex problems of a national character, is to look for the impossible.

"Let me give you the characteristics of the period: Robert Dahl characterized the New Haven strategy as an executive-centered strategy. That was an accurate characterization. And even though CPI was independent of the city, I always publicly acknowledged that it was part of the executive coalition. I never pretended that it was anything but that.

"Now, there came a time when participation, or maximum feasible participation, as it was described in the Economic Opportunity Act, became very important, as a national issue and as a local issue. New Haven, because of its long history—and a successful history—of an executive-centered strategy, had difficulty making that adjustment. No question about that. And that was a factor.

"Second factor: There came a time somewhere in late '65—which happened to coincide with the time I was planning to leave, although that was a pure coincidence—when federal funds began to get cut back. That complicated the problem.

"Then there was a time—and all of these things happened roughly in the same period—when the talent began to leave New Haven. Each of these factors fed the others. Participation was an issue; the need for a drastic change in strategy; the cutback in federal funds; the exodus of talent—and all of this acted as a depressant on the mayor, both psychologically and physically."

Although the conflict between citizen participation and the executive-centered strategy was one of the factors in the city's loss of momentum, Sviridoff said, he did not necessarily advocate total citizen control of agencies and programs.

Nor, he said, would participatory perfection be accomplished through the regular channels of representative government. "If you leave to the Board of Aldermen what the city should be like, it would not be a city that the participatory advocates want. And so what the participatory advocates talk about is really something more than what the elective process produces.

"We're really talking about what some people call 'a piece of the action,' what others call a sharing of power. It takes more than what the elective process produces, because the elective process produces at its most extreme a winner-take-all situation. And Dick Lee, for a long time, was a winner-take-all politician.

"Those who win the winner-take-all kind of victory are not power-sharers, as a rule. And Dick Lee wasn't a power sharer. Power-sharing is a fine art, which no mayor has figured out how to do. And there just ain't no easy way. It means, in some cases, creating community-based corporations and delegating authority to those corporations. It means maybe decentralizing your school system and delegating a measure of authority and control to a locally-based group. It means setting up economic development corporations and putting some of your wealth into those corporations. It means allowing new leaders from the new groups—in this case, the black groups—to emerge as leaders; it means providing them with the instruments for the development of leadership.

"That's why I think Pat Moynihan missed the point in *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. The great achievement of the antipoverty program is not what's done in terms of program; it's what's done in terms of producing new leaders from this group, and making it possible for the leaders to emerge, to acquire experience and sophistication so that they in fact *can* share power.

"I think this is where Mayor Daley is wrong and where John Lindsay has been right. I think this is where the city of New Haven was slow in adjusting to new needs and new pressures."

Did Sviridoff think New Haven would regain its position, a solid step ahead of the social revolution?

"No. I don't see that happening." ■

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Memo of the Month

The following doomsday guide, distributed last year, is still in effect at the NLRB:

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Washington, D. C.

ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN

TO: All Employees

SUBJECT: Post-Attack Registration of Federal Employees

Civil Service Commission instructions require that government agencies remind all employees annually of their responsibilities under the Commission-operated registration system.

In the event of an attack all National Labor Relations Board employees should follow the procedure outlined below:

If you are prevented from going to your regular place of work because of an enemy attack or, if you are prevented from reporting to an emergency location — Go to the nearest Post Office, ask the Postmaster for a Federal Employee Emergency Registration Card, fill it out and return it to him.

He will see that it is forwarded to the office of Civil Service Commission which will maintain a registration file for your area. When your card is received the Civil Service Commission will notify us and we can then decide where and when you should report back for work.

Another important reason for mailing in your Registration Card as soon as possible is that it will enable us to keep you on the roster of active employees and enable us to forward your pay.

Even though you complete your Registration Card promptly, it may be a while before you are put back to work. In the meantime, you would be expected to volunteer your services to the civil defense authorities.

Approved for issuance:
C.S.W.

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Locking The Barn Door: Secretary Shultz and the Miners

by Robert Walters



Two weeks after United Mine Workers of America insurgent Joseph A. (Jock) Yablonski, his wife and his daughter were found murdered in their home in Clarksville, Pennsylvania, Labor Department Solicitor Laurence Silberman offered a major concession to Yablonski's supporters. He suggested that "maybe—just maybe—it's pretty difficult to expect an international union to properly investigate itself."

For almost six months prior to the deaths of the three members of the Yablonski family, the Labor Department had insisted otherwise, on the grounds that its interpretation of existing federal statutes governing labor-union elections precluded any federal intervention in the bitterly contested UMWA election until the union had a chance to "clean itself up."

Officials of the Labor Department, as well as policymakers in other federal agencies whose intervention had been sought by Yablonski and his backers, repeatedly cited two factors upon which bureaucrats regularly rely to explain their non-enforcement of the law—"legislative intent" and "long-established policy."

"Legislative intent"—what Congress really meant when it approved the law, as opposed to what the law actually says—is presumably divined by lawyers in various executive branch agencies who pore over committee reports, records of floor debates, and sundry other documents in an effort to find the hidden meaning of the statute in question. "Long-established policy" is more easily explainable. It means simply: "We haven't done it that way before and we're not about to change."

To the extent that the executive branch of government refused to interest itself in the UMWA election to any substantial degree prior to Yablonski's death—and indeed has been less than enthusiastic about the matter in the weeks since the slaying—the case is almost a classic example of what happens to legislation after it is approved by Congress and signed by the President.

After all the attention-grabbing committee hearings, the dramatic votes on the floor of the House and the Senate, and the solemn White House bill-signing ceremonies, legislation is consigned to an obscure corner of the federal bureaucracy where enforcement inevitably depends on:

Robert Walters is a reporter for the Washington Evening Star.

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the personal and professional viewpoints of the executive branch officials in whose custody the statute is placed, the political clout possessed by the pressure groups directly affected, and the interest maintained by Congressional proponents of the law.

At issue here is the Labor-Management and Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959—familiarly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act because its principal sponsors were Representative Phillip M. Landrum (D-Georgia) and Senator Robert G. Griffin (R-Mich.). (Griffin was a member of the House at the time.) Its introductory statement of purpose is quite explicit:

> The Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility of the federal government to protect employees' rights to organize, choose their own representatives, bargain collectively and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection. . . .
>
> [It] is essential that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations.
>
> The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which will require further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants and their officers and representatives.

The law provides a number of very specific guarantees in relation to union elections. Among them:

- "Adequate safeguards to insure a fair election shall be provided, including the right of any candidate to have an observer at the polls and at the counting of ballots."
- "Every national or international labor organization . . . shall be under a duty, enforceable at the suit of any bona fide candidate for office in such labor organization in the district court of the United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office, to comply with all reasonable requests of any candidate to distribute by mail or otherwise at the candidate's expense campaign literature in aid of such person's candidacy to all members in good standing of such labor organization and to refrain from discrimination in favor of or against any candidate with respect to the use of lists of members."
- "In any election . . . which is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office . . . and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any members thereof."
- "No moneys received by any labor organization by way of dues, assessment or similar levey, and no moneys of an employer shall be contributed or applied to promote the candidacy of any person in an election. . . ."

Yablonski announced his candidacy for the UMWA presidency on May 29, 1969. Shortly thereafter, he wrote to UMWA President W. A. (Tony) Boyle, the man he was seeking to unseat. Yablonski specifically requested that the union mail out, at his expense, campaign literature to all union members. The union refused, and Yablonski was forced to file a civil suit in U.S. District Court in Washington to have the law enforced. On June 20th, Judge Howard Corcoran issued a preliminary injunction directing the UMWA to distribute Yablonski campaign literature.

Yablonski had been acting director of Labor's Non-Partisan League, the UMWA's lobbying arm. But on June 6th, only one

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week after his declaration of candidacy, he was summarily removed from the post by Boyle. Again, Yablonski was forced to turn to the judiciary for enforcement of the law, and on July 15th, Judge Corcoran ruled that Yablonski's dismissal was an illegal reprisal, as defined by the Landrum-Griffin Act.

But while the court was acting with the speed that few expect from the judicial branch these days, the executive branch—specifically the Labor Department—was clearly in no hurry to become involved in the UMWA election.

On July 9th, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., the veteran labor, civil-rights and civil-liberties lawyer, wrote the first of a series of letters to Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz. He alleged that "the (UMWA) incumbents are engaged in massive violations of the Landrum-Griffin Act in order to save their posts in the union" and asked that an investigation be initiated. More than a week passed with no reply from Shultz but with continuing reports from UMWA locals about allegedly illegal conduct on the part of those supporting the incumbent UMWA candidates.

On July 18th, Rauh, who served as Yablonski's counsel throughout the campaign, again wrote to Shultz. Among the practices cited in Rauh's first two letters:

In order to qualify for a place on the ballot, Yablonski needed the nomination of at least 50 UMWA locals during the official nominating period of July 9-August 9. International and district union officials attempted to revoke the charters of many of the locals where Yablonski was known to have enough support to receive the nomination. In still other instances, efforts were made to consolidate locals in order to prevent a Yablonski nomination. Where neither of those tactics was feasible, a third technique was used.

It is best described in a letter to Yablonski from Stanley J. Finkas, a miner living in St. Michael, Pa. and a member of UMWA local 6394:

"The officers made a special meeting on Saturday, July 9, 1969, to vote for you or Tony. The rank and file was not notified of this going on. They did not post any notices on the mine bulletin board so the men did not know what was going on. The vote came out 13 for Tony and 6 for you. The men are asking for another special meeting and notices posted for another election. I know you would come out better if we could get another election."

Wanson Ray Hutchinson, president of UMWA local 1374 in Oakwood, Virginia, submitted to Yablonski a sworn affidavit in which he said paid union officials summoned him to a UMWA office and "ordered me to 'talk down' anyone who nominated Mr. Yablonski from the floor of my local union nomination meeting." Nevertheless, Hutchinson's local nominated Yablonski on July 27th. The following day, Hutchinson and three members of his local were invited to make an all-expenses-paid trip to Pittsburgh, where officials of UMWA District 5 would "tell us the truth" about Yablonski.

Hutchinson and his companions were in Pittsburgh for four days, but when they returned to Virginia the union paid them for six days of lost work time in addition to reimbursement for all travel expenses, Shultz was told. When Hutchinson persisted in his support for Yablonski and asked UMWA officials about the possible consequences of bucking the incumbent union leadership, he was told "that a local union president supporting Mr. Yablonski might be removed from office for circulating false campaign statements—i.e., statements critical of incumbent UMWA President Boyle," Rauh said in his complaint to the Labor Department.

There were numerous other allegations: In Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, "the only notices posted (announcing nomination meetings) were at remote job sites long since abandoned by the mining industry." In Southern Illinois, the presidents of "pensioner locals"—those composed of retired miners who rely on the UMWA leadership for meager pensions of $30 a week—"were being offered $150 to $200 each to coerce their locals into nominating incumbent Boyle and to block nominations for the Yablonski ticket." In Fredericktown, Pennsylvania, a Boyle campaign worker "offered to pay $5 a vote for Boyle at a nomination election of local union 688."

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Shultz responded to Rauh's July 9th and July 18th pleas for prompt initiation of a Labor Department investigation in a letter of July 23rd. It was to establish a pattern for all subsequent government replies to requests for intervention.

Rauh had cited as authority for a potential Labor Department investigation Section 601(a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, which states: "The Secretary shall have the power when he believes it necessary in order to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this [law] . . . to make an investigation and in connection therewith he may enter such places and inspect such records and accounts and question such persons as he may deem necessary. . . ."

Shultz said that although he "does have the power under Section 601(a) . . . to investigate election irregularities at any time, it is the Department of Labor's long-established policy not to undertake investigation of this kind without having a valid complaint under Section 402(a) after an election has been completed. In the absence of such a complaint the Secretary of Labor lacks the enforcement authority prescribed in Section 402(b)."

The conflict between the two interpretations of the law stems from the fact that although the section cited by Rauh applies to the entire Landrum-Griffin Act, the law also includes a specific procedure for enforcement of its provisions regarding union elections. Section 401 says any member of a labor union "who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws" of his union or "has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month alleging violation of any provision" requiring honest elections.

The statute outlines a tortuous procedure which must be followed before the challenged election is ruled void and a new one held under the supervision of the Labor Department. It begins with a 60-day investigation of the complaint, followed by the filing of a civil suit, if the government accepts the complaint, then a court trial and resolution of any appeals from the court decision, and finally nullification of the original election results.

On the question of legislative intent, Shultz wrote Rauh that "the Congress intended to preserve independence and self-government in the labor movement by giving unions opportunity to correct violations insofar as possible before the Secretary of Labor becomes involved in elections of union officers."

Shultz added: "The Department of Labor, as a matter of policy, has never initiated or conducted an investigation of an election prior to the actual conduct of the election. In those very few situations where investigations have been conducted prior to the receipt of a valid complaint under Section 402(a), the Department acted only after the election had been completed or a request for intervention had been received from both parties involved."

One of those cases involved now-imprisoned Teamsters Union President James R. Hoffa—for whom no labor law was too obscure, no legislative intent too restrictive, and no "long-established policy" too firm to preclude enthusiastic government prosecution. The only other instance in which the Labor Department invoked the election provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act came in 1965 and involved the International Union of Electrical Workers. In that case, the initial results released by the IUE showed that incumbent President James B. Carey had won re-election by 23,316 votes, but the government-supervised recount gave the presidency to challenger Paul J. Jennings by a margin of 2,913 votes.

Finally, Shultz disposed of Rauh's specific complaints in a point-by-point effort to prove that there was nothing the Labor Department could do for Yablonski anyhow. Two problems had been settled in court, Shultz noted (without saying whether the Labor Department should have had primary responsibility for their resolution). A number of allegations of violence or threats of violence were handily disposed of in the time-honored fashion of the bureaucracy; they were referred

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to another government agency—in this case the Justice Department. As for the remainder of the complaints, Shultz said he simply didn't have the authority to act.

Upset by Shultz's July 23rd letter, Rauh immediately requested an appointment with the Secretary so that he could present his case personally. At three o'clock the next afternoon they met in Shultz's office. Government officials decline to discuss the meeting, but Rauh recalls that "I used the word 'violence' over and over again. I said, 'The fact that you're in the field investigating will prevent violence. Your presence is what's going to stop violence.' "

Rauh argued that Section 601 of the Landrum-Griffin Act "was obviously intended to supplement Sections 401 and 402" and that he was not asking the Labor Department to initiate any formal complaint against the UMWA leadership. Rather, he was asking the Department to gather the evidence in the field while it was still available and hold it for use in a probable action after the election. Shultz turned him down.

The next day, on July 25th, Rauh submitted another lengthy letter to Shultz. After detailing 15 new allegations of Landrum-Griffin Act violations, the Yablonski attorney concluded:

"When I left your office yesterday afternoon, I predicted that, unless you acted, there would be acceleration in the violations of the law you are charged with enforcing. As we spent last night rechecking the oral allegations I had made to you, we also validated that prediction. The gauntlet has now been laid down to us and to you by the Boyle crowd—even if we get the 50 nominations, they will find a way not to count them. . . . It is not too much to say that only your announcement of an investigation of illegal activities inside the UMWA election process can prevent fraud and intimidation and possible violence from one end of the mining country to the other."

Among the new allegations presented in that letter to Shultz:

- On July 13th, a UMWA employee telephoned Charles Shawkey, the pro-Yablonski president of UMWA local 9616 in Boomer, West Virginia, "and threatened to kill him."
- On July 19th, a member of UMWA local 1577 in Girardville, Pennsylvania, was approached by a UMWA international representative who "offered him $5 to leave or to vote for Boyle. The union member refused and was offered $5 more, but this bribe also was rejected."
- On the same day, UMWA local 7604 in Kopperstown, West Virginia, held a regularly scheduled meeting. "No notice was given that there would be nominations. As a result, only about 40 people showed up, whereas there are at least 700 members of that local.

On July 30th, Rauh wrote still another letter to Shultz, but the Labor Department steadfastly refused to open an investigation. Finally, on August 5th—four days before the close of the month-long nominating period—the Labor Department took one very small step. W. J. Usery, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations, sent the following telegram to Boyle:

"The Department of Labor has received repeated serious allegations of widespread violations of the election provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act to prevent candidates from being nominated and their names placed on the ballot. We have declined thus far to conduct any investigation of complaints alleging violation of . . . the act. However, I strongly urge you as President of the international union to make every effort to have locals, districts and the international comply with the law to obviate further investigation and possible litigation and to give all members of the UMWA the opportunity to exercise their democratic rights under the union constitution and the law. If complaints are received or renewed upon the completion of the nominating phase of the election the Department of Labor may find it necessary to investigate such complaints before the balloting occurs in December, 1969."

Indeed, there were further complaints, but there never was any investigation—even though Shultz had told Rauh in a

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July 25th letter that "the developing circumstances in this case may . . . lead us to consider this matter further after the nominations are closed on August 9."

On August 13th, the day after the UMWA announced that Yablonski had received the nominations of 96 locals and thus would have his name on the December 9th ballot, Rauh wrote Shultz for the fifth time to complain about "unprecedented violence, despotism and corruption" within the union. Among the new complaints:

On July 19th, at a meeting of UMWA local 6045 in Footdale, Pennsylvania, two UMWA district representatives "attempted to override the desire of the membership for a secret ballot vote by telling them that UMWA General Counsel Edward Carey had made a ruling that the UMWA constitution prohibited a secret ballot vote in nomination elections. . . . Even after the membership rejected the purported ruling and obtained a secret ballot vote, [UMWA official Joseph] Pesar was observed to mark at least 15 ballots for persons who were voting."

In Fairview, West Virginia, UMWA local 9099 nominated Yablonski by a vote of 49 to 45. But after a number of members had left the meeting, a new vote was called. Boyle was declared the winner by a margin of 36 to 35. Similarly, in Brookwood, Alabama, UMWA local 8878 nominated Yablonski but union officials "coerced a new nomination election with a different result." And there were countless stories of Yablonski sympathizers being either threatened or bought off, the latter accomplished through the creation of positions for "special organizers" and "dust committeemen."

On November 26th, only two weeks before the election, the Labor Department issued a carefully worded five-page memorandum on the subject of UMWA finances. Although Yablonski had referred repeatedly in his campaign speeches to the alleged misuse of union funds by UMWA officers, no complaint on that subject had ever been lodged with the Labor Department. Nevertheless, the Landrum-Griffin Act includes detailed requirements for the reporting of union finances to the Labor Department's Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports.

The memo from Leonard J. Lurie, acting director of that office, reported that: "Some [UMWA] officials have claimed reimbursement for hotel expenses during periods when they were at their places of residence, some have claimed expenses for hotels and travel for practically every day of the year, and some have claimed identical amounts for hotel expenses and automobile travel for every day spent in travel. An official, by his own admission, has spent varying periods of time on vacation and claimed expenses of $20 a day for his entire vacation."

Referring to a UMWA account known as the "Agency Fund," Lurie reported: "In 1960, the top officers of the union transferred $850,000 from the general funds of the union to establish a retirement fund to pay the three officers of the union their full salaries annually upon retirement after at least 10 years of service in office. At the present time this fund has approximately $1.5 million. The fund has never been adequately disclosed in the annual financial report submitted to the Department of Labor."

Finally, on the subject of nepotism, Lurie noted that Boyle's daughter, Antoinette, receives an annual salary of $40,000—the same amount paid to the union's vice president and its secretary-treasurer—for her services as a UMWA attorney in Billings, Montana. In addition, R. J. Boyle, the brother of the international union president, receives a UMWA salary of $25,000 in his role as president of the union's District 27, also based in Billings. John Owens, the UMWA's secretary-treasurer, had two sons on the union payroll. And Harrison Combs, Sr., assistant director of the UMWA legal department, had three sons, a daughter-in-law and a son-in-law all on the payroll drawing annual salaries ranging from $7,200 to $40,000.

Noting that Owens reported expenses of $4,945 for 1967, the last year for which complete figures were available, Lurie added this footnote: "The union also pays rent for a hotel suite in Washington for the use of Secretary-Treasurer John

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Owens. In 1967 this amounted to $11,500 which was not shown as an expense payment to Mr. Owens."

At the time of its release, the Lurie memo was widely viewed as a Labor Department effort to respond indirectly to Yablonski's complaints. In fact, it was released only after Labor Department officials discovered that Yablonski's lawyers were preparing to file still another civil suit against Boyle, using much of the same financial information. And although the Labor officials went to the trouble of compiling and publicizing the figures, they took no action on the basis of their own report. Instead, the findings were simply referred to the Justice Department and Internal Revenue Service "for appropriate action." Nothing has been heard of the matter since.

Federal District Judge George Hart, hearing a civil case in which Yablonski alleged that the election was about to be stolen by the Boyle forces, said: "The trouble is, as I see it, so far as this court is concerned, when you start talking about a fair election you are not talking about anything much that I can do anything about. The Secretary of Labor will attend to this business ex *post facto* and . . . the courts can't get involved therein. If you want to say that is a funny way to do things, I couldn't agree with you more."

On December 1st, Rauh submitted his last appeal for assistance to Shultz: "If the incumbent UMWA officers are allowed to steal this election on December 9th with the Department of Labor standing idly by, then everyone will know that enforcement of this law is a joke. The remedy of a post-election lawsuit by the Secretary of Labor to set aside a fraudulent election and a re-election four years or so down the road, with the illegal incumbents in office for the whole intervening time, is a hollow pretense."

There was no Labor Department intervention. The election was held, as scheduled, with the UMWA leadership printing 275,000 ballots although the maximum number of potential voters was 193,550. Some locals received far too many ballots from Washington, while others—particularly those where Yablonski was known to have support—didn't seem to receive enough for their membership. There were reports of Yablonski poll-watchers being physically threatened, of ballot boxes disappearing into the night, and of unrequested "assistance" in marking ballots being offered by scores of UMWA local and district officials at polling places throughout the country.

According to the UMWA's unofficial vote count, Yablonski lost the election, but he refused to concede defeat. In his last major public statement, on December 10th, he said:

"Boyle's re-election is directly attributable to his embezzlement of millions of dollars from the UMWA treasury for his campaign purposes, his use of more than 500 UMWA employees as full-time campaign aides, his padding of the union payroll with at least 1,000 new employees whose sole job was to campaign for Boyle, and the hiring of countless hundreds who were paid by Boyle to cart retired miners to the polls by car and bus.

"Yet, in the face of the most dishonest election in the history of the American labor movement, the Labor Department, the Justice Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation stood by idly as thousands of miners were callously denied their democratic rights. It demonstrated that Landrum-Griffin is only a paper law; it is not put into practice. One thing is clear: if the Labor Department had assumed its duty and overseen the election, Boyle would have been defeated."

Although the voting was over, Yablonski, Rauh, and their allies were determined to press their case for a post-election challenge to Boyle's presidency. On December 15th, the defeated candidate and his lawyer met with Silberman, Lurie, and other Labor Department officials to again seek governmental intervention without the necessity of following the complex Landrum-Griffin formula. "At the end of the meeting, they told us they would consider it," Rauh recalls. But on December 23rd, the Labor Department announced that it had no plans to interfere with the election.

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On December 18th, Yablonski initiated the process of formally contesting the election results. In letters to Boyle, the union's other two international officers, and the three "International Tellers" who were to conduct the official ballot count, he served notice of his intent to challenge the election. The last paragraph of his letter to the tellers said:

"Tellers, stand up before it's too late. I, too, once submitted to the discipline of Tony Boyle. But I shall die an honest man because I finally rejected that discipline. I realized at long last that there are values so great in this world that the time had come to stand up and be counted for decency in our union and a better life for the miners we represent. Your conscience will have to be your guide."

Although Yablonski presented far fewer complaints to the Justice Department than to the Labor Department, his success in convincing Justice to take any action matched his record at Labor. In addition to the data on UMWA finances forwarded from Labor to Justice, there were several other union-related complaints being investigated by Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

On June 28th, Yablonski was concluding a private campaign meeting in a Springfield, Illinois, hotel room when one of the approximately 15 UMWA officers present at the time struck him from behind with a karate chop to the neck. Yablonski was unconscious for 7 to 8 minutes. When he regained consciousness, all of those present denied having made the attack. A complaint was lodged with the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice Department's Criminal Division. Justice Department and FBI officials were reported to be investigating the case last summer, but no prosecution has ever been initiated.

Also referred to the same Justice Department unit was Yablonski's charge that "sham loans have been made to [UMWA] districts to finance Boyle's campaign." Yablonski specifically alleged that Boyle held a series of conferences last February with the presidents of various union districts and told them each to request a "loan" from UMWA headquarters, then use those funds to finance Boyle's campaign in their regions. Rauh says he fully documented two cases in which UMWA checks for $2,500 were ostensibly cashed for payment of "organizing expenses" but in fact were used to pay Boyle campaign costs.

Rauh said he took the actual checks to Henry E. Peterson, head of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. "I developed the case and took it to him," he said. "But they later told me that they didn't think they could convince a jury to convict anyone because Boyle heard about our material and saw to it that the money was returned."

The FBI had little to do with the UMWA election until after the discovery of Yablonski's body. But even then it appeared unable to decide how extensive its participation was to be. The FBI was called into the case on an active basis only after Rauh visited Mitchell to plead for the use of federal investigators in the effort to find the killer or killers. When Mitchell announced his decision to grant that request two hours after Rauh's visit, he said the FBI was being brought into the case at the request of Pennsylvania Governor Raymond P. Shafer.

As for the status of their investigation into the allegations that union funds were used in Boyle's campaign, one Justice Department official says that "the matter is still under investigation" but emphasizes that "we have very limited jurisdiction to take action." However, another Justice Department man insists that it is "premature" to assume there will be no prosecution. He says that grand juries in both Washington and Pittsburgh are actively interested in the matter.

Three weeks after Yablonski's body was found, the government's position was summed up by a pair of federal officials, one working on the case at the Labor Department, the other at the Justice Department. Labor: "It's important to keep the death of Yablonski separated from the election situation until a connection is proved. So far, there is no evidence of any connection." Justice: "When we find a violation of the law, we will prosecute it. We haven't found one yet."■

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The Philippines: U.S.



There is no land quite like the Philippines. In so many respects it has so many things going for it that many other young countries do not have. The quality of Filipino education, for example, is evidenced by the ease with which engineers and doctors from the Philippines find employment in the United States and other nations. The country's apparent political stability also stands out in a world in which the coup has become an ever more routine means of changing governments. Six times since 1946 Filipino voters have gone to the polls to elect a President, and on half of these occasions an incumbent chief executive was defeated and subsequently left office peacefully. Economically, the Philippines is one of the few countries in Asia to have so increased its rice production in recent years as to have a surplus where once it had a deficit.

Despite these accomplishments, however, the country may have more problems today than at any time since it regained its independence in 1946.

Take the Philippines' vaunted political stability, for instance. Defeated candidates for public office invariably accuse

Richard Butwell, who formerly lived in the Philippines, last visited there during that country's 1969 presidential campaign. He is Professor of Southeast Asian Politics at American University.

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America's Former (?) Colony

by Richard Butwell

their successful opponents of every type of trickery, as Senator Sergio Osmena, Jr., did after his defeat last November in President Ferdinand E. Marcos's successful bid for re-election. But they accept the results of the election and, equally important, do not feel threatened by those who have defeated them at the polls. This, however, is largely because all Filipino politicians derive from the same small and ideologically united élite, and their interests (beyond the desire to hold public office) are not jeopardized by such defeats. The real "ins" have thus far never been replaced by the real "outs."

Marcos, who last year became the first Filipino President to gain re-election, left the then-ruling liberals in 1964, when he was president of the Senate. He joined the "opposition" because he was denied the opportunity to be his party's presidential nominee. In the three presidential elections of the Sixties—1961, 1965, and 1969—at least one of the four candidates nominated by the two major parties for either the presidency or the vice presidency had switched parties—sometimes only months earlier. This *de facto* domination of the "opposition" by the same interests that control the government has prevented those who oppose the prevailing leadership from competing for a real change, at least peacefully. This is why there will probably be a resort to large-scale coordinated violence in this decade by the long unrepresented Filipino political left—the overwhelming dimensions of Marcos's 1969 re-election victory notwithstanding. What has seemed to be stability in fact has been suppression, particularly on the local level—with all that this means in terms of potential *in*stability.

So it is with several of the Philippines' other apparent advantages: what seems at first glance to be an advantage is often a serious problem. The large number of well-trained Filipino doctors and other specialists who easily find employment abroad, for example, do not represent a surplus of talent except in terms of the country's incapacity to satisfy their often highly demanding material aspirations. Thus, they are yet another indication that many educated Filipinos would rather be

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Americans than Filipinos (as shown by the long line of would-be immigrants waiting outside the United States Embassy in Manila every day).

Similarly, if the Philippines no longer needs to import the rice on which most of its inhabitants subsist, it is also true that there was no corresponding drop in the country's foreign-exchange drain during the first Marcos administration. Far less essential items than rice were imported in 1969, the year in which the Philippines became a rice-exporting nation—big (and air-conditioned) foreign cars, for example, among other luxury items. The rice problem was apparently solved, but one of the many potential benefits of its solution, the conservation of declining foreign-exchange reserves, was not realized. Filipino dollar reserves dropped from $200 million to $137 million between 1967 and 1969.

Besides these difficulties, the Philippines has another problem that is almost without parallel among the other former Western colonies of the world. This is the persistence of its excessive dependence on the United States and, even more surprising, the gross idealization of America and Americans, even today, by some Filipinos. Today, at the start of the 1970's, the United States still mans the most important military bases it operated before colonial rule ended in 1946. Americans still have the right to invest in the Philippines (and to own and develop its natural resources) on a level of equality with Filipinos—so-called "parity"—a privilege not accorded any other ex-colonial ruler by any former colony anywhere else in the world.

Filipinos, while critical of both the bases and parity, nonetheless press for continued preferential access to the big American market and for retention of their share of the lucrative United States sugar quota (with its higher price than otherwise available on the international market). Even President Marcos, whose 1969 re-election resulted partly from a late campaign expression of super-nationalism with anti-American overtones, was willing to let a Filipino civil-action contingent remain in Vietnam until his re-election—in return for a $39 million American financial contribution to his government.

American economic rights in the Philippines expire in 1974, and talks are due to begin this year on renegotiation of the bases agreement, which has been altered several times since it came into being in 1946. The American presence reflected in these two agreements, however, is only part of the problem. The real difficulty lies in the minds of many Filipinos. Far too many dream of escape to America (in 1969, for example, more doctors and nurses emigrated to the United States from the Philippines than from the rest of the world put together). Other Filipinos seek to follow the American model uncritically in solving their nation's not necessarily similar problems. And those who attack the United States often excuse their own country's shortcomings, such as the widespread violence, by claiming that there is a greater manifestation of the same problem in America. In only one of the Philippines' 54 provinces, however—Ilocos Sur—849 persons were murdered from 1966 to 1969, which cannot be explained away by reciting crime rates in the United States (a favorite pastime of Manila newspaper columnists). Too many Filipinos think of too many things in American terms.

The Philippines has accomplished as much as it has—which is considerable—in spite of its politicians rather than because of them. This is largely because all the Philippine Presidents since Manuel Roxas, who was elected on the eve of independence in 1946, have bent so much of their energies toward protecting their position or trying to lay the political groundwork for re-election to a second term. And this included President Marcos in the last 18 months of his first four-year term.

A Chance for Change

At the start of the 1970's, which could be the last decade in which the Philippines

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has a chance to effect major change peacefully, four circumstances combine to give the country an unusual opportunity to break with the past. It is almost as if the Filipinos had been given the opportunity to declare their independence anew—and this time to do it right.

Probably the most important of these circumstances is Marcos's re-election triumph, which was second in magnitude only to the record 1953 election of the late Ramon Magsaysay. Because no Filipino President had ever before been elected to a second term, there has always before been the need for a President to spend his first year in office organizing a government (which inevitably included the allocation of rewards to backers in the campaign). And always, too, there was the need to devote the last year (or more) of a presidential term to the pursuit of re-election—not least of all in the case of former President Macapagal, who initially declared his intention not to seek a second term. Marcos today, however, is unique: he has a government in being, and he is constitutionally precluded from seeking a third term. The opportunity for decisive leadership has never been greater in the Philippines.

The other converging circumstances derive from events that are still evolving. The United States, on which the Philippines has depended so heavily in the past, has said it intends to disengage from the war in Vietnam and to lessen its presence in Southeast Asia as a whole. Far from there being strong opposition to such disengagement in the United States, which would make an American military withdrawal from the Philippines politically costly for the President executing it, there is a growing demand for such a move.

The expiration in 1974 of the unpopular 1956 Laurel-Langley agreement governing U.S.-Filipino economic relations makes a redefinition of those relations imperative. Since change there will be (and a reduction in the importance of American economic interests in the islands), the United States should think twice about pressing for the perpetual validity of property and other advantages acquired since 1946. Such restraint would go far to persuade the Filipino people that the U.S. wants the best possible relations with the important Southeast Asian nation it once ruled. The United States has already indicated that it will not seek an extension of parity beyond its expiration in 1974, but it has also made clear that Americans are entitled to retain properties obtained under parity between 1946 and 1974. The Philippines, as a sovereign country, could very easily wipe out such holdings, but why should it come to that?

Last, but not least important, next year will mark a milestone in Philippine history, the 25th anniversary of independence from the United States. The event will be honored by the holding of a constitutional convention to determine whether the structure of Philippine government needs to be changed. The constitution under which the country is governed was drawn up in 1935, when the United States still ruled the land, and many think it excessively imitative of American institutional arrangements. To take one example: the Philippines has a Senate only because the United States had one at the time the Filipino constitution was written. But unlike those in the United States, its 24 Senators (eight elected every other year) are chosen by the whole people, just as the Filipinos (like the Americans) elect their President. The United States Senate gives representation to the 50 states that comprise the American federal union, but the Senate's chief contribution in the Philippines seems to be the never-ending rivalry between its 24 would-be Presidents and the incumbent President.

Whether the Filipinos or the Americans seize the opportunities offered by these convergent circumstances remains to be seen. For the Americans, the task is far easier. The United States should have modified its economic role in the Philippines long ago. That role is almost wholly the result of America's former colonial presence; it does not come from operation of those free economic forces on which, Americans claim, their own great economic system was built. Parity was an act of economic intimidation that must rank among the least noble deeds of the

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generally far-sighted Truman Administration. The Filipinos were forced—by the circumstance of widespread war destruction—to amend their basic law after World War II to permit the United States extraordinary investment opportunities in their land. If the Philippines did not alter its constitution, the Truman government threatened, there would be no American rehabilitation assistance (even though the Americans governed the islands against the will of the Filipino people and were unable to prevent the fall of the country to Japan).

It is too late to undo such past behavior, but it is not too late for today's Americans to show today's Filipinos how much the American attitude towards their country has matured. This can be done partly by the largely symbolic act of disavowing parity before its expiration, and partly by not pressing for Filipino acceptance of the perpetual validity of property rights acquired by Americans within the parity framework since 1946.

The United States should also consider relinquishing its bases in the Philippines (or at least altering their character) if this would improve Filipino-American relations and encourage a spirit of greater self-reliance on the part of the Philippine government and people. The bases are not vital to the defense of the United States; they are much more important to the Philippines (whether Filipinos realize this or not). If the Filipinos urge a continued American military presence in their country (and if this also fulfills a *real* American need), the least the United States can do is to respond more sympathetically to Filipino demands for a larger voice in determining which government will have jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. military personnel. Some American servicemen have seemed to derive sports-like pleasure from shooting at scavenging Philippine nationals in and about U.S. bases. Filipino feelings about such shootings run high, and justifiably so. American military personnel committing crimes against Filipino citizens should be tried in Filipino courts—which would probably sharply curtail the incidence of such crimes.

Philippine Problems

Why are the problems facing President Marcos in his unprecedented second administration much more awesome than those confronting the United States in dealing with the Philippines? In his first four years in power (1966-69), Marcos probably provided more effective leadership than any previous President—increasing food output and building new roads, bridges, and schoolhouses, among other accomplishments. His re-election was clearly a vote for performance over promises. The rural, regional, and Manila returns all reflected a departure from the anti-administration voting of past presidential elections, suggesting a new maturity on the part of the Filipino electorate. But the question now is whether the country's major interests will support Marcos in his efforts to provide more effective leadership in his second term. There are many ways such interests can block even the best-intentioned President —not least of all through the Congress, which failed in 1968 to support Marcos's efforts to increase the income tax paid by wealthy Filipinos.

Filipino leadership, for the most part, has not sought to reform a shockingly inequitable economic and social system in the years since independence—largely because many of the interests that profit from the exploitation of their fellow men are the same interests that support the politicians who have governed the country for the last 24 years. Ten per cent of the population own 90 per cent of the wealth, while three-fourths of the people live below the so-called "poverty line." In the province of Negros Occidental, to illustrate the inequities of the system, feudalistic sugar barons pay their serf-like laborers only a quarter of the legal minimum wage, yet they report full payment to the government for tax purposes. In no land in Southeast Asia is there a greater gap between the few rich and the many poor. And the gap is growing. The rich keep getting richer, but the poor are less well-off relatively with each passing year.

The Philippine economic problem,

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however, is also a problem of far less industrialization than the country's natural resources and the skill and training of its people would seem to permit. (Slow-moving Filipino economic development poses problems, in a world of unstable commodity prices and rising costs, for various imported manufactured goods and capital equipment.) It is a problem, too, of excessive dependence on foreign credits, another sign of the non-self-reliance of the Philippines as a country. And it is a problem of graft, smuggling, and fraudulent import declarations—all made possible by what is probably the most easy-to-bribe bureaucracy in all Asia.

So many copies of *Reader's Digest* were being stolen as they arrived in the country that the *Digest* finally decided to publish a separate edition in the Philippines as the only way to beat the pier thieves. Dishonesty may have benefitted the country in this instance, but most thieves, smugglers, and corrupt officials cost their country millions of dollars annually in higher prices and lost revenues—perhaps as much as $300 million a year.

Such behavior subverts the country's potential economic progress. And those who live a life of splendor amid squalor in Manila (and in the often feudally ruled rural areas of the nation) import more luxury goods and travel abroad in greater numbers than the élite of any other land in Asia. Many such Filipinos also hide part of their wealth in banks in Europe and America. President Marcos's recent action in restricting the amount of money that can be taken abroad when travelling indicates that the Filipino leader is aware of the economic losses occasioned by the high-spending Filipino traveller. The Philippine chief executive also moved to curb the volume of imports by 45 per cent.

President Marcos, in his second administration, will be hard pressed to eliminate these various inequities, losses, and waste, although he has already started to try to do so. Many persons in and about his administration—as well as others who supported him in the 1969 election—are among the beneficiaries of one of the most unequal distribution systems in the world. But Marcos will have to crack down—"to give up something to save the rest," as he himself once put it—or the mounting revolutionary forces in the country will ultimately come to devour the élite of which he himself is so much a part.

The hour is one for boldness—on the part of the American as well as the Filipino government. United States tariff preferences and the American sugar quota help to perpetuate some of the Philippines' worst economic evils, especially those of the most backward rural parts of the country. It might well be in the interest of the whole Filipino people if the United States were to end in 1974 its indirect encouragement of the more exploitative areas of the agricultural sector of the economy which exist, in part, because of the financial support they receive from American economic policies.

It is often said that there is "too much politics" in the Philippines. Probably the opposite is the case. The Philippines has not had enough politics—of the right kind. There is no country with regular elections in which there is less real political competition. It is not that the franchise is not widely shared or used—it is. The problem is that the candidates on both the local and national levels are invariably the men (and women) with the greatest financial resources. Marcos himself, for example, bought the 1965 Nacionalista presidential nomination after quitting the Liberal party.

There is no democracy, or would-be democracy, anywhere in the world that is less democratic in the degree to which it is manipulated by a small élite and in which the members of the élite, once elected, are so unresponsive to the needs of their constituents. In this sense the Philippines is only partly a democracy. And because it is only partly a democracy, it is very much in danger today.

The sugar-field workers in some parts of the country and the landless peasants of central Luzon are not represented in the government. Many of them voted, of course, but "democracy" ended there as far as they were concerned. Increasingly, they turn to others for political help, and these others are the ever more important Communists (whose ranks are being

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steadily augmented by recent and fervent college graduates). President Marcos's campaign promise of an opening to the left —to legalize Communist political activity so long as it is not revolutionary—could be the beginning of a healthier political situation. The Philippines is a country in which greater polarization would probably be desirable (so concentrated towards one end of the spectrum are Filipino political power, ideology, and interests).

Already Marcos's defeated 1969 opponent, Senator Sergio Osmena, Jr., has accused him of moving towards a dictatorship. The charge is, at the very least, premature. There is a difference between leadership and dictatorship, and Marcos's challenge and opportunity is to take advantage of his newly established position to provide strong leadership. Seven out of eight Nacionalista senatorial candidates were victorious in the voting, and Marcos's party also won 80 per cent of the seats in the 110-member House of Representatives. With control of both houses, Marcos has—in the margin of his party's victory, which was (and is largely recognized as) his victory—unprecedented leverage over the country's lawmakers.

With an administration in being and a third term constitutionally denied him (unless this constitutional restriction is altered next year), Marcos is in a position to move. He can, for example, crack down on those of his countrymen who subvert their nation's future by smuggling, non-payment of taxes (by as much as 50 per cent of the government's due), and illegal exploitation of their countrymen. He can undercut revolutionary forces by embarking on imaginative land-reform or other justice-serving ameliorative measures to help the vast mass of the rural poor. He can further mobilize nationalist sentiment as a springboard to the remaking of the nation—exploiting, if necessary, mounting anti-foreignism (including anti-Americanism) to draw off the fire of spreading revolutionary sentiment. And he can adopt as many of the socially desirable demands of the left as possible, using his large legislative majorities before they dissolve (as ultimately they will).

In this respect the United States can render Marcos no aid at all—except by its non-involvement. For these are purely Filipino matters—and they require only Filipino boldness (and nothing from Americans except their restraint from criticism and alarmist fears).

The high level of education of the Philippine people is a national asset, but the fact that the population is growing at more than three and a half per cent a year, the highest rate in all Asia, is a burden that will pose increasing problems in the immediately upcoming years. The attainment of an impressive six per cent-plus annual economic growth rate is undercut by this population explosion—making the per capita increase less than three per cent. There are today 37 million Filipinos. There will be 42 million before President Marcos's second term expires. More than 45 per cent of today's population, moreover, is under 14, and, while Filipino colleges and universities enroll ever higher numbers of students, employment opportunities are not increasing at a sufficiently rapid rate to accommodate the large number of young persons who are, and will be, seeking jobs. Already unemployment is at least 15 per cent of the working population (and more than a quarter of the adult males living in cities). And it could increase dramatically in the 1970's, as 1,000 new workers a day come on the job market while only one-twelfth as many new jobs are created.

There are many factors underlying the Philippines' problem of growing lawlessness: frustration with the largely unfulfilled promises of the politicians, a growing awareness of widespread social injustice, lack of faith in legal processes (and in the police and other officials who do not themselves abide by those processes), the availability of arms, and, by no means least important, the fact that lawlessness has become a way of life for many Filipinos. The Philippines today has the highest murder rate in all the world. In these related circumstances lies perhaps the greatest challenge of the second Marcos administration: can the rule of law regain past losses to the rule of force?

Marcos will need all the resources he

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can summon to deal with these and other problems: festering Moslem separatism, the growing alienation of youth, and the spread of organized political violence. The question is not one of the need but of the form of his response to the need. New solutions are clearly called for. And never in the history of the Filipino people has a Filipino had the chance to lead that President Marcos will have in the first four years of the 1970's.

The "American Problem"

Essentially, the "American problem" is a Filipino problem. It is a problem of national identity as well as one of relations with the United States and other countries. The Philippines—which has received nearly $2 billion in U.S. assistance since World War II (and regards itself as badly treated)—is far too dependent on United States foreign aid, military spending, purchases of Filipino exports, exchange support, and subsidization of Filipino sugar prices. And the dependence has recently increased in some respects, such as the construction of 18 new sugar mills during the first Marcos administration to take greater advantage of the generous American sugar quota (which has benefitted the Philippines to the extent of $1 billion).

The Philippines also has one of the most developed and vigorous private sectors in all Asia, but it, too, is highly dependent on American firms—which account for half of the 50 biggest companies in the country. Growing Japanese participation in the Philippine economy and persisting overseas Chinese domination of large areas of the local economy—including retailing (despite five years' operation of the law nationalizing retail trade)—diversify the dependence of Filipinos on foreigners economically, but it is debatable whether this means greater independence.

The American problem, however, is also a problem of the defense of the Philippines. The United States spends half again as much on its armed forces in the Philippines as the Filipinos spend on their own military services. American bases in the islands proved highly useful in the Vietnam war, but there are many in the United States who would question the view that the Vietnam war was essential to the defense of their country. Moreover, if the bases are not acceptable to the Filipino people, they are of limited value to either the United States or the Philippines. And they will be increasingly unacceptable in the 1970's if the United States does not move—and promptly—to deal with Filipinos as equals in the complicated military relationship between the two countries (and not unnecessarily irritate Filipinos and their government by such difficult-to-defend behavior as failure to return to Philippine jurisdiction, as requested by President Marcos, unused land at 130,000-acre Clark Air Force Base, the second largest U.S. Air Force facility in the world). Acts like mistaking a Filipino for a "wild boar"—and shooting him—cannot be tolerated by a proud people. Yet this is what one U.S. serviceman did, and he was acquitted by an American court martial. Little wonder that Filipinos are unhappy with the provisions of the bases agreement that relate to jurisdiction over crimes committed by American servicemen!

American bases in the Philippines should not be abandoned by the United States, however—or their removal requested by the Filipinos—until it is clear to both parties what arrangements will succeed them. The United States has long been committed to the defense of the Philippines—both by treaty, passed by its Senate, and as a result of the repeated pledges of a series of Presidents and Secretaries of State. If these pledges can be redeemed only as a result of U.S. retention of its bases in the Philippines, such bases should be retained as long as the Filipinos want them, but they should not be held one day longer. The Philippines has already requested the return of the minor Sangley Point Naval Air Station—which, however, remains in U.S. hands.

On the other hand, the bases, as currently operated and unilaterally manned, may not be the only way the United States can honor its commitments to the Philippines and may even discourage the Philip-

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pine government from shouldering a larger share of the responsibility for defense of the country. The level of persisting Filipino defense dependency on the United States—apart from American operation of the main military bases in the country—was suggested in the testimony before the Symington subcommittee on U.S. foreign commitments. The United States in 1969 was providing more than 80 per cent of the operating costs of 22 F-5 jet fighters it had earlier given the Philippines and had spent almost $10 million in recent years for the purchase of "consumables" (such as ammunition and gasoline, among other items) that the Philippine government just stopped buying altogether.

American bases in the Philippines should not be continued indefinitely just because they have seemed useful for several years—during which time this utility was never fully evaluated. If they no longer serve their former purposes for political or other reasons, they should be terminated completely and quickly (though with due consultations and presumably some compensation for the approximately $150 million in income paid annually to Filipino employees of the American services in the Philippines). It is possible that Filipino-American agreement to reduce, otherwise alter, or eliminate the U.S. military presence in the islands could prove a spur to regional military cooperation among the countries of the area. This will not come quickly, however, and it may not occur at all. But, if a start is to be made, the time for decision—and perhaps a little boldness—is now.

There are other ways, too, in which the Philippines can reduce the impact of the persisting but unnatural influence of once stepmother America. There is no reason at all why the Philippines should not trade as much as it profitably can with any of the Communist countries, including China. There is also no reason why Manila and Moscow—and perhaps even Peking—should not exchange diplomatic representatives. Nor is there any reason why the Philippines should not swap its 70-year-old dependence on distant America for more intimate ties with other countries in its own part of the world (which have been, and will remain, suspicious of the Filipino as long as he remains so self-consciously dependent in various ways upon the United States). Friendship with the United States is not only possible in such altered circumstances; it is much more likely to last.

Anticipating Two Explosions

The Philippines should have experienced two violent outbursts by this point in its post-colonial history. These may still occur. The question is whether their aims can be attained in any other way.

The first likely explosion is an internal one. Social justice does not exist in the Philippines and may be more thwarted today than at any time since the return of independence in 1946. Filipino political leaders—at least up to Marcos—have not been responsive to the needs of most of their countrymen, which is why no President was ever before re-elected. If Marcos does not head off the revolution by otherwise accomplishing some of its aims, it probably will not be long delayed.

The second imminent outburst would destroy different dimensions of the persisting American presence—if the Americans do not beat the gun, so to speak, by reducing their presence before such an explosion. The United States put much into the Philippines, but it obtained a fair return from its investment, however one defines it (economically, militarily, or politically). Americans may pretend that the 1970's are still the 1940's or the 1950's, the first years of resumed Filipino independence, if they wish to do so. But if they do, they will be making no less a mistake than if President Marcos failed to recognize the altered dimension—and character—of Filipino revolutionary forces in the years since 1950, 1960, or even 1965, the year of his first election.

If there were ever a time for boldness in redirecting Filipino political, economic, and social life—and in redefining Philippine-American relations—that time is now. If there is no boldness, the decade of the Seventies could be disastrous—particularly for the élite that has governed the Philippines for so long.■

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

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